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ABSTRACT 
Three Essays on Financial Restatements 
Ying Zhang, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2012 
 
This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay (chapter two) examines the impact of 
Canadian financial restatements on market quality. We find that Canadian financial restatements 
announced during 1997-2006 signal to market participants that expected future cash flows and 
their uncertainty are diminished and increased, respectively, and that they affect the market 
quality for restating firms. Abnormal returns are not only related to downward revisions in the 
consensus earnings forecasts of analysts but they become more negative for firms cross-listed in 
the U.S., and for revenue recognition and company-initiated restatements. Total residual volatility 
and its information-based permanent component from a GARCH model with an asymmetric 
effect and the adverse selection spread component increase following such announcements. 
Relative spreads and a spread-depth market-quality index not only increase (decrease) following 
such announcements but are lower (higher) for firms cross-listed in the U.S. Relative spreads 
(unlike the market-quality index) remain higher post-announcement, and are lower after the 2002 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Relative spreads, Amihud illiquidity estimates, 
synchronicity and volatilities increase for revenue recognition restatements. 
 The second essay (chapter three) examines the link between Canadian financial restatements 
and corporate governance. Using a novel, hand-collected dataset of corporate governance 
characteristics for a matched sample of 177 restating and 177 control firms, we find that Canadian 
firms are less likely to restate when they have bigger blockholder and management ownerships, 
audit committees with at least one director with financial expertise, a lower leverage ratio, and 
when they use a big 5 auditor.  Restatement likelihood is not related to the proportion of unrelated 
directors, and whether the CEO is the Board Chair or belongs to the founding family. CEO, 
President, CFO and external auditor turnover are significantly higher for restating firms compared 
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to control firms over the two years following restatement announcements, but not for the turnover 
of the Board Chair, unrelated directors and audit committee members. The passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley did not strength the disciplinary actions against management. After controlling for other 
determinants of turnover and restatement severity, the sensitivities of CEO, top executives and 
CFO turnovers to restatements do not increase in the post-SOX period. The number and 
proportion of unrelated directors, unrelated audit committee members and blockholder ownership 
increase in the two years post-restatement. The insignificant difference in the governance 
characteristics of restating and control firms post-restatement is consistent with the notion that 
restating firms attempt to move their governance to the norm and restore their reputation after 
restatement announcements.   
 The third essay (chapter four) examines the link between Canadian financial restatements and 
executive compensation. Using a novel, hand-collected dataset of executive compensation for a 
matched sample of 146 restating and 146 control firms, we do not find that firms are more likely 
to restate their financial statements when the sensitivity of total, vested and unvested option 
values, and in-the-money-stock options are higher for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. Incentives 
from equity, restricted stocks and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the 
incidence of restatements for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. The total, vested and unvested 
option sensitivities are not related to the incidence of restatements due to accounting malfeasance. 
Except for the equity holdings of CEOs, restricted stock, equity holdings and long-term incentive 
payouts are not associated with the likelihood of restatements due to accounting malfeasance for 
top executives, CEOs and CFOs. The option sensitivities for top executives, CEOs and CFOs 
have no effect on the size of the restatements. The incentives from restricted stock are related to 
the size of restatements for top executives, CEOs and CFOs, and higher CFO equity holdings are 
related to larger restatements. Restating firms do not raise more long-term debt and equity capital 
in order to reduce the cost of external financing. Top executives and CEOs exercise more options 
during the first year restated when the magnitudes of the restatements are larger. 
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When a firm’s previous reported financial results contain errors, there is the need to restate 
the financial statements. Financial restatements by publicly traded companies have increased 
significantly in recent years both in the U.S and Canada. According to the United States 
Government Accountability Office (formerly the United States General Accounting Office or 
GAO), restatements due to accounting irregularities grew about 145 percent from January 1997 to 
June 2002, and 67 percent from 2002 to September 2005. In Canada, the number of firms listed 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) that restated their financial results due to irregularities 
increased from 1 in 1997 to 56 in 2006. One example of a financial restatement by a Canadian 
firm is Nortel Networks Corporation. On October 23, 2003, Nortel announced that it intended to 
restate its financial results for 2000, 2001 and 2002 and the first and second quarters of 2003, as a 
result of its comprehensive asset and liability review. The restatements, which were primarily 
related to the elimination of liabilities of approximately US $900 million, were partially offset by 
a reduction in net deferred income tax of approximately US$160 million. 
Firms can restate their financial statements for reasons such as discontinued operations, stock 
splits, merger and acquisitions, changes in reporting currency or changes in accounting principles. 
These types of restatements represent normal corporate activities and should not have any 
material impact on firm value due to accounting irregularity. In this thesis, we only study the 
financial restatements due to accounting irregularities according to the definition of the GAO 
(2002, 2006); i.e., “accounting irregularity is an instance in which a company restates its financial 
statements because they were not fairly presented in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). This would include material errors and fraud”. 
In this thesis, we address three topics related to financial restatements. The second chapter 
(first essay) examines the event impact on returns, risks and market quality due to financial 
restatement disclosures. Financial restatements potentially may send two signals to market 
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participants. The first signal deals with the firm’s future earnings prospects and the second signal 
deals with the quality of the firm’s management team and information systems. If the second 
signal is not material, then there should be a one-time adjustment in price and the earnings 
forecasts of analysts with no change in the uncertainty of future cash flows (as reflected in the 
permanent component of return volatilities and spreads, or the dispersion in the forecasts of 
analysts). If the second signal is also material, then there also should be a change in the 
uncertainty of future cash flows.  
In contrast to the impact on equity prices of restatement announcements, the impacts on 
market quality (such as risk, liquidity, volatility and informational asymmetry) have received 
little attention in the literature. To address this shortcoming, we analyze the changes in the 
following measures around restatement announcements: (i) liquidity from a multivariate 
perspective; (ii) the asymmetric spread component, (iii) (un)informed trader arrival rates and the 
probability of trading with an informed trader, (iv) the temporary and permanent components of 
the volatilities of residual returns; and (v) the synchronicity of stock prices. We also assess the 
impact of being cross-listed or of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 on 
restatement announcements. 
Our findings support the hypothesis that financial restatements send two information signals 
to market participants. The first signal is that the future earnings prospects of the restating firms 
are diminished. Consistent with the literature, Canadian restatements are associated with 
significant downward revisions in the consensus forecasts of earnings and significant negative 
abnormal returns. The second signal is that the uncertainty of future cash flows of the restating 
firms due to increased informational asymmetry has increased. We find that relative quoted and 
effective spreads increase in the restatement announcement window and remain elevated after the 
restatement announcements. Both spread measures are lower for firms that are cross-listed in the 
U.S., and for financial restatement announcements after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002. We also find that the adverse selection and order processing components of the spread 
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increase and decrease, respectively, following restatement announcements. Both uninformed and 
informed trading increase following restatement announcements.  The probability of informed 
trading only increases significantly for cost or expense restatements. The results also indicate that 
both the long-run component and total volatility (jump risk) increases are associated with 
restatement announcements. Using the R2 from a basic return-generating model, we find higher 
levels of synchronicity following the restatement announcements, and especially for the 
securities-related subsample.  
In the third chapter (second essay), we examine the relation between corporate governance 
characteristics and the likelihood of restatement. We are interested in determining whether certain 
governance characteristics are associated with the incidence of financial restatements. Good 
corporate governance is central to the effective and efficient operation of the corporation and it 
plays a significant role in protecting shareholders’ interests and maximizing shareholder value. 
There have been significant developments in corporate governance following corporate frauds, 
such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S. and approval of National 
Instrument 58-101, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, and National Policy 58-201, 
Corporate Governance Guidelines in Canada. However, the literature provides mixed results on 
the consequences of financial fraud.  
We build on the literature by examining the consequences of restatement announcements on 
unrelated directors, audit committees, and external auditors in addition to top executives and 
CFOs. In addition, Canada provides an ideal alternative laboratory for examining the impact of 
corporate restatements on corporate governance given its similarities and differences with the U.S. 
Both countries share similar legal, institutional and regulatory environments, including corporate 
governance mechanisms and minority shareholder protections but not regulatory enforcement. 
However, Canadian public companies differ from their U.S. counterparts in that the percentages 
of Canadian public firms with controlling shareholders (concentrated ownership), families as the 
ultimate controlling shareholders, and issued restricted or subordinated voting shares and 
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pyramidal structures are higher (e.g., Gadhoum et al., 2005; Gadhoum, 2006; King and Santor, 
2008).  
Our findings suggest that the likelihood of restatement is lower when a firm’s audit 
committee includes at least one director with financial expertise. In addition, firms are less likely 
to restate when they have bigger blockholder and management ownerships, a lower leverage ratio, 
and when their external auditor is one of the big 5 auditors. However, there is no evidence that 
firms are more likely to restate when they have a lower proportion of unrelated directors, or their 
CEO is also the Board Chair or belongs to the founding family. Given the negative impact of 
financial restatements we find in the first essay, we are also interested in the consequences of 
financial restatements to the executives at restating firms. We find that the market punishes the 
firms misstating their financial results since the CEO, President, CFO and external auditor 
turnovers are significantly higher for restating firms compared to control firms within the two 
years following restatement announcements. However, we do not find that restatement 
announcements are related to higher turnovers of the Board Chair, unrelated directors and audit 
committee members.  
Because our sample covers 1997-2006, it provides a natural experiment to examine whether 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 enhances the accountability of 
management for financial reporting. The results suggest that the market does not punish the firm 
more severely after the passage of SOX since the sensitivity of CEO, top executives and CFO 
turnovers to restatements do not increase in the post-SOX period.  
Given all the consequences for restating firms, we ask the next question: did those firms try to 
improve their governance to restore their reputations or to regain the confidence of their investors? 
The results indicate that restating firms attempt to improve their governance since the number and 
proportion of unrelated directors and unrelated audit committee members as well as blockholder 
ownership increase by two years after the restatement announcements. In addition, the 
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governance characteristics of restating firms become not significantly different from control firms 
following the restatement announcements.  
 Prior studies on stock-based compensation can be categorized into two streams. One stream 
of the literature argues that using equity compensation aligns the interests of managers and 
shareholders so that the agency costs are reduced (Smith and Watts, 1992; Baber et al., 1996; 
Core et al., 2003). Another stream of the literature argues that equity compensation provides 
incentives for managers to manipulate financial results to gain short-run benefits (Bar-Gill and 
Bebchuk, 2003; Jensen, 2005; Goldman and Slezak, 2006). We are interested in the reason why 
firms misreport their financial results from the perspective of stock compensation.  
 In the fourth chapter (third essay), we addresses the link between executive compensation and 
the likelihood of financial restatements.  We extend the previous studies by examining whether 
the incentives from stock options, restricted stocks, equity holdings and the long-term incentive 
payouts for top executives (including CEOs and CFOs) are associated with a higher likelihood of 
restatement. The results show that firms are not more likely to restate their financial statements 
when the sensitivity of total, vested and unvested option values and values of in-the-money stock 
options are higher for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. Incentives from equity, restricted stocks 
and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the incidence of restatements for top 
executives, CEOs and CFOs. We find that total, vested and unvested option sensitivities are not 
related to the incidence of restatements due to accounting malfeasance, i.e., prompted by 
regulators or auditors. Except for the equity holdings of CEOs, restricted stock, equity holdings 
and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the likelihood of restatements due to 
accounting malfeasance for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. The results also suggest that option 
sensitivities for top executives, CEOs and CFOs have no effect on the size of the restatements. In 
addition, we do not find any evidence that firms raising more long-term debt and equity capital 
are more likely to misreport financial results in order to reduce the cost of external financing. 
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However, top executives and CEOs exercise more options during the first year restated when the 
magnitudes of the restatements are larger. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS BY CANADIAN FIRMS CROSS-LISTED AND NOT 
CROSS-LISTED IN THE U.S. 
 
 2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The regulation of financial reporting by public companies is shaped principally by three 
interrelated considerations of materiality, accuracy and cost. In an efficient market, stock prices 
and their return moments (e.g., mean and standard deviation) reflect the available information set 
(e.g., Fama, 1991; Ross, 1989), including misinformation or misrepresentations that are currently 
unknown to market participants. When a financial restatement or other corrective disclosure 
occurs to correct previously reported information that was inaccurate or misleading and 
unforeseen by firm outsiders, we expect such disclosures to result in event risk which may affect 
prices, market microstructure (including spreads and (un)informed trading), and the return 
moments (and their components) of the restating public company. The magnitudes and directions 
of these effects are expected to depend on the materiality of the correction (as shown by, e.g., 
Kryzanowski (1978, 1979) for expected returns for material corporate disclosures, including 
misinformation, in a Canadian context). 
 The evidence reported herein supports the conjecture that financial restatements affect the 
market quality (as reflected in spreads and/or depths) for restating firms and that they send two 
signals to market participants. The first signal deals with the firm’s future earnings prospects and 
the second signal deals with the quality of the firm’s management team and information systems. 
If the second signal is not material, then there should be a one-time adjustment in price and the 
earnings forecasts of analysts with no change in the uncertainty of future cash flows (as reflected 
in the permanent components of return volatilities and spreads, or the dispersion in the forecasts 
of analysts). If the second signal is also material, then there also should be a change in the 
perceived uncertainty of future cash flows associated with a financial restatement. 
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A body of research (reviewed in the next section) that is primarily focused on U.S. firms 
analyzes the equity price impact of financial restatements by publicly traded firms. This literature 
finds a negative relation between abnormal returns estimated using traditional return-generating 
models and financial restatement announcements, with abnormal returns ranging from -4% to -12% 
(e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Turner et al., 2001; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Wu, 2002; Palmrose et 
al., 2004).  In contrast to the impact on equity prices of restatement announcements, the impacts 
on risk, liquidity, volatility and informational asymmetry have received little attention in the 
literature. Notable exceptions include the studies by Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Palmrose et 
al. (2004) who do and do not respectively find a significant increase in spreads for revenue-
recognition restatements.   
To our knowledge, no published studies examine changes in the following measures around 
restatement announcements: (i) liquidity from a multivariate perspective; (ii) the asymmetric 
spread component, (iii) (un)informed trader arrival rates and the probability of trading with an 
informed trader, (iv) the temporary and permanent components of the volatilities of residual 
returns; and (v) the synchronicity of stock prices. Furthermore, no study has examined financial 
restatements from a Canadian perspective or examined the impact of being cross-listed or of the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 to further test the robustness of inferences 
drawn from primarily U.S. restatement announcements. 
To address these issues, this paper examines a large sample of financial restatement 
announcements by Canadian firms over the period of 1997-2006 whose stocks are listed on the 
TSX. This time period coincides with the time period included in the GAO database to facilitate 
cross-market comparisons and embeds the enactment of SOX in 2002. Furthermore, about one-
third of our sample consists of firms that are cross-listed in the U.S.
1
 Thus, our study contributes 
to the existing literature by analyzing various previously unexplored aspects of market quality, 
                                                             
1
 Findings suggest that being cross-listed (Charitou et al., 2007) or becoming cross-listed (Leil and Miller, 
2008) is associated with better corporate governance. 
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informational asymmetry and uncertainty around restatement announcements for domestic-only 
and cross-listed firms. We also assess the impact on spreads of the enactment of SOX in 2002 that 
introduced sweeping changes to the corporate governance and disclosure obligations of domestic 
companies publicly traded on U.S. markets.  While adherence to SOX was voluntary for foreign 
firms with fiscal years prior to July 15, 2006, Anand et al. (2012) find that Canadian firms 
voluntarily adopted U.S. standards (SOX) rather than Canadian guidelines, regardless of their 
cross-listed status and ownership structure. This was based on an analysis of the adoption of 
corporate governance standards by firms included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index over the 
five-year period 1999-2003. 
Our univariate findings are consistent with U.S. findings by Anderson and Yohn (2002) in 
that relative effective (and extended to quoted) spreads increase for Canadian restatement 
announcements associated with revenue recognition problems. We extend examinations of U.S. 
restatements to depths and find that market depths decrease (but only significantly based on the 
medians) for such restatement announcements.  When we control for spread determinants already 
identified in the literature (such as price, volume and volatility) in a multivariate setting, we find 
that relative quoted and effective spreads increase in the restatement announcement window for 
the full sample and remain elevated post-restatement announcement. We also find that both 
spread measures are lower as expected for the one-third of our sample that are cross-listed in the 
U.S., and for financial restatement announcements after the enactment of SOX in 2002. Using the 
market quality index suggested by Bollen and Whaley (1998) to capture the effects of financial 
restatements on both dimensions of liquidity, we find market quality is lower in the restatement 
announcement window. 
We investigate the links between restatements and informativeness of stock prices by 
examining the behavior of the spread components around the announcements using the 
decomposition models of Madhavan et al. (1997) and Glosten and Harris (1988). We find that the 
adverse selection and order processing components of the spread increase and decrease, 
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respectively, following restatement announcements. These changes in the full sample are mainly 
attributable to the revenue recognition, and cost or expense subsamples. We also find increases in 
both uninformed and informed trading following restatement announcements. However, we find 
no effects of restatement announcements on the probability of new information events as well as 
on the probability of informed trade (PIN) based on the market microstructure sequential trade 
model developed by Easley et al. (1996). This is not inconsistent with the information asymmetry 
hypothesis that restatement announcements lead to increased information asymmetry. The reason 
is that the arrival rates of informed and uninformed traders increase significantly in such a 
manner that with an unchanged probability of future information events that the PIN does not 
change significantly. However, we find that the probability of informed trading increases 
significantly for cost or expense restatements. This suggests an increase in information 
asymmetry for such restatements. 
Duarte and Young (2009) show that the PIN component related to asymmetric information is 
not priced, while the PIN component of illiquidity that is unrelated to information asymmetry 
explains the relation between the PIN and expected returns. We find that buy orders are more 
volatile than sell orders and the correlations between buyer- and seller-initiated trades are positive 
for both the pre- and post-restatement periods except for the fifth percentile of the mean. 
Therefore our results provide supportive evidence for Duarte and Young (2009) since the PIN 
model developed by Easley et al. (1996) cannot explain the pervasive positive correlation 
between buy and sell orders and the high variances found in the data. 
We perform analysis of the effects of restatement announcements on the earnings forecast 
revisions of analysts. Consistent with Palmrose et al. (2004), we find a significant downward 
revision in the consensus forecasts of earnings by analysts after restatement announcements, 
which suggest that these announcements have a material unanticipated component from the 
perspective of financial analysts. We find no significant changes in either analyst following or the 
dispersion of their forecasts of earnings. 
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Consistent with the literature, we find a significant negative abnormal return (AR) associated 
with Canadian restatement announcements using a dual-beta market model. The cross-sectional 
regression analysis indicates that more negative Ars are associated with firms cross-listed in the 
U.S., and for restatements involving revenue recognition problems and those initiated by the 
company as they signal negative information about a firm’s future prospects and/or earnings 
quality. Ars are significantly and positively related to the revisions in the earnings forecasts of 
analysts over the restatement announcements, which implies that earnings revisions are a driver 
of the Ars and that the restatements are a driver of the revisions in the earnings forecasts of 
analysts. We find no evidence that changes in illiquidity or the sizes of the restating firms help to 
explain abnormal returns.  
We examine the impact of corporate restatement announcements on the information-based 
permanent or long-run component and the transitory noise-trading-induced or short-run 
component of the residual volatility of returns.
 
The full residual volatility model uses the 
component GARCH or CGARCH model of Engle and Lee (1993, 1999) with (out) an 
asymmetric effect on residual volatility of shocks to returns, as in Glosten et al. (1993). The 
results indicate that increases in both the long-run component and total volatility (jump risk) are 
associated with restatement announcements.  
When combined with the liquidity findings, these volatility results provide support for the 
hypothesis that restatement announcements lead to deterioration in market quality. Based on the 
Amihud et al. (1986, 2001) argument that greater liquidity should lower the cost of capital for a 
firm, we surmise (but do not test) that restatement announcements increase the firm’s cost of 
capital. 
Our study also contributes to the literature that examines measures of the incorporation of 
firm-specific information into security prices. Using the R2 from a basic return-generating model, 
we find higher levels of synchronicity (i.e., relatively less firm-specific information being 
impounded into stock prices) following the restatement announcements, and especially for the 
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securities-related subsample. While Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) suggest that the proportion of 
zero returns is a better measure of synchronicity, we find that this metric increases significantly in 
the post restatement period only for firms associated with revenue recognition problems. These 
results provide evidence that the zero-return metric is a competitive alternative measure of the 
relative contribution of firm-specific information to the variation of stock returns.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The hypotheses are developed in 
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discusses the data and our sample selection. The methodology and results 
for the impact of restatement announcements are presented and analyzed in sections 2.4, 2.5 and 
2.6 for their impacts on liquidity, asymmetric information and consensus expectations, 
respectively. Section 2.7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 HYPOTHESES 
 It is well established in the literature that shareholders in firms who announce earnings 
restatements earn negative abnormal returns. The United States Government Accountability 
Office  (formerly the United States General Accounting Office or GAO) reports that the market 
capitalization of restating companies decreased by $100 billion and by $36 billion in the days 
surrounding restatement announcements in 2002 and 2006, respectively. Restatements involving 
cost or expense-related issues produced greater dollar losses in 2002, while restatements 
involving revenue issues, financial report fraud, and/or accounting errors led to greater market 
losses in 2006. Restatements are associated with an increase in the firm’s cost of equity (Hribar 
and Jenkins, 2004) and debt (Graham et al., 2008). Li and Zhang (2006) find strong evidence of 
profitable insider trading surrounding restatement announcements, especially prior to the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Two papers obtain mixed results for changes in bid-ask spreads around restatement 
announcements. Anderson and Yohn (2002) find a significant increase in spreads for revenue-
recognition restatements. Palmrose et al. (2004) do not find significant spread increases for their 
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full and revenue-recognition samples.
2
   We extend their analysis by examining other proxies of 
market liquidity (such as effective spreads, dollar volumes and dollar depths) and a measure of 
market quality that examines the net effects on spreads and depths. Our first hypothesis, stated in 
its alternative form, is as follows: 
 
1 :AH Market liquidity and quality decreases following the restatement announcements. 
Financial restatements can impact both the permanent (adverse selection) and transitory 
(order processing) spread components. The permanent component will decrease (increase) if 
restatement announcements reduce (increase) informational asymmetry, and the temporary 
component will decrease (increase) if restatement announcements increase (decrease) trading 
volume. We expect increases and decreases in respectively the permanent and transitory 
components post-announcement. Therefore, the second hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, 
is as follows: 
 
2 :AH  The permanent and temporary spread components respectively increase and decrease 
following the restatement announcements. 
We further analyze the changes in information asymmetry around restatement 
announcements by examining the probability of informed trading (PIN) using the model 
developed by Easley et al. (1996). The expected effect of restatement announcements on PIN is 
indeterminate since it depends on changes in the probability of information events (α) and in the 
arrival rates of both informed and uninformed traders (μ and ε). While a reduction in α is 
expected as analysts turn private information into public information by attracting more analysts 
to the announcing firms (Easley et al., 2001), an increase in α is expected if analysts fulfill their 
role of creating new private information (Easley et al., 1998). The effect of changes in the arrival 
                                                             
2
 Anderson and Yohn (2002) examine time-weighted median absolute quoted spreads, while Palmrose et al. 
(2004) examine relative quoted spreads (i.e., the closing absolute quoted spread divided by the share price 
on day -2 relative to the restatement announcement). 
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rates (μ and ε) depends upon their net effect on the pool of active (un)informed traders and their 
trade behaviors. Therefore, the third hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows: 
3 :AH  The change in the probability of informed trading following the restatement 
announcements is indeterminate.  
 Palmrose et al. (2004) interpret a downward revision in the mean and an increase in the 
dispersion of the earnings forecasts of analysts following restatements as evidence of diminished 
firm prospects.  In contrast to Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Wu (2002) who find a decrease in 
the response of prices to earnings disclosures following restatements, Wilson (2008) finds that 
concerns about post-restatement earnings are only transitory, and investors regain confidence 
within a short period of time following restatements. If financial restatement announcements are 
totally unexpected events, they should result in downward revisions in the consensus expectations 
about the prospects of announcing firms and indeterminate changes in the dispersion of such 
expectations depending on whether the announcements cause a divergence or convergence of 
perceptions on what has happened to informational asymmetry. Accordingly, our fourth 
hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is: 
 
4 :AH  The consensus earnings forecasts of analysts decline and the changes in the dispersion 
of their forecasts are indeterminate after financial restatement announcements. 
Callen et al. (2006) conjecture that the three factors that may affect the market reaction to 
financial restatements are the downward revision of future cash flow expectations, weakness in 
the accounting information system and opportunistic managerial behavior as evidenced by 
reporting higher profits than warranted. They find that market reactions are significantly negative 
when all three factors are present, and are not significant when alone or more factors are absent. . 
Unlike Callen et al. (2006), we exclude restatements due to changes in accounting principles 
because we are only interested in the restatements that are associated with accounting fraud or 
errors. We argue that Canadian restatement announcements, similar to those in the U.S., lead to a 
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lowering of consensus expectations about firm prospects, which in turn, are manifested in 
negative abnormal returns (Ars) that depend upon the reasons provided for the restatements. To 
illustrate, Anderson and Yohn (2002) argue that restatements due to revenue recognition 
problems are perceived as being more intentional than restatements due to expense problems and 
more important because revenue generation is the key to firm value. Ertimur et al. (2003) find 
that investors react differently to revenue and expense surprises because revenue surprises are 
more persistent, easier to manage and less noisy than expense surprises.
3
 Therefore, the fifth 
hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows: 
5 :AH  Significant negative abnormal returns are associated with restatement announcements, 
with those involving recognition problems being more negative. 
Studies for the impacts of other corporate events, such as stock splits (Dubofsky, 1991; 
Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1993; Desai et al., 1998), find that volatility changes follow that event. 
For example, Desai et al. (1998) find that both the transitory and permanent components of 
volatility increase after the split, which is consistent with an increase in the number of both 
informed and noise traders following the split. To our knowledge, no such study assesses the 
impact of restatement announcements on the components of volatility. Previous studies find that 
return variances are positively related to bid-ask spreads (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987), so we 
propose the sixth hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, as: 
6 :AH  Both the transitory and permanent components of volatility increase following 
restatement announcements.  
Morck et al. (2000) and Durnev et al. (2003) suggest that stock price synchronicity or the 
extent to which stock prices move together reflects the firm-specific information impounded in 
stock prices. Although different measures of synchronicity exist in the literature (Jin and Myers, 
                                                             
3 Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006) also find significant abnormal returns after earnings announcements for 
stocks that are involved with large revenue surprises. 
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2006), the most popular is R2.  Higher values of R2 all else held equal indicate lower idiosyncratic 
volatility (Roll, 1988).  Durnev et al. (2003) find that lower firm-specific (idiosyncratic) price 
variation as measured by a higher R2 is associated with prices that are less informative about 
future earnings. Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find that stock price synchronicity measured by R
2
 
does not consistently capture the variation of firm-specific information for international markets. 
They provide evidence that a zero-return metric based on Lesmond et al. (1999) is a better 
measure of firm-specific information embedded in stock prices.
4
 Thus, a bigger proportion of 
zero returns implies that relatively less firm-specific information is impounded into stock prices 
(i.e., greater return synchronicity). 
Restatement announcements are major information events that signal that the firm-specific 
information embedded in pre-restatement prices was of lower reliability (or quality) for a variety 
of reasons, and are more likely to have had an adverse impact on price synchronicity. Thus, we 
expect price synchronicity to increase after the restatement announcements. Therefore, our 
seventh and final hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is: 
7 :AH Stock price synchronicity increases after financial restatement announcements.  
 
2.3 SAMPLE AND DATA  
Restatement announcements of Canadian companies are identified using searches of Lexis-
Nexis News Wires for the ten-year period from January 1997 to December 2006. Key word 
searches are performed using “restate,” “restates,” “restated,” “restating,” or “restatement” as 
well as other variations such as “adjust” and “amend” and “revise” within 50 words of “financial 
statement” or “earnings.” Restatement announcements are excluded if they result from 
                                                             
4
 Based on the argument that the marginal investor will only trade if the value of the information signal 
exceeds transaction costs, Lesmond et al. (1999) use the proportion of zero-return trading days over a year 
as being indicative of the cost of trading.  
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discontinued operations, stock splits, stock dividends, mergers and acquisitions,
5
 changes in 
business segment definition, changes made for presentation purposes, and changes in currency of 
reporting (for example, converting from Canadian to U.S. dollars). Restatements due to changes 
in accounting policy also are excluded as a general rule because they represent normal corporate 
activities which do not involve accounting fraud or errors.
6
 Restatements are classified into one or 
more of the nine categories described in Appendix 2.1 based on the GAO (2002, 2006) 
classification. The restatement initiator is also identified for each announcement.  
Our initial sample consists of 365 restatement announcements.  Restatements are eliminated 
for 134 firms listed on the TSX Venture Exchange, Alberta Stock Exchange, Vancouver Stock 
Exchange, and Canadian Dealing Network due to the unavailability of intraday data, six firms 
with insufficient daily stock returns and closing prices in the Canadian Financial Markets 
Research Center (CFMRC) database, four firms with simultaneous trading halts and subsequent 
delistings, and those firms with multiple restatement announcements during the 250 trading days 
used for analysis purposes. This results in a final sample of 210 restatements by 193 firms. Daily 
S&P/TSX Composite Index (formerly TSE 300 Composite Index) returns are also drawn from the 
CFMRC database. The daily one-month Canadian T-bills rate (risk-free proxy) is collected from 
the Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System (CANSIM II). Quoted closing 
mid-spreads are used as the proxies for any missing closing prices in the tests requiring returns.  
 Intraday data obtained from the TSX Trade and Quote database during exchange hours of 
9:30 to 16:00 are included. Trades that are opening trades, delayed delivery, cancellation or have 
                                                             
5
 For example, a firm restates its financial statements after completion of a merger where the merger was 
accounted for as a pooling of interests.  
6
We exclude firms adopting new accounting recommendations by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or the Emerging Issues Task Force 
(EITF). However, we include restatement announcements resulting from SEC clarifications of revenue 
recognition in financial statements (SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101) and lease accounting for 
operating lease (Feb.7, 2005, letter from SEC’s Chief Accountant to American Institute of Certified Public 
Accounts clarifying SEC staff's interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application under 
GAAP relating to operating leases). To our knowledge, there are no restatements resulting from changes in 
Canadian regulations. 
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special terms are excluded. To eliminate potential errors, trades with trade-by-trade returns 
greater than 50% and quotes with bid-ask spreads greater than 30% of their mid-spreads are also 
excluded.  
Summary characteristics for the restatement announcements in the final sample differentiated 
by the reason for the restatement, the party initiating the restatement, industry groups based on 
primary two-digit SIC codes and distribution of restatements by year are reported in Table 2.1. 
Because some firms report multiple reasons for their restatements, the total number of reasons 
reported in Panel A exceeds the total sample size. Cost or expense is the most common reason 
(25.7%), followed by other (21.3%) and revenue recognition (16.5%). The frequencies differ 
from those reported for U.S. restatements (e.g., Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004; 
Hribar and Jenkins, 2004), where revenue recognition is the largest restatement category. Based 
on Panel B of Table 2.1, the initiators are unknown for 42.9% of the reinstatements, followed by 
company-initiated restatements for 33.3% of the reinstatements. Based on Panel C of Table 1, 31% 
of the firms are in manufacturing, followed by 24.8 % and 18.6% of the firms in mining and 
services, respectively. Based on Panel D of Table 2, the number of restatements has increased 
significantly from one in 1997 to 56 in 2006.  
[Please insert table 2.1 about here.] 
 
2.4 LIQUIDITY EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS 
2.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
 We examine various liquidity measures to test the first hypothesis that market liquidity is 
expected to decrease following restatement announcements. The relative quoted spread is 
measured as the quoted spread divided by the spread midpoint, and the relative effective spread is 
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measured as the effective spread divided by its midpoint.
7
   Dollar volume is share volume times 
the corresponding price for each trade. Dollar depth is the sum of the ask price times ask size and 
the bid price times bid size for each quote. Chung et al. (2010) argue that corporate governance 
can affect both the spread and depth simultaneously, and therefore a measure that captures both 
dimensions of liquidity is required. They use a measure called the market quality index that was 
proposed by Bollen and Whaley (1998). This measure is defined as the ratio of the average 
quoted depth to the relative quoted spread. We also use this market quality index. 
 Since these measures of illiquidity rely on the availability of microstructure data, Amihud 
(2002) proposes a measure of illiquidity that is readily available over long periods for most 
markets, called ILLIQ. It is equal to the average ratio of the daily absolute return to its daily dollar 
volume over some multi-day period. We employ this measure of illiquidity to examine the price 
impact of order flow.  
 
2.4.2 Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Market Liquidity 
 The literature reports that spreads are positively related to volatility and negatively related to 
price and volume (e.g., Copeland and Galai, 1983). Thus, we estimate the following pooled cross 
sectional time series regression to isolate the changes in spreads due to financial restatements 


















    (2.1) 
In (2.1), t=1 represents the pre-restatement period [-55, -10], t=2 represents the post-restatement 
period [10, 55] and t=3 represents the three-day event window [0, 2].  LnSpreadit is the natural 
logarithm of average relative quoted or effective spreads for stock i during window t. 
                                                             
7 We also examine the quoted spread which is the difference between the ask and bid prices, and the 
effective spread which is defined as twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and 
the prevailing quote midpoint. Significant results are reported hereafter in the footnotes. 
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LnMarket_quality_indexit is the natural logarithm of the market quality index for stock i during 
window t. LnPriceit , LnVolumeit and LnVolatilityit  are the natural logarithms of average daily 
closing prices, daily trading share volumes and standard deviations of daily returns for stock i 
over each of the three windows, respectively. The dummy variable Crosslisti, which is equal to 
one if stock i is cross-listed and zero otherwise, is included since one third of our sample firms 
are cross-listed in the U.S. Sarbanesi is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the financial 
restatement for firm i is announced after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 
2002 and zero otherwise. Post-restatementi is a dummy variable that is equal to one in the post-
restatement announcement period and zero otherwise. Restate is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one in the three-day event window [0, 2] and zero otherwise. 
 
2.4.3 Empirical Results 
 The estimates of the spreads (quoted and effective), quoted dollar depths, dollar volumes, the 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and market quality index around the restatement 
announcements for the full sample are reported in Table 2.2. The pre- and post-restatement 
periods each consist of 46 trading days ending ten days before and starting ten days after the 
announcement, respectively.
8
 For the entire sample, the mean (median) relative quoted spread 
increases insignificantly from 0.0359 (0.0204) dollars to 0.0366 (0.0209) dollars. This is 
consistent with the univariate findings of Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Palmrose et al. (2004)  
who find that quoted spreads do not change significantly around undifferentiated restatement 
announcements. Similarly, the mean relative effective spreads do not increase significantly in the 
                                                             
8 We also examine the different illiquidity measures in the seven-day window [-3, 3] used by Anderson and 





 As we subsequently show later in this section, these univariate results 
are not robust because they do not control for other spread determinants. 
 The mean (median) traded volume in thousands of dollars increases insignificantly from 
3932.67 (207.20) to 4202.99 (199.96). The mean (median) market depth decreases from 
44,398.55 (25,520.20) to 42,998.51 (25,568.57) dollars following restatement announcements, 
and only the median change is significant based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The average 
Amihud illiquidity increases in the post-restatement period, and only the median is weakly 
significant (p-value = 0.07). The median market quality index decreases insignificantly following 
restatement announcements. 
[Please insert table 2.2 about here.]  
The liquidity results based on the reasons for restatement are only reported in Table 2.3 for 
the four subsamples with significant changes.
10
 The relative quoted and effective spreads increase 
significantly only for revenue recognition restatements in the post-announcement period, which is 
consistent with the findings of Anderson and Yohn (2002) and not Palmrose et al. (2004).11 The 
subsample results for quoted dollar depths suggest that the decrease in median depths for the full 
sample is mainly due to a significant decrease in median depths for revenue-recognition 
restatements (median = -52.14, Wilcoxon p-value = 0.04). Revenue-recognition restatements are 
also the only subsample with a weakly significant change (increase) in market illiquidity ILLIQ 
(mean = 0.309, t-stat = 1.68).  
 [Please insert table 2.3 about here.] 
                                                             
9
 Based on untabulated results, the mean quoted and effective spreads do not change significantly in the 
post-restatement period. The median quoted and effective spreads decrease significantly based on the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
10
 The dollar volume and market quality index results for subsamples are not reported as none of them 
exhibit a significant change after the restatement announcements. 
11  Based on untabulated results, the mean and median quoted and effective spreads only decrease 
significantly for three of the subsamples of restatements (i.e., cost or expense, reclassification, and other). 
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The multivariate regression estimates for relative quoted and effective spreads are reported in 
Table 2.4. Consistent with the literature, the estimated coefficients for LnPriceit , LnVolumeit and 
LnVolatilityit have their predicted signs and are highly significant (< 1% level) for both spread 
measures. All of the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables are highly significant with 
their predicted signs. The coefficient estimates for the Crosslisti and Sarbanesi dummy variables 
are negative and highly significant for both spread measures. This implies that being cross-listed 
and the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are associated with lower bid-ask spreads and 
therefore improved market liquidity. The coefficient estimates for the Restatei dummy provide 
support for our first hypothesis that market liquidity decreases following the restatement 
announcements. Specifically, both (log) relative quoted and effective spreads increase 
significantly on average by 0.38% and 0.53%, respectively, in the three-day event window [0, 2]. 
The average (log) relative quoted and effective spreads are higher by 0.44% in the post- versus 
pre-restatement announcement period.  
To capture the effects of financial restatements on both spreads and depths, we run a 
regression for the market quality index controlling for the spread determinants.  Consistent with 
Chung et al. (2010), the market quality is higher for firms with higher trading volumes, lower 
prices and lower return volatilities. Similar to the spread results, being cross-listed significantly 
increases market quality. However, unlike the spread results, the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley 
is not associated with an increase in market quality. The coefficient for the dummy variable 
Restatei is negative and significant, which suggests that the market quality decreases significantly 
during the three-day event window. This result also shows that financial restatements affect both 
dimensions of market liquidity (i.e. spreads and depths). Although market quality is still lower in 
the post-restatement period as suggested by the negative coefficient of Post-restatementi,, it is not 
statistically significant. 
[Please insert table 2.4 about here.]  
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2.5 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION EFFECTS AROUND 
FINANCIALRESTATEMENTS 
2.5.1 Behavior of Spread Components 
2.5.1.1 Methodology 
In this section, we test our second hypothesis that the permanent and temporary spread 
components respectively increase and decrease following the restatement announcements. The 
two spread components for the pre- and post-restatement announcement periods are estimated 
using the following models of Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans or MRR (1997) and Glosten 
and Harris or GH (1988) (further details are given in Appendix 2.2):  
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans:  
tttt IIp   1)()(                                    (2.2) 
Glosten and Harris:                           
tttttttttt IVzIzIIVcIIcp   101110 )()(                (2.3) 
where α is the constant drift;  represents the transitory effect of order flow on prices;  
represents the degree of information asymmetry or the permanent effect of order flow on prices;   
is the first-order autocorrelation of the trade indicator variable It; It and It-1 are the trade indicator 
variables (+1 for a buyer initiated trade and -1 for a seller-initiated trade); and Vt is number of 
shares traded in transaction t. 
 
2.5.1.2  Empirical results 
The spread component estimates based on both models for the pre- [-55, -10] and post-
announcement [10, 55] periods and tests of their differences, which are reported in panels A and 
B of Table 2.5, support our second hypothesis of an increase and a decrease in the permanent and 
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temporary spread components following the restatements.
12
 The mean adverse selection 
component increases significantly from 1.32 to 2.12 cents (t-stat = 3.26) for the MRR model and 
insignificantly from 1.57 cents to 1.63 cents for the GH model from the pre- to post-
announcement period. The order processing component decreases significantly from 1.34 cents to 
0.71 cents (t-stat = -2.51) based on the MRR model, and from 4.23 cents to 3.41 cents (t-stat = -
2.41) based on the GH model.  
The proportion of the spread attributable to adverse selection increases following restatement 
announcements by a significant 18.58 percent (t-stat = 3.02) for the MRR model, and by an 
insignificant 4.21 percent (t-stat = 0.80) for the GH model. Given that the proportions add to 100 
percent, the proportion associated with the order processing component decreases significantly by 
18.58% (t-stat = -3.02) for the MRR model and insignificantly by 4.21% (t-stat = -0.80) for the 
GH model. Thus, the unfavorable effect (increase) of restatement announcements on total spreads 
is caused by their unfavorable effect on the asymmetric or permanent component of the spread 
given that the temporary component decreases.  
Panels C and D of Table 2.5 report the MRR model spread components of the revenue 
recognition and cost or expense subsamples. The mean permanent component and transitory 
component of the spread significantly increase and decrease, respectively, for restatements 
involving revenue recognition problems. Therefore, the increase in total spreads for the revenue 
recognition subsample is mainly due to the increase in the permanent component given that the 
temporary component decreases. In contrast, total spreads for the cost or expense subsample 
following the restatement announcements did not increase significantly because the increase in 
the permanent component sufficiently offset the decrease in the temporary component following 
the restatement announcements. 
[Please insert table 2.5 about here.]  
                                                             
12
 Some restatement observations are eliminated for both models due to insufficient data or estimation 
problems. 
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2.5.2 Behavior of (Un)informed Trader Arrivals and the Probability of Informed Trade 
2.5.2.1 Methodology 
To examine another aspect of the effect of informational asymmetry on market behavior and 
to test our third hypothesis of an indeterminate change in PIN, we examine the trade behaviors of 
both informed and uninformed traders and the probability of informed trading (PIN) around 
restatement announcements using the EKOP model developed by Easley et al. (1996) (further 
details are given in Appendix 2.2).
13
 PIN is estimated for the periods around the announcements 
by maximizing the following likelihood function: 









                                                                                     (2.4)
                                           
  
where B and S are the total number of buys and sells for the day, respectively, and the parameter 
vector is  = (α, , , ). The probability of informed trade (PIN) is given by: 
    2PIN                 (2.5)
  
2.5.2.2 Empirical results 
Summary statistics for the estimated parameters of the EKOP model for the full sample (201 
restatements) are reported in panels A, B and C of Table 2.6. The arrival rates of informed and 
uninformed traders ( and ) are scaled by their pre-announcement values to facility comparison. 
The percentage differences of these two variables instead of their raw differences are compared, 
as in Easley et al. (2001). 
[Please insert table 2.6 about here.] 
                                                             
13
 One should distinguish between privately informed traders and insiders. The latter is a subset of the 
former. See Li and Zhang (2006) and Agrawal and Cooper (2008) for insider trading activities around 
restatement announcements.  
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The probability of an information event (α) increases insignificantly (from 0.3361 to 0.3374 
for the mean) following the restatement announcements. Thus, restatement announcements do not 
significantly change the market’s expectation of the probability of future information arrival. 
Similarly, the probability that any information is bad news () does not change significantly 
based on the mean, although the median change from 0.50 to 0.51 following announcement is 
marginally significant. 
The arrival rates of both informed and uninformed traders ( and ) increase significantly by 
26.20% and 55.16%, respectively, upon announcement. The behavior of the informed is 
consistent with Kyle’s (1985) conjecture that the informed adjust their trading in response to 
changes in uninformed trading.  
The effect on the probability of informed trading (PIN) is determined by the complex net 
effect of the changes in the arrival rates of both informed and uninformed traders and the 
probability of information events from the restatement announcements. The PIN increases 
insignificantly from 0.2620 to 0.2727 following such announcements because both arrival rates 
increase significantly while the probability of an information event remains unchanged.   
Based on the PIN analysis reported in Panel D of Table 2.6 for the cost or expense subsample, 
the probability of an information event does not increase significantly (as for the full sample) and 
the probability of informed trading increases significantly (unlike for the full sample). Both the 
mean and median probabilities of the information being bad news increase significantly after 
these announcements. The arrival rates of informed and uninformed investors increase 
significantly and insignificantly, respectively, after these announcements. When considered 
together with previous results that the adverse selection spread component increases significantly 
following these announcements, this evidence implies that information asymmetry has increased 
for cost or expense restatements post-announcement. 
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Duarte and Young (2009) find that PIN is only priced for illiquidity unrelated to information 
asymmetry and that the component related to asymmetric information is not priced. They argue 
that the PIN model developed by Easley et al. (1996) cannot explain the pervasive positive 
correlation between buyer- and seller-initiated order flow and the variances of buy and sell order 
flow. We examine whether this is the case for our data. Table 2.7 reports the summary statistics 
on the number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades for both pre- and post-restatement 








 percentiles of the mean for 
mean buyer-initiated trades, mean seller-initiated trades, variances of buy and sell orders, and the 
correlations between the buys and sells. Similar to the findings of Duarte and Young (2009), we 
find that the buy orders are more volatile than sell orders, except for 25
th
 percentile of the mean 
for both the pre- and post-restatement periods and 5
th
 percentile of the mean for the post-
restatement period. In addition, the correlations between buyer- and seller-initiated trades are 
positive, except for the 5
th
 percentile of the mean for both the pre- and post-restatement periods. 
Thus, our results are consistent with those reported by Duarte and Young (2009).  
[Please insert table 2.7 about here.] 
 
2.6 IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS ON CONSENSUS 
EXPECTATIONS 
2.6.1 Impact on Earnings Forecasts and Their Dispersion 
2.6.1.1 Methodology 
 In this section, we test our fourth hypothesis that the change in consensus earnings forecasts 
of analysts and their dispersion is negative and indeterminate following restatement 
announcements. To investigate the impact of restatement announcements on the forecasts of 
financial analysts, we first measure their earnings forecast revisions around the restatement 
announcements. The earnings forecasts are obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) Summary History Tape. To be included for this test, an announcement must 
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satisfy three criteria. First, the earnings forecast must be available one month before and after the 
restatement announcements. Second, the stock price must be available 30 days before the 
restatement announcement. Third, the current and next fiscal years for the forecasts are 
unchanged for each restatement announcement, as in Denis et al. (1994).
14
 This results in a final 
sample of 88 and 87 observations, respectively, for the current and next fiscal year earnings 
forecasts.   
 The earnings forecast revisions of analysts for the current and next fiscal years are measured 
using: 
                   , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1, 1 i t i t i t i ti t tFR AF P AF P                                                                      
(2.6) 
In (2.6), AFi,t+1 and  AFi,t-1 are the mean (median) forecasts of earnings of analysts for firm i made 
respectively one month after and before the restatement announcement; and Pi,t-1 is firm i’s stock 
price 30 days before the restatement announcement.  The mean and median forecasts of earnings 
of analysts in U.S. dollars are converted into Canadian dollars using the I/B/E/S Daily Exchange 
Rate. Changes in analysts following the firms and in the dispersions (standard deviations) of their 
cross-sectional earnings forecasts between the pre- and post-restatement announcement periods 
also are examined. The sample is further reduced to 62 observations when examining changes in 
the dispersion of the EPS forecasts of analysts. 
 
2.6.1.2 Empirical results 
 Panel A of Table 2.8 presents the results of revisions of earnings (EPS) forecasts by analysts 
for the current fiscal year. Consistent with Palmrose et al. (2004) and the fourth hypothesis, the 
mean (-0.0548, t-stat = -1.74) and median (-0.0408, t-stat = -2.29) EPS forecasts decline 
                                                             
14
 The next fiscal year changes into the current fiscal year in I/B/E/S when a firm’s earnings have been 
reported. For example, if a firm’s fiscal year end is August, the actual earnings for fiscal year 2000 are 
reported in October 2000. In September 2000, prior to the earnings announcement, the current fiscal year 
forecast is still the fiscal year 2000. However, the current fiscal year forecast is for the fiscal year 2001 in 
October 2000.  
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significantly following the restatement announcements. Based on Panel B of Table 2.8, the mean 
and median EPS forecasts of analysts for the next fiscal year also decline significantly in the post-
announcement period, consistent with Hribar and Jenkins (2004) who find a significant decrease 
in one-year ahead EPS. Based on Panel C of Table 2.8, the mean analysts following decreases 
insignificantly after the restatement announcements.  
 Chung et al. (1995) and Van Ness et al. (2001) find that financial analysts have greater 
incentives to follow a stock with greater information asymmetry since the value of private 
information increases with information asymmetry. In contrast, Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1995) find greater analyst following leads to greater information production and a reduction in 
the adverse selection component of the spread. Our result is in line with the findings of Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1995) because the permanent (or adverse selection) component of the spread 
increases significantly following restatement announcements.  Easley et al. (1998) argue that 
analyst following is not a good proxy for the level of private information as this measure is 
negatively related with PIN. We also find a similarly weak relation between analyst following 
and PIN.  
 Based on Panel D of Table 2.8, the dispersion in the EPS forecasts of analysts (as measured 
by their standard deviation) increases insignificantly from 0.1655 to 0.1971 following the 
announcements. This is inconsistent with Palmrose et al. (2004) who find a significant increase in 
dispersion for U.S. restatements.  
 The results in this section imply that Canadian restatement announcements are unexpected 
events for financial analysts; that they convey negative information, on average, regarding future 
earnings; and that revisions in earnings expectations are most likely a major driver of the negative 
abnormal returns associated with restatement announcements that we find in the following section 
of this chapter.  
[Please insert table 2.8 about here.] 
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2.6.2 Impact on Abnormal Returns and Their Determinants 
2.6.2.1 Methodology 
In this and the subsequent section, we test our fifth alternative hypothesis that significant 
negative abnormal returns are associated with restatement announcements, and we identify the 
determinants of such abnormal returns. To study the stock price reaction to the restatement 
announcements, the following dual-beta market model is used: 
it
j




2121                                                                   (2.7) 
where Rit  is the excess return on stock i for trading day t, and is equal to the return for stock i 
minus the Canadian one-month T-bill rate,  
αi  is the intercept for stock i, 
Rmt  is the excess return for the market, where the market return is proxied by the return on the 
S&P/TSX Composite Index, 
D1 is a dummy variable equal to one on and after the restatement announcement and zero 
otherwise to account for the possibility that the beta of the firm might change due to the 
restatement announcement, 
D2j is the event dummy variable equal to one for stock i for day j in the event window that 
covers the eleven days centered on the restatement announcement and zeros otherwise, 
and 
it  is the error term that is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean, constant 
variance and zero correlation between error terms across and over time. 
The Ars are estimated using 250 trading days before and 100 trading days after the 
announcement day. The estimated coefficients γ-5i ,…,  γ5i  are the daily Ars during the eleven-day 
event window [-5, 5] for stock i. The daily Ars are then averaged across all the stocks to obtain 
the daily average abnormal returns (AARs). The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
are the sum of the AARs over a given multi-day time period. Nonsynchronous trading problems 
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are corrected using a Scholes and Williams (1977) type of procedure by estimating the 
coefficients on lagged, lead and contemporaneous market excess returns. 
 Cross-sectional regression analyses are performed to examine the AR determinants. The 
dependent variable is the three-day CAAR from the event day to two days after the restatement 
announcements. We include a dummy variable REVENUE, which is equal to one if the 
restatement is related to revenue recognition problems and is zero otherwise. We also include the 
variables indicating the party who initiated the restatements as COMP, AUDITOR and 
REGULATOR. The three variables are equal to one if the company, auditor, or regulator initiated 
the restatements, respectively, and are zero otherwise. SIZE, which is measured as the natural log 
of market capitalization, is included as a control variable. Hegde and McDermott (2003) argue 
that if the announcement (in their case the addition of a stock to the S&P 500 Index) leads to an 
improvement in market quality, part of the Ars should be related to the decline in the effective 
spread. Following Hegde and McDermott (2003), we include the variable EFFSPRDDIFF, which 
is measured as the change in effective spreads over the post- versus pre-restatement period using 
the MRR model. The effective spread in the MRR model is given by (1-)(2 + ). For the 
subsamples with available earnings forecasts, we include the variable FR to examine whether Ars 




2.6.2.2 Empirical results 
Based on panel A of Table 2.9, the AARs are not significant for each of the five days pre-
event for the full sample. As expected and consistent with our fifth alternative hypothesis, the 
AARs on the announcement day of -2.61%, on the day after the announcement of -1.73% and on 
the second day after the announcement of -0.90% are significantly negative at the 1% level. 
                                                             
15 Only the median revision is used in the reported regression. The results are generally the same using the 
mean.  
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Similarly, the three-day mean CAARs for the windows [-1, 1] and [0, 2] of -4.70% and -5.24%, 
as are their corresponding medians, are significant at the 1% level.  
[Please insert table 2.9 about here.] 
Based on panel B of Table 2.9, the CAARs are significantly negative for both TSX-listed (-
4.49%) and cross-listed stocks (-6.67%), and their difference is not statistically significant. Based 
on Panel C of Table 2.9, the CAARs are more negative for restatements with earnings releases (-
6.66%) than without earnings releases (-4.02%), but their difference is not statistically significant. 
This finding contrasts with that of Palmrose et al. (2004) who document significantly more 
negative Ars for their no-earnings release group than their earnings release group.  Based on 
panel D of Table 2.9, significant negative Ars are found for financial restatement announcements 
associated with the following reasons: Cost or expense, Revenue recognition, Securities related, 
Reclassification, and Other. Consistent with Anderson and Yohn (2002), Akhigbe et al. (2005) 
and our fifth hypothesis, the CAARs for revenue-recognition related financial restatements are 
significantly more negative (-14.23%) than those related to reasons of Cost and expense (-4.24%), 
Securities related (-4.06%), Reclassification (-2.47%) and Other (-3.81%).  
 Regression results for the determinants of the three-day CAAR for [0, 2] are reported in 
Table 2.10.  Consistent with our univariate results, restatements associated with revenue 
recognition problems have more negative Ars for both models (i.e., with and without the 
inclusion of revisions in the EPS forecasts of analysts). This finding is consistent with those of 
Anderson and Yohn (2002), Akhigbe et al. (2005) and our fifth hypothesis. Similar to Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) and Palmrose et al. (2004), company-initiated restatements are associated with 
more pronounced negative Ars, but not for regulator-initiated restatements. Unlike Hribar and 
Jenkins (2004) and Palmrose et al. (2004), auditor-initiated restatements are not associated with 
more negative Ars. Size also is not a significant AR determinant. The coefficient estimates of the 
effective spread differences for both models are negative, but not statistically significant. This 
result indicates that Ars are not associated significantly with changes in illiquidity following 
 33 
restatements. The estimated coefficient for the revisions in the earnings forecasts of analysts is 
significant for the subsample regression, suggesting that such revisions play a significant role in 
explaining the negative Ars for restatement announcements when this variable proxies for market 
expectations. It also implies that such revisions by analysts, like those of the general market, 
change due to the restatement announcements. 
[Please insert table 2.10 about here.] 
 
2.6.3 Impact on Volatility of Residual Stock Returns 
2.6.3.1 Methodology 
In this and the subsequent section, we test our sixth alternative hypothesis that both volatility 
components increase following restatement announcements. To capture the effect of restatement 
announcements on the volatility components, we use the component GARCH model of Engle and 
Lee (1993, 1999) to model conditional residual volatility. Specifically: 
11111
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The long-run component of volatility given by qit in (2.9) is slowly mean reverting in an 
autoregressive manner. The short-run or transitory component of volatility is given by hit  - qit in 
(2.8) where hit  is the conditional total volatility. The parameters τi1 and τi2 measure the impact of 
restatement announcements on the short- and long-run volatilities, respectively, and all the other 
terms are as previously defined.  
Following Glosten et al. (1993) and Engle and Lee (1999), an asymmetric effect is also 





1 )()()( Dqhdqqqh iitititititiititiitit                       (2.10) 
In (2.10), dt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if εit-1 is a negative shock, and is zero 
otherwise. A transitory leverage effect occurs in the conditional variance if   is greater than zero. 
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The coefficients of equations (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10) are estimated by maximum likelihood.  The 
standard errors of the parameters are computed using the Marquardt algorithm. 
 
2.6.3.2 Empirical results 
 The mean parameter estimates and their corresponding t-values for the CGARCH without 
asymmetry effects are reported in columns 2 and 3, and those with asymmetry effects in columns 
4 and 5 of Table 2.11. Consistent with our fifth alternative hypothesis, the AARs are still 
significantly negative as expected on the day of and the day after the financial restatement 
announcements for both models. The 
1 estimates, which measure the sensitivity of the restating 
firm’s stock returns with those of the market, are marginally below 0.52 and are highly significant 
for both models. The β2 estimates, which measure the impact of the financial restatement 
announcements on the sensitivity to market risk, are positive but not significant at the 0.05 level 
for both models (mean values of 0.0637 and 0.1328 without and with asymmetry effects, 
respectively). Thus, as expected, restatement announcements do not significantly change the 
restating firm’s market risk.  
 The   estimate, which measures the presence of an asymmetry effect in the variance, is 
positive and significant (mean = 0.0789, t-stat = 11.55). The τ1 and τ2 estimates, which measure 
the change in the short-run or transitory noise-trading-induced and long-run or information-based 
permanent volatilities of residual returns, are both insignificant in the CGARCH without 
asymmetry effect. In contrast, the τ1 estimate is positive but insignificant (τ1 = 0.0027, t-stat = 
1.16) and the τ2 estimate is positive and significant (τ2 = 0.0185, t-stat = 12.12) in the CGARCH 
with asymmetry effect. Similarly, the effect of the restatement announcements on total residual 
volatility (as measured by 1 2ˆ ˆ   is negative and insignificant for the CGARCH without 
asymmetry effect, and positive and significant for the CGARCH with asymmetry effect ( 1 2ˆ ˆ 
=0.0212; t-stat = 11.63).  Due to the asymmetric effect of wealth-induced changes in leverage on 
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volatilities (Christie, 1982), our results are consistent with our jump risk hypothesis that the total 
volatility and its permanent (not temporary) component increase following restatement 
announcements (our alternative hypothesis six). The mean  estimates of 0.6485 and 0.6254 for 
the CGARCH without and with asymmetric effect, respectively, are much lower than the value 
reported in Engle and Lee of about 0.99 for the mean-reverting speed of the long-run component 
of residual return volatility for the market. This result could be attributed to the much shorter 
estimation period used in this chapter (less than one year) when compared to the multi-decade 
time period used by Engle and Lee.  
 The increases in the total return volatility and its permanent component, together with the 
results of an increased spread for the revenue recognition subsample and an increased dispersion 
in the forecasts of analysts (albeit insignificant) indicate that the second signal of financial 
restatements is also material. That is, financial restatements are associated with changes in the 
uncertainty of future cash flows for restating firms. 
[Please insert table 2.11 about here.] 
 
2.6.4. Impact on Stock Return Synchronicity 
2.6.4.1 Methodology 
In this and the subsequent section, we test our seventh and final alternative hypothesis that 
stock price synchronicity increases following restatement announcements. Similar to Morck et al. 
(2000), Durnev et al. (2003), and Jin and Myers (2006), the following regression is used to test 
whether stock price synchronicity changes after the restatement announcements:  
     ittUSitmiiti EXRRR   ][ ,2,1,         (2.11) 
In (2.11), Ri,t is stock i’s return, Rm,t is the return on the S&P/TSX Composite index, RUS, t is the 
return on the S&P 500 index obtained from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), 
and EXt is the rate of change in the exchange rate per U.S. dollar. The term ,US t tR EX translates 
 36 
U.S. market returns into local currency units. The S&P 500 return is included because 
approximately one third of the total sample is cross listed on American exchanges, including 
NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX and OTC, and the Canadian and U.S. markets are to a large extent 
integrated. The regression is estimated separately using daily and then weekly returns for the 12-
month period ending one month before restatement announcements and then for the 12-month 
period starting one month after such announcements. Weekly returns are used to dampen any 
microstructure effects that can be more influential with daily data. In a similar fashion, the zero-
return metric is the number of zero-return days over each of these 12-month pre- and post-
restatement periods. 
 
2.6.4.2 Empirical results 
Panels A and B of Table 2.12 report the R2 values in the pre- and post-restatement 
announcement periods as well as their change for the full sample. Consistent with our seventh 
alternative hypothesis, the R2 estimates increase significantly following restatement 
announcements based on daily returns (mean = 0.0097, t-stat = 2.14) and based on weekly returns 
(mean = 0.0245, t-stat = 2.53). This implies that stock prices move with the market more 
frequently and relatively less firm-specific information is incorporated into the returns after the 
restatement announcements. Based on Panels C and D of Table 2.12, the significant increases in 
R2 post-announcement are mainly due to the one subsample with a significant R2 change (i.e., the 
securities-related subsample).
16
 Contrary to the findings of Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), stock 
price synchronicity measured by R2 does capture the relative effect of firm-specific information 
on stock prices.  
Panels E and F of Table 2.12 present the zero-return metric values for the full sample and the 
only subsample with a significant change in this metric (i.e., the revenue recognition subsample). 
                                                             
16 The changes in R2are not significant for all the other subsamples. 
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Consistent with our seventh alternative hypothesis, the mean proportion of zero daily returns 
increases insignificantly by 0.47% for the full sample and significantly by 3.29% for the revenue-
recognition subsample in the post-announcement periods.  
Lesmond (2005) and Bekaert et al. (2007) use the incidence of zero daily returns as a 
measure of illiquidity for emerging markets. When interpreted in this fashion, the increase in zero 
returns in the post-period for restatement announcements associated with revenue recognition 
problems is consistent with earlier results that find a decrease in liquidity based on relative 
spreads, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and market depth for this type of restatement 
announcement.  
[Please insert table 2.12 about here.] 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 We investigated the effects of 210 Canadian financial restatement announcements on 
liquidity, spread components, (un)informed arrival rates, informed trading probabilities, analyst 
followings and earnings forecasts, price effects, residual return volatilities and their components, 
and price synchronicities over 1997-2006. Our results support the hypothesis that information 
asymmetry increases after restatement announcements.  Significant increases occur in the arrival 
rates of (un)informed investors, residual return volatilities and their permanent component and in 
illiquidity after restatement announcements.   
 We documented deterioration in market liquidity as manifested in an increase in relative 
quoted and effective spreads and a decrease in depths (median only) for revenue-recognition 
restatements following the announcements. After controlling for literature-identified spread 
determinants (such as price, volume and volatility) in a multivariate setting, we found that both 
relative quoted and effective spreads increase in the announcement windows for the full sample, 
remain elevated post-announcement, are lower for U.S. cross-listed firms, and for such 
announcements after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. By using the market quality index 
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which captures the effects of financial restatements on both spreads and depths, we found that 
market quality decreases during the announcement window and is higher for U.S. cross-listed 
firms.  
We documented a significant negative stock price reaction to restatement announcements 
over a three-day window [0, 2] of approximately 5.2 percent. More negative abnormal returns 
(Ars) are associated with restatements involving revenue recognition problems and those initiated 
by the company. The negative Ars associated with restatement announcements are positively and 
significantly related to changes in the consensus forecasts of earnings of analysts over these 
unexpected events. 
With regard to the change in price synchronicity after the financial restatements, we 
documented a higher R
2
 for the securities-related subsample and a higher proportion of zero-
returns for the revenue-recognition subsample. For both subsamples, stock prices reflected 
relatively less firm-specific information and more market-related information following the 
restatement announcements.  Thus, both metrics appear to be useful in measuring price 
synchronicity. 
Thus, our findings support the overriding hypothesis that financial restatements diminish 
market quality and send two information signals to market participants. The first signal is that the 
future earnings prospects of the restating firms are diminished; and the second signal is that the 




CANADIAN FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Good corporate governance is central to the effective and efficient operation of the 
corporation and it plays a significant role in protecting shareholders’ interests and maximizing 
shareholder value. Following the accounting scandals, there have been significant developments 
in corporate governance such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. In April 
2005, the Ontario Securities Commission approved National Instrument 58-101, Disclosure of 
Corporate Governance Practices, and National Policy 58-201, Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
which replaced the corporate governance guidelines imposed by the Toronto Stock Exchange in 
1994. 
While prior research has examined the relation between governance characteristics and 
financial fraud (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Abbott et al., 2000), limited research exists 
on the effectiveness of governance regulations in preventing the occurrence of restatements. 
Abbott et al. (2004) investigate the association between audit committee characteristics and the 
likelihood of financial restatements. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine the relation between 
governance mechanisms and the probability of financial restatement.  
 The previous literature provides mixed results on the consequences of financial fraud. While 
some studies do not find that SEC enforcement actions for GAAP violations are associated with 
an increase in subsequent managerial turnover (Beneish, 1999; Agrawal et al., 1999), more recent 
studies find turnovers of CEOs, top executives (CEOs, Presidents and Board Chairs), CFOs, and 
outside directors are greater for restating firms than control firms (Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 
2006; Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Agrawal and Cooper, 2007; Collins et al., 2009). Agrawal and 
Cooper (2007) document a higher auditor turnover for restating firms in a univariate analysis, but 
find the relation vanishes using a multivariate analysis. While the U.S. literature divides the board 
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of directors into inside and outside (including grey and independent) directors (Beasley, 1996; 
Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), the Canadian governance guidelines define directors as unrelated 
and related directors (see section 3.2.3 for particulars).  
We extend previous studies by examining the relation between corporate governance 
characteristics and the likelihood of restatement using the more recent time period.  We also 
extend the literature by examining the consequences of restatement announcements on the 
turnover of unrelated directors, audit committees, and external auditors in addition to top 
executives and CFOs using hand-collected data from proxy statements. We believe that we are 
the first to examine the relation between financial restatements and governance from a Canadian 
perspective to further test the robustness of inferences drawn primarily for U.S. restatement 
announcements. 
Canada provides an ideal alternative laboratory for examining the impact of corporate 
restatements on corporate governance given its similarities and differences with the US. Both 
countries share similar legal, institutional and regulatory environments, including corporate 
governance mechanisms and minority shareholder protections but not regulatory enforcement. 
However, Canadian public companies differ from their U.S. counterparts in that the percentages 
of Canadian public firms with controlling shareholders (concentrated ownership), families as the 
ultimate controlling shareholders, and issued restricted or subordinated voting shares and 
pyramidal structures are higher (e.g., Gadhoum et al., 2005; Gadhoum, 2006; King and Santor, 
2008).  
 We examine a sample of 177 Canadian firms who announced restatements over the period of 
1997-2006 and 177 matched control firms using a novel, hand-collected dataset of corporate 
governance characteristics. Consistent with Abbott et al. (2004) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) 
for 88 and 159 U.S. public firms, we find that the likelihood of restatement is lower when a 
Canadian firm’s audit committee includes at least one director with financial expertise. In 
addition, firms are less likely to restate when they have bigger blockholder and management 
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ownerships (unlike Abbott et al., 2004), a lower leverage ratio (unlike Abbott et al., 2004), and 
when their external auditor is one of the big 5 auditors (unlike Agrawal and Chadha, 2005). We 
find no evidence that the likelihood of restatement is higher for firms with a lower proportion of 
unrelated directors (like Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), or whose CEO is also 
the Board Chair or belongs to the founding family (like Abbott et al., 2004 but unlike Agrawal 
and Chadha, 2005).  
Using a logistic regression that controls for other turnover determinants, we find that the CEO, 
President, CFO and external auditor turnover are significantly higher for restating firms compared 
to control firms within the two years following restatement announcements. The return on assets 
is significantly and negatively related to turnover of both executives and external auditors. The 
abnormal returns associated with restatement announcements are also significantly and negatively 
related to turnover of executives. However, we do not find that restatement announcements are 
related to a higher turnover of the Board Chair, unrelated directors and audit committee members.  
While adherence to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was voluntary for foreign firms 
with fiscal years prior to July 15, 2006, Anand et al. (2012) find that Canadian firms included in 
the S&P/TSX Composite Index over the five-year period 1999-2003 voluntarily adopted U.S. 
standards (SOX) rather than Canadian guidelines, regardless of their ownership structure. 
According to Burks (2007, 2010) and Collins et al. (2009), if the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) of 2002 enhances the accountability of management for financial reporting, then 
disciplinary actions against management for accounting restatements should be more severe. 
Therefore, we examine the impact of SOX on management turnover related to financial 
restatements. The results indicate that even though CEO, CFO and President turnovers are still 
positively related to restatement announcements in the post-SOX period, the passage of SOX has 
no impact on the likelihood of management turnover in the post- versus pre-SOX period. Even 
after controlling for other determinants of turnover and restatement severity, the sensitivity of 
CEO, top executives and CFO turnover to restatements do not increase in the post-SOX period. 
 42 
However, the sensitivity of President turnover to restatements declines after SOX , which may 
due to the decline in restatement severity.  In addition, the sensitivity of turnover to restatement 
severity does not change in the post-SOX period. The size of the restatements also does not 
increase the likelihood of executive turnover in the pre-SOX period. More negative abnormal 
returns are associated with a higher likelihood of CEO and CFO (but not President and top 
executive) turnover after SOX.  
We find an increase in the number and proportion of unrelated directors and unrelated audit 
committee members as well as blockholder ownership two years after the restatement 
announcements. In addition, the governance characteristics of restating firms are not significantly 
different from control firms following the restatement announcements. The results provide 
evidence that restating firms attempt to improve their governance and restore their reputation 
after restatement announcements.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review of 
the prior literature. Section 3.3 discusses the data and our sample selection. Section 3.4 
investigates the link between governance characteristics and the likelihood of restatements.  
Section 3.5 analyzes the turnover (managerial, director and auditor) associated with restatement 
announcements. Section 3.6 examines the changes in governance following restatement 
announcements. Section 3.7 concludes the paper. 
 
3.2 PRIOR LITERATURE 
3.2.1 Financial Restatements and Corporate Governance  
Beasley (1996) investigates a sample of 75 fraud-associated firms with fraud during the 
period 1980-1991 and finds that a higher proportion of outside directors on the board (defined as 
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grey plus independent directors) reduces the likelihood of fraud.
17
 Dechow et al. (1996) examine 
92 firms convicted by the SEC for violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) between 1982 and 1992. They find that the likelihood of manipulating earnings are 
higher in firms with no audit committee and outside blockholders, who have a greater proportion 
of insiders on the board, and whose CEOs are Board Chairs or the founders of their companies.  
Abbott et al. (2000) study the relation between audit committee activity and independence and 
financial statement fraud using the same data source as Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996). 
They conclude that firms with audit committees which are composed of independent directors 
and which meet at least twice per year are associated with a lower incidence of financial fraud. 
Klein (2002) and Bedard et al. (2004) find a negative relation between earnings management and 
audit committee independence and expertise.  
Two papers linking governance characteristics with the likelihood of financial restatement 
yield mixed results. Abbott et al. (2004) investigate the impact of audit committee characteristics 
identified by the Blue Ribbon Committee on the likelihood of financial restatements. They find 
that the presence of a completely independent audit committee, higher frequencies of meetings, 
and the presence of at least one audit committee with financial expertise are significantly 
negatively related to the likelihood of restatements. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) study the 
relation between governance characteristics and the incidence of restatements for a sample of 159 
U.S. firms restating in 2000 or 2001. Their results suggest that firms with an independent director 
with financial expertise on their boards or audit committees and whose CEOs do not belong to the 
founding families are less likely to restate their earnings. Furthermore, they find that the 
likelihood of restatement is not related to board or auditor independence, the nonaudit services 
provided by outside auditors, and the use of Big 5 audit firms.  
                                                             
17
According to Beasley (1996), outside directors are non-employee directors. Grey directors are outside 
directors who are related to management such as retired executives of the firm or have business 
relationships with the company such as consultants, suppliers, attorneys, and investment bankers. 
Independent directors are outside directors who have no tie to the firm outside of their role as directors.  
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3.2.2 Financial Restatements and Turnover 
Evidence regarding the consequences of financial fraud on the permanency of the firms’ 
executives is mixed. Beneish (1999) finds no significant differences in CEO turnover among 
firms that overstated their earnings and control firms that did not. Similarly, Agrawal et al. (1999) 
find that fraud revelation is not significantly related to an increase in turnover among 
management or directors.  
Srinivasan (2005) reports that outside directors (especially audit committee members) 
experience higher turnover for income-decreasing restatements. Persons (2006) finds that the 
revelation of fraud and lawsuits is associated with higher turnover of top-executives (CEO, 
president, and Board Chair). Desai et al. (2006) report that at least one of the top executives 
leaves the company within two years following restatement announcements, and that displaced 
managers subsequently have difficulty in finding new jobs or accept poorer quality new 
employment. Arthaud-Day et al. (2006), Agrawal and Cooper (2007) and Collins et al. (2009) 
report greater CFO turnover for restating versus control firms. Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) also find 
that restatement firms are more likely to experience turnover of outside directors and audit 
committee members than control firms. Agrawal and Cooper (2007) find no significant relation 
between external auditor turnover and restatement announcements.  Collins et al. (2009) find that 
the higher CFO turnover rate related to the restatements is not affected by the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but terminated CFOs of restating firms suffer greater labor market penalties 
in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period. Burks (2010) finds that despite the decline in the severity 
of restatements, disciplinary actions against CFOs have been strengthened after SOX as the 
relation between CFO turnover and restatements becomes stronger in the post-SOX period. 
However, CEOs are penalized by reductions in bonus payout instead of terminations after SOX, 
which is a less severe penalty commensurate with less severe restatements. Wang and Chou 
(2011) find that restatement characteristics such as core-earnings and the magnitude of the net 
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income restated significantly affect the likelihood of management turnover. These results suggest 
that the higher the restatement severity, the higher the likelihood of CEO or CFO turnover. 
 
3.2.3 Canadian Regulations Regarding Corporate Governance 
In Canada, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) Committee on Corporate Governance issued a 
report containing fourteen proposed guidelines for effective corporate governance on December 
20, 1994.  The TSX requires all listed corporations to disclose on an annual basis their approach 
to corporate governance with reference to the TSX Guidelines. According to the guidelines, “an 
unrelated director is a director who is free from any interest and any business or other relationship 
which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director’s ability to 
act with a view to the best interests of the corporation”.  
In the aftermath of the accounting scandals, significant developments occurred in corporate 
governance, such as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that imposes corporate 
governance requirements to all the companies whose securities are listed on stock exchanges in 
the United States. In Canada, the Canadian Securities Administrators have also engaged in 
reviewing existing corporate governance matters and recommending changes to the existing TSX 
guidelines. In April 2005, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) approved amendments to 
Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees (MI 52-110) which came into force on June 30, 
2005. The OSC also approved National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance 
Practices (NI 58-101) and National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines (NP 58-
201). The instrument and the policy replaced the corporate governance guidelines imposed by the 
TSX, and came into force on June 30, 2005. National Instrument 58-101 requires the Corporation 
to identify directors as being independent or not independent (as defined in MI 52-110).  A 
director is independent if the member has no direct or indirect material relationship with the 
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company.  A material relationship is a relationship which could, in the view of the company’s 
board of directors, reasonably interfere with the exercise of a member’s independent judgement.18  
 
3.3 SAMPLE AND DATA  
Restatement announcements for Canadian companies are identified using searches of Lexis-
Nexis News Wires for the ten-year period from January 1997 to December 2006. Key word 
searches are performed using “restate,” “restates,” “restated,” “restating,” or “restatement” as 
well as other variations such as “adjust” and “amend” and “revise” within 50 words of “financial 
statement” or “earnings.” Restatement announcements are excluded if they result from 
discontinued operations, stock splits, stock dividends, mergers and acquisitions,
19
 changes in 
business segment definition, changes made for presentation purposes, and changes in currency of 
reporting (for example, converting from Canadian to U.S. dollars). Restatements due to changes 
in accounting policy also are excluded as a general rule because they represent normal corporate 
activities which do not involve accounting fraud or errors.
20
  
Our initial sample consists of 231 restatement announcements for firms listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX).  The sample is reduced to 180 restatements after eliminating six firms 
with insufficient daily stock returns and closing prices in the Canadian Financial Markets 
Research Center (CFMRC) database, four firms with simultaneous trading halts and subsequent 
delistings, eighteen income funds, fifteen firms with multiple restatement announcements during 
                                                             
18
 The meaning of independent is more strict than the meaning of unrelated. An independent director must 
be an unrelated director, but an unrelated director is not necessarily an independent director. 
19
 For example, a firm restates its financial statements after completion of a merger where the merger was 
accounted for as a pooling of interests.  
20
We exclude firms adopting new accounting recommendations by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or the Emerging Issues Task Force 
(EITF). However, we include restatement announcements resulting from SEC clarifications of revenue 
recognition in financial statements (SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101) and lease accounting for 
operating lease (Feb. 7, 2005, letter from SEC’s Chief Accountant to American Institute of Certified Public 
Accounts clarifying SEC staff's interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application under 
GAAP relating to operating leases). To our knowledge, there are no restatements resulting from the 
changes of Canadian regulations. 
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the 250 trading days used for analysis purposes, and eight firms with unavailable proxy 
statements or with  first proxy statements filed in the System for Electronic Document Analysis 
and Retrieval (SEDAR) whose dates follow the restatement announcements.  
Following Agrawal et al. (1999), Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Young et al. (2008), we 
match each restating firm with a unique control firm that (1) has the same two-digit Compustat 
primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry code,
21
 (2) has the closet market 
capitalization to the restating firm at the end of the fiscal year before the year of the restatement 
announcement,
22
 and (3) did not announce any restatement in the two years preceding the 
restatement by its matched firm. A replacement control firm is selected if there is a restatement 
announced within the preceding 24 months. We add an additional requirement that the match firm 
has proxy statements available in SEDAR for the years for which such data are available for the 
restating firm to ensure that turnover data are comparable between sample and control firms. 
Market capitalization is measured as the monthly close price times the number of shares 
outstanding, both of which are obtained from CFMRC. The procedure reduces our final sample to 
177 sample firms and 177 control firms. 
Summary characteristics for the restating firms differentiated by the reason for the 
restatement, the party initiating the restatement and industry groups based on primary two-digit 
SIC codes are reported in Table 3.1. Because some firms report multiple reasons for their 
restatements, the total number of reasons reported in Panel A exceeds the total sample size. Cost 
or expense is the most common reason (25.5%), followed by other (23.4%) and revenue 
recognition (18.1%). The frequencies differ from those reported for U.S. restatements (e.g., 
Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004), where revenue 
recognition is the largest restatement category. Based on Panel B of Table 3.1, the initiators are 
                                                             
21
We use Bloomberg or Factiva to obtain any missing SICs for restating firms.  
22
 For six restating firms who started trading on the TSX later than the end of the fiscal year before the year 
of the restatement announcements, the match date is the first trading month in the CFMRC.   
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unknown for 42.9% of the reinstatements, followed by company-initiated restatements for 33.3% 
of the reinstatements. Based on Panel C of Table 3.1, 30.5% of the firms are in manufacturing, 
followed by 25.4% and 18.6% of the firms in mining and services, respectively. There is no 
financial restatements by firms in Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. 
[Please insert table 3.1 about here.]  
The financial data for restating firms and control firms are obtained from the Compustat 
database. Missing data (except for sales growth) are obtained from Mergent online or hand 
collected from the firms’ financial statements deposited with SEDAR (as are the governance 
variables from the proxy statements before the restatement announcements).   
Because the dates when the CEO, President, Chair and CFO left their positions are usually 
available, we track the turnover of these persons within 24 months following the restatement 
announcements.
23
 The dates of changes in unrelated directors and audit committee members are 
usually unavailable as these changes are usually only disclosed in the annual proxy. Thus, we 
track the turnover of unrelated directors and audit committee members using the subsequent two 
proxy statements issued after the restatement announcements.
24
 We define top executive turnover 
as the turnover of CEOs, Presidents and Board Chairs.
25
 Unrelated directors are considered to 
have turned over if the director leaves the Board or becomes a related director. Audit committee 
turnover occurs if a committee member leaves the board or the member still stays on the board 
but no longer as a member of the audit committee. If a person leaves a position due to retirement 
or death, we do not consider it to be turnover for the purposes of this study. 
 
                                                             
23
 If the firm only has a vice president of finance, we consider this position as the CFO. 
24
 In this case, we need the data for 2007 and 2008.  
25
 If the person is both the CEO (or President) and Chairman before the restatement and only the CEO (or 
President) after the restatement, we consider this to be turnover.  
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3.4 GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS AND RESTATEMENT INCIDENCE 
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for the financial and governance variables for the 
restating and matched control firms. Both the median sales and total assets of control firms are 
significantly smaller than restating firms. The mean (median) leverage ratio is about 0.48 (0.48) 
for restating firms and 0.41 (0.39) for control firms. The mean (median) ROA is about -9.56% (-
1.53%) for restating firms and -5.1% (0.97%) for control firms. Similar to Desai et al. (2006), we 
find that the restating firms are significantly more leveraged and have worse performance than 
control firms prior to the restatement announcements. Restating firms also have a higher sales 
growth rate, but the difference is not statistically significant. While the restating firms have a 
smaller board size, a lower proportion of unrelated directors, and more board meetings than the 
control firms, these differences are not statistically significant. 
The mean audit committee size (3.32 members) for control firms is not significantly bigger 
than restating firms (3.28 members). The median proportion of unrelated audit committee 
members is significantly higher for control firms. The mean and median number of meetings held 
by the audit committee is significantly higher for restating firms. As in Abbott et al. (2004) and 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005), we define directors as having financial expertise if they hold a CPA, 
CFA, CA, investment banker or venture capitalist designation, or have served as chief financial 
officer, vice president of finance, controller or treasurer. The mean proportion of firms whose 
audit committees have at least one director with financial expertise is about 75% for restating and 
83% for control firms, respectively. Both the differences in means and medians are statistically 
significant at the 10% level.  
The mean proportion of restating (control) firms whose CEO is also the Board Chair is 0.34 
(0.40). The mean (median) tenure of the CEO on the board is 8.47 (6) years for restating and 9.45 
(7) years for the control firms. The mean proportion of firms whose CEOs belong to the founding 
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family is 37.3% and 33.3%, respectively, for the restating and control firms. However, none of 
the above differences are statistically significant. 
 The ownership of restating and control firms is also similar. Blockholder ownership is 
defined as the percentage of voting rights held by outside blockholders with at least 10 percent of 
the voting rights attached to any class of voting securities who are unaffiliated with 
management.
26
 For a firm with a dual-class structure (i.e. subordinate and multiple voting shares), 
blockholder ownership is calculated as the sum of multiple voting shares times the number of 
votes each multiple voting shares carries and subordinate voting shares owned by blockholders, 
which is divided by the sum of total outstanding multiple voting shares times the number of votes 
each multiple voting shares carries and all subordinate voting shares. Management ownership is 
the percentage of voting rights held by management (for example CEO, President, Executive 
Vice President, Vice President, Chief financial officer) who serves on the board. We find that 
control firms have higher (not statistically significant) ownership by blockholders, CEOs, 
managements, related and unrelated directors and top three persons (CEO, President and Board 
Chair) than restating firms. The number of outside blockholders who own 10 percent or more of 
the voting rights is significantly higher for control firms (0.76) than restating firms (0.58). 
 The proportion of firms whose external auditor is a Big 5 auditing firm (Arthur Andersen, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernest & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) is 
significantly higher for control firms (0.91) than restating firms (0.81). The non-audit fees paid to 
the external auditor at 34% and 30% of the total audit fees for the restating and control firms, 
respectively, are not significantly different.  
[Please insert table 3.2 about here.] 
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 We use five percent as the criteria for blockholder ownership if the firm uses five in its proxy statements. 
Outside blockholders do not include clearing Agencies such as Cede & Co. and CDS & Co. who are only 
nominees and not beneficial owners of common shares. The Company usually has no knowledge of the 




Table 3.3 reports the correlations between the independent and explanatory variables. The 
likelihood of restatement (RESTATE) is significantly and positively correlated with leverage and 
sales growth. The likelihood of restatement is lower when the audit committee has at least one 
director with financial expertise (EXPERT) and the external auditor is a Big 5 auditing firm 
(BIG5). The proportion of unrelated directors (PUNRELDIR) is significantly and positively 
correlated with the proportion of unrelated audit committee members (PUNRELAUD) and 
outside blockholder ownership (BLOCKHLD), and is higher when the external auditor is a Big 5 
firm (BIG5). The proportion of unrelated directors (PUNRELAUD) is significantly and 
negatively correlated with sales growth, and is lower when the CEO also chairs the board 
(CEOCHAIR) or the CEO belongs to the founding family (CEOFOUND). The proportion of 
unrelated audit committee members (PUNRELAUD) is significantly and negatively correlated 
with sales growth, and is higher when the audit committee has at least one director with financial 
expertise (EXPERT) and the external auditor is a Big 5 firm (BIG5). When the CEO belongs to 
the founding family, it is less likely that the audit committee has at least one director with 
financial expertise (EXPERT). A CEO who is also the Board Chair is more likely to belong to the 
founding family (CEOFOUND) and have less blockholder ownership (BLOCKHLD). When the 
CEO belongs to the founding family, the shares owned by outside blockholders are lower 
(BLOCKHLD). CEO ownership is lower when the external auditor is a Big 5 firm (BIG5). 
[Please insert table 3.3 about here.] 
 
3.4.3 Logistic Regression  
 As a robustness test of our univariate analysis, we estimate the following logistic regression 
to examine the relation between governance characteristics and restatement announcements.  
 RESTATE=f (PUNRELDIR or PUNRELAUD, EXPERT, CEOCHAIR, CEOFOUND,     
                              BLOCKHLD, MGMTOWN, BIG5, LEVERAGE, GROWTH)                   (3.1) 
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where RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm and zero 
if the firm is a control firm. PUNRELDIR is the proportion of directors who are unrelated. 
PUNRELAUD is the proportion of directors in the audit committee who are unrelated. EXPERT 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the audit committee includes at least one director who 
is a financial expert. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is also the 
Board Chair and zero otherwise. The board’s monitoring function is less effective when the CEO 
is also the Board Chair (Jensen, 1993; Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996), so we hypothesize a 
positive relation between CEOCHAIR and the likelihood of restatement. CEOFOUND is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO belongs to the founding family of the firm and 
zero otherwise. Dechow et al. (1996) argue that CEOs are less accountable to the board when 
they are also the company founders. We hypothesize that the likelihood of restatement is higher 
for firms with CEOs that belong to the founding family.  
BLOCKHLD is the percentage of voting rights held by outside blockholders with at least 10 
percent of the voting rights attached to any class of voting securities who are unaffiliated with 
management. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Beasley (1996), large outside 
blockholders have greater incentives to monitor management and therefore serve as an additional 
monitoring mechanism. We hypothesize a negative relation between blockholder ownership and 
the likelihood of restatement.  
MGMTOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by managements who serve on boards. 
Stock ownership held by management could motivate management to increase stock value and 
therefore reduce the agency problems between managements and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) or to artificially inflate the stock values that could lead to material management 
fraud (Loebbecke et al., 1989). Therefore, we do not hypothesize a direction for the relation 
between management ownership and the likelihood of restatement.  
 BIG5 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s external auditor is a Big five 
auditing firm and zero otherwise. Largest audit firms are associated with lower incidence of fraud 
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as they are quality-differentiated suppliers (Palmrose, 1988; Carcello and Nagy, 2004). We 
hypothesize a negative relation between BIG5 and the incidence of restatement.  
 LEVERAGE is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets in the fiscal 
year before the restatement announcements. Leverage is a proxy for the firm’s demand for 
external financing which may explain why earnings are manipulated to avoid debt covenant 
violations (Dechow et al., 1996). We therefore hypothesize a positive relation between leverage 
and the likelihood of restatement.  GROWTH is calculated as the compound growth rate of sales 
in the three years preceding the year of restatement announcements. Richardson et al. (2002) note 
that restatement firms are associated with high growth rates because they are under great pressure 
to inflate the earnings to meet analyst’s expectations. We hypothesize a positive relation between 
growth rates and the incidence of restatement.  
The logistic regression results are reported in Table 3.4.  Consistent with the findings of 
Abbot et al. (2004) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005), a restatement is less likely for firms whose 
audit committee has at least one director with financial expertise (p-value < 0.05 for both models). 
The likelihood of restatement is significantly negatively related to outside blockholder ownership 
(p-value < 0.05 for both models). This is consistent with the argument of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) and Beasley (1996) that large outside blockholders have greater incentives to monitor 
managers. The likelihood of restatement is also significantly negatively related to management 
stock ownership (p-value < 0.05 for both models). This evidence is consistent with the view of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that higher management stock ownership motivates management to 
increase firm value therefore reducing the agency problems between management and 
shareholders. The incidence of restatement is lower for firms whose external auditor is a Big 5 
auditing firm (significant at 1% level). Thus, the audit quality provided by Big 5 auditors is better 
at lowering the likelihood of restatement. The incidence of restatement is higher for firms with 
higher leverage ratios.  This is consistent with Dechow et al. (1996) who argue that the leverage 
ratio is a proxy for demand for external financing which may explain why highly levered firms 
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tend to manipulate earnings to raise external financing at lower cost. Sales growth is positively 
related to the incidence of restatement, but only marginally significant at the 10% level for both 
models. This is weakly consistent with the result of Young et al. (2008). The likelihood of 
restatement is higher but not statistically significant for firms who have a lower proportion of 
unrelated directors and whose CEOs are also the chair of their boards.  Contrary to the finding of 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005), the likelihood of restatement is not significantly higher for firms 
whose CEO belongs to the founding family.  
[Please insert table 3.4 about here.] 
 
3.5 FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS AND TURNOVER 
3.5.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3.5 reports the summary statistics on the turnover rates for restating and control firms. 
The sample sizes for CEO, President, Board Chair, and CFO turnover rates are smaller since 
some firms do not have individuals that occupy positions with those titles. The CEO turnover rate 
for restating firms and control firms is 0.337 and 0.160 in years (1, 2), respectively, and their 
difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). The higher turnover rate for restating firms 
over two years mainly occurs in year +1. By one year after the restatement announcements, 25.2% 
and 8.6% of the CEOs turn over in restating and control firms, respectively. The CEO turnover 
rates are not statistically higher for restating firms than control firms during the second year after 
the restatements announcements. Similarly, the turnover rates of Presidents and CFOs are 
significantly higher for restating firms, compared with control firms in years +1 and (1, 2). The 
Board Chairs turnover rates are higher (significant at the 10% level) for restating firms than 
control firms in year +1, but not significantly higher in year +2 and (1, 2). Turnover rates of 
individuals holding the top three positions for restating and control firms are 0.339 and 0.161 in 
year +1, and 0.435 and 0.333 in year (1, 2), respectively. The differences are significant at the 1% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  Restating firms also experience (not significantly) higher turnover 
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rates for unrelated directors and audit committee members. The external auditor turnover rate is 
significantly higher (p-value < 0.01) for restating versus control firms in years +1, +2 and (1, 2).  
[Please insert table 3.5 about here.] 
 
3.5.2 Logistic Regressions 
We perform a multivariate analysis to examine the turnover of executives and external 
auditors to control for the other factors that could affect turnover. The following logistic 
regression is estimated: 
TURNOVER=f (RESTATE, PUNRELDIR, BODSIZE, CEOCHAIR, ROA, CAR)       (3.2) 
where TURNOVER is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a person who holds a senior 
position (CEO, President, Board Chair, CFO, unrelated director, audit committee) leaves the firm 
or the external auditor changes within twelve or twenty-four months following the restatement 
announcements. RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm 
and zero if the firm is a control firm. We include a variable PUNRELDIR, which is the 
proportion of directors who are unrelated, as Jensen (1993) argues that top executive removal is 
less difficult with higher representation of outside directors on the board. Agrawal and Cooper 
(2007) also argue that outside directors could prevent auditors from being fired when questioning 
management. We hypothesize a positive (negative) relation between management (external 
auditor) turnover and the proportion of directors who are unrelated. Yermack (1996) argues that 
smaller boards are more effective. Thus, we hypothesize a negative (positive) relation between 
management (external auditor) turnover and the number of directors on the board (BODSIZE). 
CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is also the Board Chair and zero 
otherwise. Beasley (1994) and Dechow et al. (1996) argue that the board is less effective in 
monitoring when the CEO is also the Board Chair. We hypothesize a negative (positive) relation 
between management (external auditor) turnover and CEOCHAIR. Following Desai et al. (2006), 
we include the firm’s return on assets (ROA) in the fiscal year prior to the restatement 
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announcement as a measure of prior performance. We hypothesize a negative relation between 
management (external auditor) turnover and ROA. Similar to Agrawal and Cooper (2007), CAR 
is the cumulative abnormal return over days [-5, 5] around each restatement announcement.
27
 We 
hypothesize a negative relation between management (external auditor) turnover and abnormal 
returns based on the finding of Warner et al. (1988) who show that poor stock performance 
increases the probability of management changes. 
The logistic regression results are reported in Table 3.6. Panel A provides the results when 
the independent variable is the executive or auditor turnover within one year after the restatement 
announcements. Consistent with the univariate results, the coefficients of RESTATE are positive 
and significant (p-value < 0.01) for all the turnovers. This suggests that restatement 
announcements are significantly related to turnover of executives and auditors even after 
controlling for other determinants of turnover. However, turnover is not significantly related to 
the proportion of unrelated directors, board size and when the CEO is also the Board Chair. The 
return on assets (ROA) is significantly and negatively related to executive but not auditor 
turnover. As expected, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is significantly and negatively 
related to CEO, President, top three executives and CFO turnovers. Based on untabulated results, 
restatement announcements are not associated with a higher turnover of Board Chairs. Unlike 
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 The abnormal return (AR) is calculated using the following dual-beta market model: 
it
j






where Rit  is the excess return on stock i for trading day t, and is equal to the return for stock i minus the 
Canadian one-month T-bill rate, Rmt  is the excess return for the market, where the market return is proxied 
by the return on the S&P/TSX Composite Index, D1 is a dummy variable equal to one on and after the 
restatement announcement and zero otherwise to account for the possibility that the beta of the firm might 
change due to the restatement announcement, D2j is the event dummy variable equal to one for stock i for 
day j in the event window that covers the eleven days centered on the restatement announcement and zeros 
otherwise. The ARs are estimated using 250 trading days before and 100 trading days after the 
announcement day. 
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Srinivasan (2005), we find no evidence that unrelated directors and audit committee turnover are 
related to the restatement announcements.
28
 
Panel B of Table 3.6 reports the results when the independent variable is executive or auditor 
turnover within two years after the restatement announcements. Restatement announcements are 
associated with greater CEO, President, CFO and external auditor turnover, but not for turnover 
among the top three executives. Firms whose CEO is also the Board Chair experience higher 
CEO and President turnovers. The ROA is significantly and negatively related to both executive 
and auditor turnover. The CAR is only significantly and negatively related to CEO, President and 
top three executives turnovers within two years following the restatement announcements. 
Overall, the results in Panel B are similar to the results in Panel A of Table 3.6.  
[Please insert table 3.6 about here.]  
 
3.5.3 Univariate Analysis for Turnover Changes after SOX 
Hennes et al. (2008), Collins et al. (2009), Burks (2010), Wang and Chou (2011) examine 
whether the likelihood of management turnover changes after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX). They argue that if SOX changes the governance environment by enhancing 
the accountability of management for financial reports, then disciplinary actions against 
management following restatements should be more severe in the post-SOX period. Since our 
sample covers 1997 to 2006, it provides a natural experimental setting to test the impact of SOX 
on management turnover. Panel A of Table 3.7 provides descriptive statistics for restating firms 
in the pre- and post-SOX periods. The pre-SOX period is January 1, 1997 to July 30, 2002, and 
the post-SOX period is August 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006. The size of the restatement is 
measured as the cumulative impact of restatements on net income, scaled by total assets in the 
fiscal year prior to the restatement announcements. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over 
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 The results for unrelated director and audit committee turnover are untabulated as they are similar to 
those for the univariate analysis.  
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the restatement event window [-5, 5]. The mean size of restatement is -0.066 in the pre-SOX 
period and -0.013 in the post-SOX period. However, the differences-in-mean based on unequal 
variances are not statistically significant. The mean CAR is -0.12 in the pre-SOX period and -0.05 
in the post-SOX period. The post-SOX restatements have marginally significant less negative 
abnormal returns. This is consistent with Hennes et al. (2008), Collins et al. (2009) and Burks 
(2010) that the incidence of relatively benign restatements may have increased in the post-SOX 
period. 
Panel B of Table 3.7 reports the differences in turnover rates between the pre- and post-SOX 
period. Turnover is equal to one if the management, directors, or auditors leave or are terminated 
twenty-four months after the restatement announcements. CEO and CFO turnover rates for 
restating firms are significantly higher than for control firms in both the pre- and post-SOX 
period. The turnover rates for President for the restating firms are significantly higher in the pre-
SOX period and marginally higher in the post-SOX period than for the control firms. In contrast, 
Board Chair and top executives have significantly higher turnover rates for restating firms than 
for control firms in the pre-SOX period, but not in the post-SOX period.  
[Please insert table 3.7 about here.]  
 
3.5.4 Multivariate turnover analysis controlling for the impact of SOX 
We conduct a multivariate analysis to examine the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 









        (3.3) 
where TURNOVER is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the person who holds the position 
(CEO, President, CFO) leaves the firm within twenty-four months following the restatement 
announcement. RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm 
and zero otherwise. POSTSOX is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the restatement is 
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announced in the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. The interaction term 
RESTATE*POSTSOX allows us to examine whether the sensitivity of turnovers to restatement 
announcements has changed in the post-SOX period. If the passage of SOX has increased the 
accountability of executives, disciplinary actions should be more severe so that the positive 
relation between turnover and restatements should be strengthened in the post-SOX period. We 
hypothesize a positive coefficient for 3. The other control variables are as defined in section 3.5.2. 
The regression results are reported in  Table 3.8. Consistent with the univariate results, the 
coefficients of RESTATE are positive and significant (1 >0, p-value <0.02) for all the turnovers 
(except for President turnover with a p-value = 0.10). Consistent with Arthaud-Day et al. (2006), 
Agrawal and Cooper (2007) and Collins et al. (2009), restatement announcements are 
significantly related to turnover of executives in the pre-SOX period even after controlling for 
other determinants of turnover. In the post-SOX period, summing the estimated coefficients of 
RESTATE and RESTATE*POSTSOX (1+ 3) gives the estimates of 0.7388, 0.5256, 0.1045, 
and 0.6429 for CEO, President, Top executives and CFO, respectively. Consistent with the 
univariate results, the sums are significantly different from zero for CEO (p-value = 0.02), 
President (p-value = 0.10), CFO (p-value = 0.02), but not for top executives (p-value = -0.70). 
The results indicate that CEO, CFO (and President) turnovers are significantly (marginally 
significantly) related to restatement announcements in the post-SOX period. None of the 
estimated coefficients of POSTSOX (2) are significant, suggesting that the likelihood of 
executive turnover does not change after SOX. To determine whether the sensitivity of turnover 
to restatement announcements has changed in the post-SOX period, we examine the estimated 
coefficients of RESTATE*POSTSOX (3.). None of the coefficients are significant except for top 
executives (p-value = 0.07). Consistent with Collins et al. (2009) and Burks (2007), the 
sensitivities of CEO, President and CFO turnover to restatements do not change in the post-SOX 
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period. In contrast to our hypothesis, the sensitivity of the turnover of top executives to 
restatements has marginally decreased in the post-SOX period. 
In addition, management turnover is not significantly related to the proportion of unrelated 
directors (PUNRELDIR) or board size (BODSIZE). When the CEO is also the Board Chair, the 
likelihoods of CEO and President turnovers are lower. As expected, the return on assets (ROA) is 
significantly and negatively related to CEO, President and top executives turnovers but not to 
CFO turnover.  
[Please insert table 3.8 about here.] 
Burks (2007) argues that one reason for not finding an increase in the sensitivity of turnover 
to restatement announcements in the post-SOX period is the decrease in the severity of 
restatements after SOX. Similarly, Collins et al. (2009) argue that the impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on CFO turnover may depend on the severity of the restatement. The two measures 
used as the proxies for the severity of restatements is size of the restatement (RESTATESIZE) 
and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the event window [-5, 5].  Given that there is no 
evidence of increased sensitivity of CEO, President and CFO turnover to restatements after SOX 
and the severity of restatements measured by CAR has (marginally) decreased after SOX, we run 
the following logistic regression to examine the impact of the severity of the restatements on the 
executive turnover related to restatement announcements controlling for other determinants of 











   (3.4) 
The coefficients of POSTSOX measure whether the sensitivity of turnover to restatements 
changes in the post-SOX period, controlling for restatement severity and other determinants of 
turnover. The coefficients of the interaction terms, RESTATESIZE*POSTSOX and 
CAR*POSTSOX, measure whether the sensitivity of turnover to restatement severity changes in 
the post-SOX period. We hypothesize a positive (negative) coefficient for 2, respectively, 
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implying that larger restatement magnitude and more negative abnormal returns increase the 
likelihood of executive turnover.  
The logistic regression results are reported in Table 3.9. Similar to Table 3.8, the controls for 
unrelated directors and board size are insignificant. CEOCHAIR is positively related only to CEO 
and President turnover. ROA is negatively related to turnover with the exception of CFO turnover. 
In contrast to our hypothesis, the coefficients of RESTATESIZE are insignificant, suggesting that 
the size of the restatements does not increase the likelihood of executive turnover in the pre-SOX 
period. The coefficients of CAR are (marginally) significant for CFO and CEO turnover (p-values 
= 0.07 and 0.04, respectively). This indicates that more negative abnormal returns are only 
associated with a higher likelihood of CEO and CFO turnover in the pre-SOX period, but not for 
President and top executives turnover. Consistent with Burks (2007) and Collins et al. (2009),  
the coefficients of POSTSOX is insignificant for CEO, top executives, and CFO,  indicating that 
sensitivity of turnover to restatement in the post-SOX period does not increase even after 
controlling for the decrease in the severity of restatements. However, the coefficient of 
POSTSOX is negative and significant for President turnover, which suggests the decline in the 
severity of restatements contribute to the decline in the President turnover in restating firms after 
SOX. None of the coefficients of RESTATE*POSTSOX and CAR*POSTSOX are significant. 
The results imply that sensitivity of turnover to restatement severity does not change in the post-
SOX period. 
[Please insert table 3.9 about here.]  
 
3.6 CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE FOLLOWING FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS 
Farber (2005) finds that firms who manipulate their financial statements and are detected 
subsequently take actions to improve their governance. Although such firms have worse 
governance compared to control firms prior to fraud detection, they have similar proportions of 
outside directors and proportions with combined Board Chair and CEO position to the control 
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firms three years after fraud detection. Similarly, Desai et al. (2006) document an increase in the 
proportion of outside directors and the ownership of blockholders following restatements.  
We now examine whether governance characteristics change following our sample of 
restatement announcements. The post-announcement governance variables are obtained from the 
second proxy statement issued after the announcements. Table 3.10 reports the univariate analysis 
of changes in governance for 145 pairs of sample and control firms. Both board size and audit 
committee size change insignificantly (increase and decrease) for sample firms and control firms 
following the restatements, respectively. The numbers of unrelated directors and unrelated audit 
committee members increase significantly for sample firms and insignificantly for control firms. 
The proportion of unrelated directors increases significantly from 67 to 70 percent for both 
sample and control firms in the post-announcement period. The mean blockholder ownership also 
increases significantly from 11 to 13 percent for sample firms, and insignificantly for control 
firms.  The percent of the firms whose CEO is also the Board Chair decreases insignificantly 
from 33 percent to 28 percent for the restatement sample, and decreases significantly from 41 
percent to 34 for control firms, respectively. Based on the last column of Table 3.10 there are no 
significant differences between sample and control firms following the restatement 
announcements. In sum, the results suggest that restating firms experience increases in both the 
number and the proportion of unrelated directors and unrelated audit committee members, and in 
blockholder ownership in the post-announcement period. This indicates that consistent with 
Farber (2005) and Desai et al. (2006), restating firms try to improve their governance after the 
restatement announcements.  
[Please insert table 3.10 about here.] 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines the governance of Canadian firms who announced restatements during 
the 1997-2006 period. We find that firms are less likely to restate their financial statements when 
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they have bigger blockholder and management ownership, a lower leverage ratio, and an audit 
committee that includes at least one director with financial expertise, or an external auditor that is 
a big 5 auditing firm. We find no evidence that the likelihood of restatement announcements is 
higher for firms with a lower proportion of unrelated directors, or whose CEO is also the Board 
Chair or belongs to the founding family.  
Using logistic regressions that control for other determinants of turnover, we find that the 
turnovers of the CEO, President, top executives, CFO and external auditor are significantly higher 
compared to industry and size-matched control firms within 24 months following the restatement 
announcements. However, we do not find restatement announcements are related to the turnover 
of the Board Chair, unrelated director and audit committee membership. Although the CEO, 
President, and CFO turnover are still positively related to restatements in the post-SOX period, 
we find no evidence that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increases the likelihood of 
turnover rates following restatement announcements. 
We also investigate the changes in governance for restating firms following the 
announcements. We document an increase in the number and proportion of unrelated directors 
and unrelated audit committee members as well as blockholder ownership in the post-
announcement period. In addition, the governance characteristics of restating firms are similar to 
control firms following the announcements. The results provide evidence that restating firms try 
to improve their governance and restore their reputation after restatement announcements.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CANADIAN FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Much of the prior literature, starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976), finds that executive 
compensation using stock options aligns the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. 
This literature finds that the asymmetric payoffs from stock options reduces agency costs for 
firms with high growth opportunities by encouraging them to take risk (Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Baber et al., 1996), option granting maximizes firm value (Core and Guay, 1999; Rajgopla and 
Shevlin, 2002), positive stock returns are associated with announcements of long-term managerial 
compensation plans (Brickley et al., 1985), and  positive future payoffs are associated with stock 
options (Hanlon et al., 2003).  
 On the other hand, several studies challenge the use of stock options. Bebchuk et al. (2002) 
argue that executives have considerable power to influence their own pay and they use that power 
to extract rents. In addition, the desire to camouflage rent extraction might lead to the use of 
inefficient pay arrangements that provide suboptimal incentives and therefore reduce 
shareholder value. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) show that 
stock-based compensation provides incentives for managers to manipulate information in order to 
increase the value of a firm’s stock.  
Prior studies that examine the link between stock-based compensation and accounting fraud 
or financial restatements have primarily focused on CEOs and top executives (Erickson et al., 
2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2006; Johnson et al., 2009). In contrast, Baranowski 
(2010) studies the relation between restatements and certain risk factors; namely, the value (not 
sensitivity) of backdated CFO stock options and material internal control weakness. Feng et al. 
(2011) examine the reasons why CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations using 
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data from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC, and not 
financial restatements.  
 Canada provides an ideal alternative laboratory for examining the impact of corporate 
restatements on executive compensation given its similarities and differences with the U.S. Both 
countries share similar legal, institutional and regulatory environments, including corporate 
governance mechanisms and minority shareholder protections but not regulatory enforcement. 
However, Canadian public companies differ from their U.S. counterparts in that the percentages 
of Canadian public firms with controlling shareholders (concentrated ownership), families as the 
ultimate controlling shareholders, and issued restricted or subordinated voting shares and 
pyramidal structures are higher (e.g., Gadhoum et al., 2005; Gadhoum, 2006; King and Santor, 
2008). Since family-controlled firms, for example, are more likely to use dual-class shares as a 
means to separate ownership from control, this separation of ownership from control can create 
additional agency costs (Bebchuk et al., 1999). 
Thus, we extend the previous (primarily U.S.) studies by examining whether the incentives 
from stock options, restricted stocks, equity holdings and the long-term incentive payouts for top 
executives (including CEOs and CFOs) are associated with a higher likelihood of restatement for 
firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).  To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to examine the relation between financial restatements and equity-based compensation incentives 
from a Canadian perspective to further test the robustness of inferences drawn primarily for U.S. 
restatement announcements. 
 We investigate a sample of 146 Canadian firms who announced restatements over the period 
of 1997-2006 and 146 matched control firms using a novel, hand-collected dataset of executive 
compensation. We measure option sensitivity as the change in the value of stock options from a 1% 
change in stock price. Consistent with Erickson et al. (2006), we do not find that firms are more 
likely to restate their financial statements when the sensitivity of total, vested and unvested option 
values are higher for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. Incentives from equity, restricted stocks 
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and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the incidence of restatements for top 
executives, CEOs and CFOs, which is consistent with Burns and Kedia (2006). In contrast to 
Efendi et al. (2007), we do not find that restatements are more likely for firms that have higher in-
the-money stock options. 
Using an ordinal logistic regression to control for different prompters of restatements,
29
 we 
find that total, vested and unvested option sensitivities are not related to the incidence of 
restatements due to accounting malfeasance. Except for the equity holdings of CEOs, restricted 
stock, equity holdings and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the likelihood of 
restatements due to accounting malfeasance for top executives, CEOs and CFOs.  
We examine whether option sensitivity is related to the size of the restatements measured as 
the cumulative impact of restatements on net income. The results indicate that option sensitivities 
for top executives, CEOs and CFOs have no effect on the size of the restatements. We find that 
incentives from restricted stock are related to the size of restatements for top executives, CEOs 
and CFOs, and that higher CFO equity holdings are related to larger restatements.  
 In addition, we do not find any evidence that firms raising more long-term debt and equity 
capital are more likely to misreport financial results in order to reduce the cost of external 
financing. In contrast to Johnson et al. (2009) and Erickson et al. (2006), top executives, CEOs 
and CFOs at restating Canadian firms do not exercise more options during the first year restated 
than their counterparts at control firms. However, we find that top executives and CEOs exercise 
more options during the first year restated when the magnitudes of the restatements are larger. 
                                                             
29
 The ordered logistic regression or proportional odds model is a regression model for ordinal or 
dichotomous dependent variables, allowing for more than two (ordered) response categories such as bond 
ratings. The model only applies to data that meet the assumption that the relationship between any two 
pairs of outcome groups is statistically the same. Thus, the coefficients that describe the relationship 
between, for example, the lowest versus all higher categories of the dependent variable are the same as 
those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories of the 
dependent variable, and so forth. 
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 Our results provide guidance on designing compensation packages for executives. The 
compensation committee needs to find a balance between an increase in incentives to misstate 
financial results and the alignment of the interests of executives and shareholders. Our results 
should also be of interest to regulators in formulating disclosure regulations to minimize the 
occurrence of financial restatements. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief review of 
the prior literature. Section 4.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4.4 discusses the data and our 
sample selection. Section 4.5 investigates the link between executive incentives and the 
likelihood of restatements.  Section 4.6 analyzes the option exercises around with financial 
restatements. Section 4.7 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2 PRIOR LITERATURE 
 Because of potential conflicts between managers and shareholders, one should link 
shareholder wealth with managerial compensation in order to reduce agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). One way to achieve this is to use equity compensation as suggested by the 
literature on optimal contracting (Core et al., 2003).  The use of stock options is usually viewed 
as a means to align the interests of shareholders with those of managers. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that stock option compensation makes a manager’s wealth a convex function of firm value 
such that a manager’s risk aversion might be alleviated. 
 However, equity-based compensation can also have a negative impact. Jensen (2005) argues 
that overvalued stocks may lead to agency problems and stock-based compensation may 
exaggerate the problem because it encourages managers to engage in aggressive accounting to 
take advantage of short-run equity gains. Bergstresser and Philippon (2002) find higher levels of 
earnings management at a firm where the overall compensation of the CEO is closely tied to 
stock prices. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) show that equity ownership creates incentives for 
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managers to choose projects that are less transparent or to move to reduce the transparency of 
existing projects. 
 Using 43 events of fraud from 1992 to 2001, Johnson et al. (2009) find that executives at 
such firms have greater incentives to misrepresent if they hold unrestricted stocks than do 
executives at matching firms. However, they do not find that such firms have greater incentives to 
commit fraud based on their holdings of restricted stocks, vested and unvested stock options. 
Based on their examination of executive incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud during 
1996 and 2003 by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in their Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs), Erickson et al. (2006) conclude that executive equity 
incentives are not associated with accounting fraud. 
 Two papers examine the relation between CEO compensation and the likelihood of financial 
restatements. Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the sensitivity of CEO option values to stock 
prices is positively related to the likelihood of financial misstatement over the period of 1995-
2002. They do not find a significant relation between other components of CEO compensation 
(such as equity, restricted stocks, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus) and the 
propensity to misreport. Efendi et al. (2006) extend the study by Burns and Kedia (2006) by 
investigating whether in-the-money options provide additional incentives to misreport. They find 
that the likelihood of financial restatements is positively related to the value of the in-the-money 
stock options held by CEOs, the firm’s interest-coverage ratio and whether the firm undertakes 
external financing. Given the link between earnings restatements and stock-based compensation, 
Cheng and Farber (2008) investigate whether restating firms recontract with their CEOs to reduce 
option-based compensation. Their results suggest that the proportion of the value of option grants 
over total compensation decreases in the two years following the restatement. The reduction in 
option-based compensation leads to a decrease in the riskiness of investment and therefore an 
increase in firm performance. 
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 Baranowski (2010) examines the relation between restatements due to stock option 
backdating and certain risk characteristics. He finds that firms that restate due to option 
backdating have more material internal control weaknesses than control firms. He finds no 
evidence that CFO option values are related to the likelihood of restatement due to option 
backdating. Feng et al. (2011) examine why CFOs become involved in material accounting 
manipulations using Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).Their findings are 
consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations 
because of pressure from CEOs and not from them seeking immediate personal financial gain 
from equity incentives. 
 
4.3 HYPOTHESES  
  Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that option compensation makes CEO wealth a convex 
function of stock price. As a result, a CEO benefits from an increase in the stock price due to 
misstated financial statements. The loss to a CEO in the event of a declining stock price is limited 
because a CEO will choose not to exercise the options if they are not in-the-money. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) suggest that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to engage in 
earnings management to increase the price of the stocks when sold. Therefore our first hypothesis, 
stated in its alternative form, is as follows: 
 1 :AH The incentives from stock options are positively related to the likelihood of restatements. 
 Stock options usually have a vesting period of three to five years, during which a proportion of 
the shares in the options are exercisable. Firms typically grant stock options each year, so the 
executives for any specific year hold a combination of vested and unvested options. Since 
executives can exercise vested options during periods of misstatements, our second hypothesis, 
stated in its alternative form, is as follows: 
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 2 :AH The incentives from vested options are positively related to the likelihood of 
restatements. 
 Other components of executive compensation, such as restricted stocks, equity and long-term 
incentive payments, also link an executive’s wealth to stock prices. Unlike stock options, 
executives will bear the cost of misstating the financial results since significant negative returns 
are associated with the announcement of financial restatements (Dechow et al., 1996; Anderson 
and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004). Burns and Kedia (2006) argue that long-term incentive 
payouts lengthen the executive’s time horizon by making their wealth a function of longer-term 
firm performance. Our third hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows: 
3 :AH The incentives from equity, restricted stocks and long-term incentive payouts are 
not related to the likelihood of restatements. 
 The cost of new capital raised externally depends on a firm’s financial performance. This 
provides an incentive to misreport financial results. Dechow et al. (1996) and Richardson et al. 
(2003) find that an important reason for earning manipulations is the desire to attract low-cost 
external financing. Our fourth hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, is as follows: 
 4 :AH Restating firms are more likely to raise long-term debt and equity than control 
firms.  
 
4.4 SAMPLE AND DATA  
Restatement announcements for Canadian companies are identified using searches of Lexis-
Nexis News Wires for the ten-year period from January 1997 to December 2006. Key word 
searches are performed using “restate,” “restates,” “restated,” “restating,” or “restatement” as 
well as other variations such as “adjust” and “amend” and “revise” within 50 words of “financial 
statement” or “earnings.” Restatement announcements are excluded if they result from 
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discontinued operations, stock splits, stock dividends, mergers and acquisitions,
30
 changes in 
business segment definitions, changes made for presentation purposes, and changes in currency of 
reporting (for example, converting from Canadian to U.S. dollars). Restatements due to changes 
in accounting policy also are excluded as a general rule because they represent normal corporate 
activities which do not involve accounting fraud or errors.
31
  
Our initial sample consists of 231 restatement announcements for firms listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX).  The sample is reduced to 180 restatements after eliminating six firms 
with insufficient daily stock returns and closing prices in the Canadian Financial Markets 
Research Center (CFMRC) database, four firms with simultaneous trading halts and subsequent 
delistings, eighteen income funds, fifteen firms with multiple restatement announcements during 
the 250 trading days used for analysis purposes, and eight firms with unavailable proxy 
statements or with  first proxy statements filed in the System for Electronic Document Analysis 
and Retrieval (SEDAR) whose dates follow the restatement announcements. We also exclude 
thirteen firms in the financial industry (SIC 60-67) since the interpretation of their ratios are 
different from other firms and their corporate governance is different due to regulation (Efendi et 
al., 2007). This reduces the sample to 167 restatements.  
Following Agrawal et al. (1999), Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Young et al. (2008), we 
match each restating firm with a unique control firm that (1) has the same two-digit Compustat 
primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry code,
32
 (2) has the closest market 
                                                             
30
 For example, a firm restates its financial statements after completion of a merger where the merger was 
accounted for as a pooling of interests. We exclude this type of restatement because it is not associated with 
accounting fraud or error.  
31
We exclude firms adopting new accounting recommendations by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or the Emerging Issues Task Force 
(EITF). However, we include restatement announcements resulting from SEC clarifications of revenue 
recognition in financial statements (SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101) and lease accounting for 
operating lease (Feb.7, 2005, letter from SEC’s Chief Accountant to American Institute of Certified Public 
Accounts clarifying SEC staff's interpretation of certain accounting issues and their application under 
GAAP relating to operating leases). To our knowledge, there are no restatements resulting from the 
changes of Canadian regulations. 
32
We use Bloomberg or Factiva to obtain any missing SICs for restating firms.  
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capitalization to the restating firm at the end of the fiscal year before the announcement year,
33
 
and (3) did not announce any restatement during the period 1997 to 2006. A replacement firm is 
selected if the control firm announced a restatement within the sample period. We add an 
additional requirement that the match firm has disclosure about executive compensation in the 
proxy statements available in SEDAR to calculate executive compensation sensitivity. Market 
capitalization is measured as the monthly closing price times the number of shares outstanding, 
both of which are obtained from CFMRC. The procedure produces our final sample of 146 
sample firms and 146 control firms. 
The financial data for restating firms and control firms are obtained from the Compustat 
database. Missing data with the exception of sales growth are obtained from Mergent online or 
from the financial statements filed with SEDAR. The executive compensation variables are hand 
collected from the proxy statements at the year-end before the first year that was restated. The 
variables that are reported in U.S. dollars are converted into Canadian dollars using the I/B/E/S 
Daily Exchange Rate. 
Summary characteristics for the restating firms differentiated by the reason for the restatement, 
the party initiating the restatement and industry groups based on primary two-digit SIC codes are 
reported in Panels A, B, and C of Table 4.1. Because some firms report multiple reasons for their 
restatements, the total number of reasons reported in Panel A exceeds the total sample size. Cost 
or expense is the most common reason (26.1%), followed by other (21.2%) and revenue 
recognition (18.8%). The frequencies differ from those reported for U.S. restatements (e.g., 
Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004), where revenue 
recognition is the largest restatement category. Based on Panel B of table 4.1, the restatement 
initiators are unknown for 43.2% of the reinstatements, followed by company-initiated 
restatements for 34.9% of the reinstatements. Based on Panel C of table 4.1, 37.7% of the firms 
                                                             
33
 For six restating firms who started trading on the TSX later than the end of the fiscal year before the year 
of the restatement announcements, the match date is the first trading month in the CFMRC.   
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are in manufacturing, followed by 25.3% and 21.2% of the firms in mining and services, 
respectively. There are no financial restatements by firms in Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 
and construction.  Based on Panel D of table 4.1, the mean sample firms restate more than one 
year of financial statements (mean=1.48). The magnitude or size of the restatements is measured 
as the cumulative effect of restatement on net income. It is calculated as the restated income (loss) 
less originally reported income (loss) over the restated period. This data are collected from the 
financial statements and the restatement announcements. The restatements, on average, reduce the 
annual net income by 438.52 million dollars. The size of a restatement is scaled by the total assets 
in the year prior to the restatement announcement. On average, restatements represent about 3% 
of total assets. 
The restating firms are classified into five mutually exclusive groups for their financial 
constraint status using the algorithm by Hadlock and Piere (2010), whose details are provided in 
Appendix 4.1.
34
 Based on Panel E of Table 4.1, 6.3% of the firms are not financially constrained 
(NFC), 23.8% of the firms are likely not financially constrained (LNFC), 58% of the firms are 
potentially financially constrained (PFC), 6.3% of the firms are likely financially constrained 
(LFC) and 5.6% of the firms are financially constrained.  
[Please insert table 4.1 about here.]  
 
4.5 EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES AND THE INCIDENCE OF RESTATEMENT 
4.5.1 Measurement of Executive Incentives 
We define stock option sensitivity as the change in the value of a stock option for a 1% change 
in stock price. Consistent with the literature, we use the following modified Black-Scholes model 
adjusted for dividend payout by Merton (1973) to value the stock options.  
                                                             
34
 Three firms are not classified because the first year restated is before 1997. As a result, their financial 
statements are not available in SEDAR. 
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)]()([ )2/1(TZNXeZNSeValueOption rTdT             (4.1) 
where Z=[log(S/X) +T(r-d+2/2)]/T1/2; N is the cumulative probability function for the normal 
distribution; 
  
S is the price of the underlying stock; X is the exercise price of the option, T is the 
time-to-maturity of the option in years; r is the risk-free rate corresponding to the option’s time-
to-maturity; d is the natural logarithm of the expected dividend yield; and  is the expected stock 
return volatility.  
The stock price is the closing price at the fiscal year end before the first reporting year that is 
restated.
35
 The Canadian Treasury bond average yield corresponding to the option’s time-to-
maturity is used as an estimate for the risk free rate. The bond yield is collected from the 
Canadian Socio-Economic Information Management System (CANSIM II). The average dividend 
yield (adjusted for stock splits) over the past three years prior to the first year that is restated is 
used as a proxy for the expected dividend yield. The expected stock return volatility is measured 
as the standard deviation of stock returns over 60 months prior to the first year restated.  
For newly granted options, strike price and time to maturity are obtained directly from proxy 
statements. For previously granted options, the one-year approximation method of Core and Guay 
(1999, 2002) is used to estimate the strike price and the time to maturity. Time to maturity for 
unvested options is calculated as one year less than the time-to-maturity of the most recent year’s 
grant (or nine years if no option is granted in the most recent year). Time to maturity for vested 
options is calculated as three years less than the time-to-maturity of unvested options (or six years 
if no option is granted in the most recent year). The average exercise prices for vested and 
unvested options are calculated as the year-end price minus the profit per option. Profit per option 
                                                             
35
 Quoted closing mid-spreads are used as the proxies for any missing closing prices. 
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is calculated as the realizable values disclosed in the proxy statement divided by the number of 
options at the fiscal year end.
36
  
The sensitivity of the value of q stock option with respect to a 1% change in stock price is 
estimated as: 




N(Z) is the partial derivative of the Black-Scholes value with respect to stock price (i.e., 
the option’s delta); and all the other terms are as previously defined. The sensitivities of newly 
granted options, vested options and unvested options are estimated separately, and the sum of 
these three measures is the total option sensitivity.  
Similar to Burns and Kedia (2006) and Erickson et al. (2006), the sensitivity of the value of 
stock and restricted stock is defined as the change in the value of these holdings for a 1% change 
in stock price. We assume that the delta of both restricted stock and stock is equal to one, which 
means that a one dollar change in stock price results in a one dollar change in the value of stock 
and restricted stocks.  The sensitivity of stock (or restricted stock) is estimated by multiplying the 
number of shares of stock (or restricted stock) held by 1% of the stock price at the year-end 
before the first year that is restated.   
The impact of payouts for Long-term Incentive Plans (LTIP) is measured as the LTIP payouts 
divided by total compensation. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual 
compensation, restricted stock grants, LTIP payouts, all other compensation and value of newly 
granted options using the modified Black-Scholes methodology.  
                                                             
36
 To avoid double counting the newly granted options, the number and realizable value of new options is 
deducted from the number and realizable value of unexercisable options. If the number of newly granted 
options exceeds the number of unexercisable options, the excess of the number and realizable value of the 
newly granted options over unexercisable options is deducted from the number and realizable value of 
exercisable options.  
)100/()()100/()(/)( priceZNepricepricevalueoption dT  
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For top executives, the incentive variables are calculated as the average over the top five 
executives listed in the proxy statements.
37
 If firms have co-CEOs or two CEOs (CFOs) during 
the transition period, the incentive variables are summed over the co-CEOs or two CEOs (CFOs). 
 
4.5.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics of the financial variables for the restating and 
matched control firms. Both the median sales and total assets of control firms are significantly 
smaller than restating firms (p-value=0.09 and 0.00, respectively). The mean (median) leverage 
ratio is about 0.13 (0.06) for restating firms and 0.12 (0.03) for control firms. The mean (median) 
ROA is about -9.94% (-1.09%) for restating firms and -8.15% (0.36%) for control firms. 
However, we do not find that the restating firms are significantly more leveraged and have worse 
performance than control firms at the year-end prior to the first year that the financials are 
restated. Restating firms have a significantly higher mean sales growth rate (p-values=0.07) than 
control firms. Although restating firms, on average, raise more long-term debt than control firms, 
the difference is not statistically significant.  Restating firms also raise more equity capital than 
control firms based on the median (p-value=0.06). Debt and equity funds raised is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the long-term debt and new equity raised during the first year 
restated exceeds 20% of total assets, and zero otherwise. Both the mean and median for this 
dummy variable are significant at the 5% level. Consistent with Efendi et al. (2007), restating 
firms issue more debt and equity funds than control firms during the first year restated. Restating 
firms have an insignificantly higher percentage of CEOs that are the chairs of their boards. 
Restating firms have the same percentage of CEOs belonging to the founding family as control 
firms. Consistent with Erickson et al. (2006), restating firms have significantly higher stock 
                                                             
37
 Erickson et al. (2006) use the aggregated incentive variables over the entire management teams. We use 
the mean values instead of aggregated values because restating firms may report different numbers of 
executives from control firms (see Johnson et al., 2005). 
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volatility than control firms (p-values for mean and median=0.01 and 0.03, respectively). Analyst 
following in number is obtained from I/B/E/S, and is assumed to be zero if the firm is not 
included in the I/B/E/S database. Restating firms are followed by more analysts (mean=4) than 
control firms (mean=2). Both the differences in the mean and median are statistically significant 
(p-values for mean and median=0.00 and 0.00, respectively). 
 [Please insert table 4.2 about here.]  
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for executive compensation and incentive measures 
for the restating and control firms. Panel A reports the variables for top executives, measured at 
the year-end before the first restated year. The average salaries of top executives are $241,807 for 
restating firms, and $188,001 for the control firms. The difference in the means is marginally 
significant (p-value=0.07). Restating firms’ top executives also have higher bonuses than their 
control firm counterparts. However, the differences are not statistically significant for both the 
mean and the median. The mean  restricted stock grants for top executives at restating firms of 
$27,236  is significantly different from the $3,438 for control firms (p-value=0.06).   
The option grant value is calculated using the modified Black-Scholes model adjusted for 
dividend payouts, where the number of options granted is taken from the proxy statements. The 
in-the-money option is the value that executives would have realized from exercising all vested 
and unvested options. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual, long-term 
incentive payouts, other compensation, option grant value and restricted stock grant value. Top 
executives at restating firms have higher values of granted options, in-the-money options, and 
total compensations than at control firms. However, none of the differences are statistically 
significant.  
Total options sensitivity is the sum of newly granted stock options sensitivity, vested option 
sensitivity and unvested option sensitivity. Total sensitivity is the sum of total options sensitivity, 
restricted stocks sensitivity and equity sensitivity. The mean vested option sensitivity, unvested 
option sensitivity and total option sensitivity are insignificantly higher for top executives at 
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restating firms than at control firms. The mean restricted stock sensitivity of $158.0 for restating 
firms is significantly different (marginally) from the mean sensitivity of restricted stock of $20.6 
for the control firms. Although equity sensitivity and total sensitivity for top executives are higher 
for control firms than restating firms, the differences are not statistically significant. 
Panels B and C in Table 4.3 report summary statistics for the compensation and incentives 
variables for only CEOs and only CFOs, respectively. The number of observations for Panels B 
and C are lower than for Panel A due to the exclusion of firms where CEO or CFO 
compensations are not disclosed in the proxy statements. Similar to top executives, CEOs at 
restating firms have marginally higher mean salary (p-value=0.10), marginally higher restricted 
stock grants (p-values=0.08 and 0.06 for mean and median differences, respectively) and higher 
mean restricted stock sensitivities (p-value=0.09) than at control firms. The other compensation 
variables and incentive measures are not significantly different from each other. For CFOs, none 
of the variables is statistically significant.  
[Please insert table 4.3 about here.] 
 
4.5.3 Logistic Regression  
In this section, we examine whether the differences in incentive measures are associated with 
the likelihood of restatement after controlling for other determinants. We estimate the following 
logistic regression: 
 RESTATE=f (Total option sensitivity or Vested option sensitivity and unvested option  
         sensitivity, Restricted stock sensitivity, Equity sensitivity, Long-term     
              incentive plans (LTIP) payouts, Capitalraise, Volatility, CEOCHAIR,    
              CEOFOUND, Leverage, Sales growth),           (4.3) 
  
where RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm and zero 
if the firm is a control firm. We use the logarithmic transformation for the option incentive 
measures, because these measures increase at a decreasing rate with firm size according to Baker 
and Hall (1998) and Core and Guay (1999). Total option sensitivity is the natural logarithm of the 
 79 
dollar change in the value of total stock options holdings, including newly granted options, vested 
options and unvested options, for a 1% change in stock price. Vested and unvested option 
sensitivity is the dollar change in the value of the holdings of vested and unvested options for a 1% 
change in stock price. Equity and restricted stock sensitivity is the dollar change in the value of 
equity and restricted stock holdings for a 1% change in stock prices. Long-term incentive 
payment is calculated as the long-term incentive payments divided by total compensation. All the 
incentive variables are measured in the year prior to the first year restated. 
Capitalraise is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the long-term debt and new equity 
raised during the first year restated exceeds 20% of total assets, and zero otherwise. Firms may 
manipulate the earnings in order to attract low cost external funding (Dechow et al., 1996; 
Richardson et al., 2002).  We hypothesize a positive relation between the amount of debt and 
equity raised and the incidence of restatement. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of 
stock returns over the 60 months prior to the first year restated. Firms operating in less 
predictable environments are more difficult to monitor, and therefore find it easier to commit 
financial fraud (Erickson et al., 2006). We hypothesize a positive relation between volatility and 
the likelihood of restatement. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is 
also the Board Chair and zero otherwise. The board’s monitoring function is less effective when 
the CEO is also the Board Chair (Jensen, 1993; Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996), so we 
hypothesize a positive relation between CEOCHAIR and the likelihood of restatement. 
CEOFOUND is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO belongs to the founding family 
of the firm and zero otherwise. Dechow et al. (1996) argue that CEOs are less accountable to the 
board when they are also the company founders. We hypothesize that the likelihood of 
restatement is higher for firms with CEOs that belong to the founding family. Leverage is 
calculated as the ratio of total Long-term debt divided by total assets at the year-end before the 
first year restated. Leverage is a proxy for the firm’s demand for external financing which may 
explain why earnings are manipulated to avoid debt covenant violations (Dechow et al., 1996). 
 80 
We therefore hypothesize a positive relation between leverage and the likelihood of restatement. 
Sales growth is calculated as the compound growth rate of sales in the three years preceding the 
first year restated. Richardson et al. (2002) note that restatement firms are associated with high 
growth rates because they are under great pressure to inflate the earnings to meet expectations of 
analysts. We hypothesize a positive relation between growth rates and the incidence of 
restatement.  
The logistic regression results are reported in Table 4.4. Panels A and B present the model 
results when the control variables are not included. Contrary to the first hypothesis and the results 
of Burns and Kedia (2006), total option sensitivities with respect to stock price for CEOs are not 
significantly positively related to the likelihood of restatements. We do not find any evidence that 
the total option sensitivity of top executives and CFOs are positively associated with the 
probability of restatements. In contrast to the second hypothesis and the findings of Burns and 
Kedia (2006), the incentives from vested options are not significantly related to the likelihood of 
restatements for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. Consistent with our third hypothesis, incentives 
from equity and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the likelihood of 
restatements for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. However, restricted stock sensitivities are 
positively related to the incidence of restatements for top executives.  
[Please insert table 4.4 about here.] 
Panels C and D of Table 4.4 present the model results when the control variables are included. 
Even after controlling for other determinants, the incentives from total options and vested options 
are not associated with a higher likelihood to restate for top executives, CEOs, and CFOs. This is 
in contrast to our first hypothesis and the findings of Burns and Kedia (2006), but consistent with 
Erickson et al. (2006). We find no evidence that unvested option sensitivity is related to the 
likelihood of restatements. Restricted stock holdings, equity holdings and long-term incentive 
payouts are not associated with a higher likelihood of restatement. This is consistent with our 
third hypothesis and the findings of Burns and Kedia (2006). Consistent with the univariate 
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analysis, firms with higher stock return volatility (except for CEOs) and higher sales growth rates 
are more likely to restate. However, there is no evidence that more levered firms and those with 
the CEO also being the Chair of the Board or belonging to the founding family have a higher 
probability of restatements. In contrast to our fourth hypothesis, we do not find that restating 
firms are more likely to raise long-term debt and equity capital than control firms during the first 
year restated since none of the coefficients for dummy variable Capitalraise is significant.  
 
4.5.4 Ordinal logistic regression 
In the previous section, we do not distinguish the prompters (initiators) for all restatements. 
We now run a logistic regression using an ordinal dependent variable to control for the 
restatement severity since some of the restatements are voluntary while others are mandated by 
the regulator or auditor. Similar to Efendi et al. (2007), we define a firm having accounting 
malfeasance if either the regulator or auditor prompted the restatement. The ordinal dependent 
variable is equal to two if the firm has accounting malfeasance, one for all other restatements, and 
zero for control firms. The explanatory variables are the same as in the previous section.   
The ordinal logistic regression results, which are reported in Table 4.5, are very similar to 
those in Table 4.4. The option sensitivities (total, vested and unvested) are not related to the 
incidence of restatements due to accounting malfeasance. Except for the equity holdings of CEOs, 
restricted stock, equity holdings and long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the 
likelihood of restatements due to accounting malfeasance for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. 
Firms with higher stock return volatilities (except for CEOs) and higher sales growth rates 
(except for CFOs) are more likely to be associated with restatements due to accounting 
malfeasance. More levered firms and those with the CEO as the Chair of the Board or belonging 
to the founding family are not related to the likelihood of restatements due to accounting 
malfeasance.  
[Please insert table 4.5 about here.] 
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4.5.5 The impact of option sensitivity on the size of the restatement 
Burns and Kedia (2006) find that misreporting earnings that are substantially restated is more 
likely to be associated with CEOs with large option sensitivity. Although we do not find a 
relation between the likelihood of restatement and option sensitivity, option sensitivity may still 
be related to the size of the restatements. 
The size of a restatement is measured as the cumulative impact of a restatement on net 
income and is calculated as the restated net income less the originally reported net income over 
the restated period. The values are scaled by the total assets in the year prior to the restatement 
announcements. For control firms, the size of the restatement is zero.  Thus, the dependent 
variable is the absolute value of the cumulative effect of a restatement on net income scaled by 
total assets. The regression results are reported in Table 4.6. None of the coefficients of total 
option sensitivity are significant for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. This suggests that option 
sensitivity has no impact on the magnitude of restatements. Similarly, we do not find that 
incentives from restricted stock are related to the magnitude of restatement for top executives, 
CEOs and CFOs. Although there is no evidence that incentives from top executives and CEO 
equity holdings are associated with the magnitude of restatement, we find large restatements are 
associated with higher CFO equity sensitivity.  
[Please insert table 4.6 about here.]  
 
4.6 OPTION EXERCISES 
 In this section, we examine exercise behavior for executive options. Panels A, B and C of 
Table 4.7 report the dollar values of options exercised and the ratios of the number of exercised 
options to total number of exercisable options during the first year restated for top executives, 
CEOs and CFOs, respectively. The mean value of options exercised for top executives at restating 
firms and control firms is 1,054,092.4 and 227,568.8, respectively, whose difference is not 
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significant. The top executives of restating firms exercise 91% of exercisable options compared to 
9% for their counterparts at the control firms. However, the difference again is not statistically 
significant. The CEOs for restating firms have a marginally significant and higher mean value of 
options exercised and a higher percentage of exercised options to the total number of exercisable 
options (p-value=0.10 and 0.06, respectively). In contrast, the mean value of options exercised 
and ratio of exercised options to total number of exercisable options are not significantly different 
for CFOs at restating firms from those at control firms. 
 We now run a regression to control for the other factors that might affect option exercises. 
The dummy variable RESTATE is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm and zero if the firm 
is a control firm. The results are reported in Panel D of Table 4.7. The results suggest that the 
value of exercised options for top executives is positively related to the value of the in-the-money 
options and the magnitude of restatement. Consistent with Efendi et al. (2007), we also find that 
the value of exercised options for CEOs increases with the value of in-the-money options. 
Furthermore, we find that CEOs exercise more options when the magnitude of restatement is 
higher. The results also indicate that similar to top executives and CEOs, the value of options 
exercises increases with the value of in-the-money options for CFOs. CFOs also exercise more 
options when they have higher salaries. However, none of the coefficients for the dummy variable 
RESTATE are statistically significant for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. Our overall results 
suggest that consistent with Erickson et al. (2006), top executives, CEOs and CFOs at restating 
firms do not exercise more options than at control firms during the first year subsequently 
restated.  
[Please insert table 4.7 about here.]  
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 We examine the effects of executive equity incentives on the propensity to misstate financial 
statements for a sample of 146 firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange who announced 
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financial restatements during the period from 1997 to 2006 and for 146 control firms. We find 
that the likelihood of restatements is unrelated to the sensitivity of total, vested and unvested 
options for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. The incentives from equity, restricted stocks and 
long-term incentive payouts are not associated with the incidence of restatements for top 
executives, CEOs and CFOs. . 
After controlling for the different prompters of restatements, we find the option sensitivities 
(total, vested and unvested) are not related to the incidence of restatements due to accounting 
malfeasance. Except for the equity holdings of CEOs, restricted stock, equity holdings and long-
term incentive payouts are not associated with the likelihood of restatements due to accounting 
malfeasance for top executives, CEOs and CFOs.  
We also find that option sensitivities for top executives, CEOs and CFOs have no effect on 
the magnitude of restatements. Similarly, incentives from restricted stock are unrelated to the 
magnitude of restatements for top executives, CEOs and CFOs. Higher CFO equity holdings are 
associated with bigger restatements.  
 In addition, we do not find any evidence that firms raising more long-term debt and equity 
capital are more likely to misreport financial results in order to reduce the cost of external 
financing. Top executives, CEOs and CFOs at restating firms do not exercise more options during 
the first year restated and have more holdings of in-the-money stock options than control firms. 
Top executives and CEOs also exercise more options during the first year restated when the 




When a firm announces a restatement of its financial statements, market participants ask: 
What are the impacts of the restatements on stock prices, market microstructure and return 
volatility? Motivated by this question, the first essay studied the effects of Canadian financial 
restatement announcements on liquidity, spread components, (un)informed arrival rates, informed 
trading probabilities, analyst followings and earnings forecasts, price effects, residual return 
volatilities and their components, and price synchronicities over 1997-2006. The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that information asymmetry increases after restatement 
announcements since the arrival rates of (un)informed investors, residual return volatilities and 
their permanent component and illiquidity increase significantly after restatement announcements. 
After controlling for spread determinants (such as price, volume and volatility), we found that 
both relative quoted and effective spreads increased in the announcement windows for the full 
sample, remained higher post-announcement, and were lower for U.S. cross-listed firms, and after 
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. The spread-depth market quality index decreased 
during the announcement window and was higher for U.S. cross-listed firms. The negative 
abnormal returns associated with restatement announcements were significantly related to 
downward revisions in the consensus forecasts of earnings of analysts. More negative abnormal 
returns were associated with restatements involving revenue recognition problems and those 
initiated by the company. Total residual volatility and its information-based permanent 
component from a GARCH model with an asymmetric effect and the adverse selection spread 
component increased following restatement announcements.  Thus, our findings support the 
overriding hypothesis that financial restatements diminish market quality and send two 
information signals to market participants. The first signal is that the future earnings prospects of 
the restating firms are diminished; and the second signal is that the uncertainty of future cash 
flows of the restating firms due to increased informational asymmetry has increased. 
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Given the negative impact of financial restatements on market quality, the second essay 
examined the corporate governance of Canadian firms that announced restatements during the 
1997-2006 period. We found that the likelihood of financial restatements are lower when firms 
have bigger blockholder and management ownerships, a lower leverage ratio, an audit committee 
that includes at least one director with financial expertise, or an external auditor that is a big 5 
auditing firm. However, the likelihood of restatement announcements is not higher for firms with 
a lower proportion of unrelated directors, or whose CEO is also the Board Chair or belongs to the 
founding family. Using logistic regressions that control for other determinants of turnover, we 
found that the turnovers of the CEO, President, top executives, CFO and external auditor are 
significantly higher compared to industry and size-matched control firms within two years 
following the restatement announcements. However, we do not find restatement announcements 
are related to a higher turnover of the Board Chair, unrelated directors and audit committee 
membership. Although the CEO, President, and CFO turnovers are still positively related to 
restatements in the post-SOX period, we found no evidence that the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 increased the likelihood of turnover rates following restatement announcements. 
Evidence was also provided that restating firms try to improve their governance after restatement 
announcements as the number and proportion of unrelated directors and unrelated audit 
committee members as well as blockholder ownership increased after restatement announcements. 
Following the announcements, there was no significant difference in governance characteristics 
between restating firms and control firms.  
 We further investigated the reason why firms misstate their financial results despite the 
consequences that we found in the first two essays. Using stock options in designing executive 
compensation packages can either align the incentives of managers with those of shareholders or 
create motivations for executives to manipulate the financial statements and therefore reduce 
shareholder value. In the third essay, we examined whether the executive equity incentives are 
related to the propensity to misstate financial statements. In contrast to our hypothesis, we found 
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that the incidence of restatements is unrelated to the sensitivity of total, vested and unvested 
options for top executives, CEOs and CFOs even if we controlled for the different prompters of 
restatements, or to the incentives from equity, restricted stocks and long-term incentive payouts to 
top executives, CEOs (except for equity holdings) and CFOs. Although we found that option 
sensitivities for top executives, CEOs and CFOs have no effect on the magnitude of restatements, 
the size of the restatements were higher when CFOs have higher equity holdings. Our results also 
did not support the notion that firms raising more long-term debt and equity capital are more 
likely to misstate in order to reduce the cost of external financing. While top executives, CEOs 
and CFOs at restating firms did not exercise more options during the first year restated and have 
more holdings of in-the-money stock options than control firms, top executives and CEOs did 
exercise more options during the first year restated when the magnitudes of the restatements were 
higher. 
One possible explanation for not significantly higher stock options incentives for 
misreporting is that large holdings of equity and restricted stock might offset the effect of stock 
options. This is because executives bear the consequences of misstating the financial results 
unless they can sell before the stock price decreases once the restated information is disclosed. It 
would be interesting to examine whether executives at restating firms sell their stocks to take 
advantage of short-run gains before the misreporting is revealed. The results also have 
implications for the design of the compensation contracts of executives. To reduce the incentives 
from stock options to misreport, one might use more equity and restricted stocks instead of stock 
options. 
According to Becker’s (1968) economic theory of crime, people commit crime because the 
expected utility of the payoffs exceeds the expected disutility of getting caught and punished. 
Assuming that stock-based compensation is designed to align the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders in order to maximize a firm’s long-term value, two questions are: First, why are 
managers willing to take the risk of being caught and punished and still have the incentive to 
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misreport? Second, why would the payoffs from misreporting in the short run outweigh the 
payoffs from maximizing the firm value in the long-term.  Since we found that restating firms 
have significantly higher growth rates than control firms, one possible answer to these questions 
is that firms with higher growth opportunities are more difficult to monitor (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Smith and Watts, 1992), which may lower the probability of getting caught for misconduct.  
In response to the increasing corporate scandals, clawback provisions were introduced for 
U.S. public companies. “Clawback” means a repayment of previously awarded compensation by 
an executive to his or her employer under a certain trigger event. Under the clawback provision of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX section 304), if the firm is required to prepare an 
accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer as a result of misconduct, 
the CEO and CFO are required to reimburse the firm for any bonus or other incentive-based 
compensation received and any profits realized from the sale of securities during the 12-month 
period following the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever occurs first) 
of misstated financial statements. Under the clawback provision of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act section 954), in the event 
of an accounting restatement required due to material noncompliance, any current and former 
executive officer is required to reimburse the firm for incentive-based compensation (including 
stock options) in excess of what would have been paid under the accounting restatement during 
the three-year period preceding the date on which the company is required to prepare the 
accounting restatement. Canadian firms that are cross-listed in the U. S. are subject to the 
clawback provisions of both Acts. Certain Canadian financial institutions regulated by the Office 
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) have adopted clawbacks as an OSFI-
recommended best practice. However, other Canadian public firms are not required to adopt 
clawback policies. According to the study of Tuzyk (2011), 27 firms in the S&P/TSX 60 have 
clawback policies and only three out of these firms choose to adopt the clawback policies 
although they were not subject to either the U.S. provisions or OSFI-recommended best practices. 
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We leave a study of whether clawback provisions prevent or at least reduce the incidence of 
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Table 2. 1. Summary descriptive statistics on the sample of Canadian financial restatements 
This table reports the characteristics of 210 Canadian financial restatements during the period 
1997-2006. The total number of reasons exceeds the total number of restatements because some 
restatements involve more than one reason. 
 
Panel A: Reason for restatement 
Reason for Restatement Number Frequency (%) 
Cost or expense 59 25.7 
Other 49 21.3 
Revenue recognition 38 16.5 
Securities related 34 14.8 
Restructuring, assets or inventory 20 8.7 
Reclassification 15 6.5 
Acquisition or merger 11 4.8 
Related-party transaction 2 0.9 
In-process research and development  2 0.9 
Total 230 100.0 
 
Panel B: Initiating parties of the restatements 
Initiators Number Frequency (%) 
Company 70 33.3 
Auditor 15 7.1 
Company and Auditor 21 10.0 
Regulator 5 2.4 
Other 9 4.3 
Unknown 90 42.9 
Total 210 100.0 
   
Panel C: Industry distribution   
Industry and 2 digit SIC code  Number Frequency (%) 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (01-09) 1 0.5 
Mining (10-14) 52 24.8 
Manufacturing (20-39) 65 31.0 
Transportation, Communications, & Utility Services 
(40-49) 
20 9.5 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 4 1.9 
Retail Trade (52-59) 12 5.7 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (60-67) 17 8.1 
Services (70-89) 39 18.6 






Table 2. 1. Continued 
Panel D: Distribution of restatements by year   
Year Number Frequency (%) 
1997 1 0.5 
1998 5 2.4 
1999 11 5.2 
2000 7 3.3 
2001 21 10.0 
2002 15 7.1 
2003 18 8.6 
2004 35 16.7 
2005 41 19.5 
2006 56 26.7 
Total  210 100.0 
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Table 2. 2. Descriptive statistics for measures of liquidity around restatement 
announcements 
This table reports summary statistics for various measures of liquidity around 210 restatement 
announcements (RAs). The relative quoted spread in % is measured as the difference between ask 
and bid prices divided by the bid-ask midpoint. The absolute effective spread in dollars is defined 
as twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the prevailing quote 
midpoint. The relative effective spread in % is measured as the absolute effective spread divided 
by the spread midpoint. Amihud (2002) illiquidity is the daily ratio of the absolute stock return to 
its dollar volume (multiplied by 10
4
). Dollar depth is equal to: (ask price*ask size) + (bid 
price*bid size). Dollar volume (in thousands) is the sum of trading volume (in thousands) times 
the trade price for each trade. The market quality index is the ratio of half quoted depth to the 
relative quoted spread. Pre-restatement or Pre-RA consists of 46 trading days ending ten days 
before the announcement. The post-restatement or Post-RA also consists of 46 trading days 
starting ten days after the announcement. Difference is calculated as the Post-RA value minus the 
Pre-RA value. St. Dev. refers to the standard deviation. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Measure Statistics Pre-RA Post-RA Difference 
Relative quoted 
spread 
Mean 0.0359 0.0366 0.0008 
Median 0.0204 0.0209 -0.0000 
St. Dev. 0.0400 0.0411 0.0192 
t-stat   0.56 
Wilcoxon p value   0.28 
Relative effective 
spread 
Mean 0.0288 0.0296 0.0009 
Median 0.0169 0.0169 -0.0001 
St. Dev. 0.0336 0.0341 0.0215 
t-stat   0.57 
Wilcoxon p value   0.65 
Amihud 
illiquidity 
Mean 0.1599 0.2148 0.0549 
Median 0.0035 0.0039 0.0000 
St. Dev. 0.8328 0.9137 0.7281 
t-stat   1.08 
Wilcoxon p value   0.07* 
Dollar depth 
(00s) 
Mean 443.9855 429.9851 -14.0004 
Median 255.2020 255.6857 -13.6599 
St. Dev. 674.7128 619.9911 264.6934 
t-stat   -0.77 
Wilcoxon p value   0.06* 
Dollar volume 
(000s) 
Mean 3932.674 4202.991 270.317 
Median 207.204 199.957 2.695 
St. Dev. 13456.260 13557.280 5325.878 
t-stat   0.73 
Wilcoxon p value   0.33 
Market Quality 
index (00s) 
Mean 7353.21 7547.81 194.599 
Median 2083.00 2032.73 -33.323 
St. Dev. 25918.52 24012.62 4495.55 
t-stat   0.53 
Wilcoxon p value   0.92 
 101 
Table 2. 3. Liquidity around restatement announcements for the subsamples 
This table reports summary statistics for various measures of liquidity around restatement 
announcements for the subsamples differentiated by restatement reasons. The measures of 
liquidity are defined in Table 2.  Pre-restatement announcement or Pre-RA period consists of    46 
trading days ending ten days before the announcement. The post-restatement announcement or 
Post-RA period consists of 46 trading days starting ten days after the announcement. Difference 
(Diff.) is calculated as the Post-RA value minus the Pre-RA value. St. Dev. refers to the standard 
deviation. The other five restatement reasons are not reported since the results are not 
significantly different. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
N is the sample size. 
 
 
Relative quoted spread 
Relative effective 
spread 





















Cost or expense (N = 59 ) 
Mean 0.031 0.031 0.000 0.024 0.026 0.001 0.283 0.189 -0.094 547.56 567.35 19.80 
Median 0.015 0.016 -0.000 0.013 0.011 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 364.02 401.70 -5.27 
t-stat   0.00   0.74   -1.31   0.64 
Wilcoxon p    0.87   0.83   0.12   0.73 
Revenue recognition (N = 38) 
Mean 0.035 0.041 0.006 0.029 0.037 0.009 0.070 0.379 0.309 624.39 575.74 -48.66 
Median 0.028 0.032 0.005 0.024 0.024 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.001 234.53 159.27 -52.14 
t-stat   2.27
**




  -1.11 
Wilcoxon p    0.01
***







Reclassification (N = 15 ) 
Mean 0.025 0.022 -0.003 0.020 0.018 -0.002 0.028 0.018 -0.011 824.76 812.40 -12.36 
Median 0.021 0.016 -0.001 0.019 0.015 -0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.000 290.31 315.68 3.04 
t-stat   -0.95   -0.76   -0.51   -0.37 
Wilcoxon p    0.30   0.23   0.33   0.89 
Other (N = 49 ) 
Mean 0.043 0.045 0.002 0.034 0.032 -0.002 0.121 0.273 0.152 419.61 374.51 -45.11 
Median 0.021 0.022 -0.000 0.014 0.016 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.000 207.24 223.63 -4.96 
t-stat   0.72   -0.81   1.31   -0.90 
Wilcoxon p    0.95   0.15   0.40   0.74 
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Table 2. 4. Multivariate analysis of changes in market liquidity for firms financially 
restating 
This table reports the parameter estimates of log-linear, pooled cross-sectional time-series 




















where t=1 represents the pre-restatement period [-55, -10], t=2 represents the post-restatement 
period [10, 55], and t=3 represents the three-day event window [0,2].  LnSpreadit  is the natural 
logarithm of the relative quoted or effective spread for stock i during window t. 
LnMarket_quality_indexit is the natural logarithm of market quality index for stock i during 
window t. LnPriceit, LnVolumeit and LnVolatilityit  are the natural logarithms of average daily 
closing prices, average daily trading volumes in number of shares and standard deviations of 
daily returns for stock i over the three windows, respectively. Crosslisti is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if stock i is cross-listed and zero otherwise. Sarbanesi is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if restatement of stock i is announced after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 2002 
and zero otherwise. Post-restatementi is a dummy variable that is equal to one in the post-
restatement period and zero otherwise. Restate is a dummy variable that is equal to one in the 
three-day event window [0, 2] and is zero otherwise. The t-stat uses White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard error estimates.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 




Ln(Market quality index) 
Independent 
variables 
























































Adjusted R2 0.82 0.77 0.53 
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Table 2. 5. The components of the bid-ask spreads 
This table reports the estimates of the permanent and transitory components of the bid-ask spread 
using both the Glosten and Harris model and Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans model. Pre-
restatement announcement or Pre-RA period consists of 46 trading days ending ten days before 
the announcement. The post-restatement announcement or Post-RA period consists of 46 trading 
days starting ten days after the announcement. Difference is calculated as the Post-RA value 
minus the Pre-RA value. Mean (Median) ($) is mean (median) dollar spread component.  Mean 
(Median) (%) is proportional mean (median) spread component. Both models discard 
observations with negative spread component estimates. N is the sample size. t-test and Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests are used to test the average differences in each spread component between the 
pre-and post-restatement announcement periods. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
 Permanent Component Transitory Component 
 Pre-RA Post-RA Difference Pre-RA Post-RA Difference 
Panel A: Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) model (N=168) 
Mean ($) 0.0132 0.0212 0.0080 0.0134 0.0071 -0.0063 
Median ($) 0.0062 0.0084 0.0012 0.0048 0.0043 -0.0005 
t-stat   3.26***   -2.51** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.00***   0.00*** 
Mean (%) 0.6220 0.8078 0.1858 0.3780 0.1922 -0.1858 
Median(%) 0.4781 0.5566 0.0824 0.5219 0.4434 -0.0824 
t-stat   3.02***   -3.02*** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.00***   0.00*** 
 
Panel B: Glosten and Harris (1988 ) model (N=196) 
Mean ($) 0.0157 0.0163 0.0006 0.0423 0.0341 -0.0083 
Median ($) 0.0082 0.0071 -0.0005 0.0242 0.0194 -0.0011 
t-stat   0.21   -2.41** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.00***   0.00*** 
Mean (%) 0.2774 0.3195 0.0421 0.7226 0.6805 -0.0421 
Median(%) 0.2389 0.2450 0.0018 0.7611 0.7550 -0.0018 
t-stat   0.80   -0.80 
Wilcoxon p value   0.69   0.69 
 
Panel C: Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) model (Revenue recognition subsample) 
Mean ($) 0.0131 0.0241 0.0110 0.0123 0.0048 -0.0083 
Median ($) 0.0111 0.0110 0.0013 0.0048 0.0036 -0.0008 
t-stat   2.14**   -2.01** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.20   0.06* 
 
Panel D: Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) model (Cost or expense subsample) 
Mean ($) 0.0111 0.0246 0.0135 0.0205 0.0104 -0.0101 
Median ($) 0.0056 0.0088 0.0016 0.0076 0.0047 -0.0013 
t-stat   2.30**   -2.47** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.00***   0.01*** 
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Table 2. 6. Results for the Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman or EKOP (1996) Model  
This table reports the EKOP parameter estimates for restatements announcements. Pre-
restatement period consists of 46 trading days ending ten days before the restatement 
announcement. The post-restatement period consists of 46 trading days starting ten days after the 
restatement announcement. St. Dev. refers to the standard deviation. α is the probability of an 
information event,  is the probability of bad news,   is the arrival rate of informed traders, and  
is the arrival rate of uninformed traders. PIN is a function of the parameters that represents the 
probability of informed trade (equation (5) in the body of the paper). For α,  and PIN, change is 
calculated as the post-restatement value minus the pre-restatement value. For  and , change is 
calculated as post-restatement over the pre-restatement minus one. t- and Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests are conducted for differences in average values between the pre- and post-restatement 
announcement periods. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 α    PIN 
Panel A: Pre-restatement (Full sample) 
Mean 0.3361 0.4987 118.2233 100.3512 0.2620 
Median 0.3306 0.5000 34.3573 13.1765 0.2395 
St. Dev. 0.1837 0.2699 217.4437 256.1669 0.1140 
 
Panel B: Post-restatement (Full sample) 
Mean 0.3374 0.5302 125.3739 115.8272 0.2727 
Median 0.3261 0.5143 39.1803 15.5263 0.2479 
St. Dev. 0.1877 0.2689 218.5353 297.1689 0.1325 
 
Panel C: Change from Pre- to Post-restatement Period (Full sample) 
Mean 0.0013 0.0315 0.5516 0.2620 0.0108 
Median -0.0206 0.0322 0.1292 0.0548 -0.0004 
St. Dev. 0.2373 0.3214 1.6031 0.9002 0.1400 
t-stat 0.08 1.39 4.88*** 4.13*** 1.09 








Panel D: Change from Pre- to Post-restatement Period (Cost or expense subsample) 
Mean 0.0409 0.0992 0.4747 0.0683 0.0557 
Median -0.0130 0.0898 0.1248 -0.0369 0.0234 
St. Dev. 0.2976 0.2882 1.5184 0.5505 0.1834 
t-stat 1.05 2.62** 2.38** 0.95 2.31** 
Wilcoxon p value 0.71 0.02** 0.04** 0.79 0.03** 
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Table 2. 7. Summary statistics on the number of buyer- and seller-initiated trades 
This table reports the median and different percentiles of the mean on the daily number of buy 
and sell orders during the pre- and post-restatement announcement periods. The buyer- and seller-
initiated trades are identified based on the algorithm of Lee and Ready (1991). Pre-restatement 
period consists of 46 trading days ending ten days before each restatement announcement. The 
















Panel A: Pre-restatement period 
Mean buys 1.2 4 16 74 849 
Mean sells 1.5 5 17 61 689 
Variance buys 2.09 15.03 190.90 2742.51 118238.12 
Variance sells 1.94 18.29 167.21 1859.06 89680.11 
Correlation 
between buys and 
sells 
-0.21 0.17 0.42 0.66 0.87 
      
Panel B: Post-restatement period 
Mean buys 1.0 4 20 77 621 
Mean sells 1.7 5 20 69 679 
Variance buys 1.92 18.10 335.44 2767.01 105055.15 
Variance sells 3.36 27.88 218.53 2402.35 33081.82 
Correlation 
between buys and 
sells 
-0.11 0.23 0.48 0.68 0.88 
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Table 2. 8. Financial analyst behavior around restatement announcements 
This table reports the analysts’ forecast revisions, analyst following and analysts’ forecast 
dispersion around restatement announcements. The pre-RA (post-RA) earnings forecast is the 
earnings forecast of analysts made in the month before (after) the restatement announcement, 
scaled by the price 30 days before the announcement. The mean (median) analysts’ earnings 
forecast revisions or analysts’ earnings forecast difference for the current and next fiscal year is 
calculated as follows:  
     , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1, 1, 1 i t i t i t i ti t tFR AF P AF P        
where the variables are defined in the body of the paper. Analyst following is the number of 
analysts following the stock. Analysts’ forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of the 







 indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. N refers 
to the sample size. 
 
 Pre-RA  Post-RA  Difference 
Panel A: Current  fiscal year analysts’ earnings forecasts (N=88) 
Mean -0.0306 (-0.0327) -0.0854 (-0.0735) -0.0548 (-0.0408) 
Median 0.0416 (0.0411) 0.0364 (0.0340) -0.0011 (-0.0007) 
t-stat   -1.74*  ( -2.29**) 
Wilcoxon p value   0.00***  (0.00***) 
 
Panel B: Next fiscal year analysts’ earnings forecasts (N=87) 
Mean 0.0638 (0.0620) 0.0339 (0.0366) -0.0299 (-0.0254) 
Median 0.0631 (0.0603) 0.0557 (0.0551) -0.0048 (-0.0046) 
t-stat   -2.17** (-1.93*) 
Wilcoxon p value   0.00*** (0.00***) 
    
Panel C: Analyst following (N=88) 
Mean 5.50 5.35 -0.15 
Median 3.00 3.00 0.00 
t-stat   -1.04 
Wilcoxon p value   0.35 
    
Panel D: Analysts’ forecast dispersion (N=62) 
Mean 0.1655 0.1971 0.0316 
Median 0.0600 0.0400 0.0000 
t-stat   0.96 




Table 2. 9. The Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative Average Abnormal 
Returns (CAARs)  
The abnormal returns (ARs) over the event window [-5, 5] for the financial restatements are 
obtained from:  
it
j
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where the variables are defined in the body of the text. The daily ARs are averaged cross-
sectionally to obtain the daily average ARs (or AARs). The cumulative AARs (or CAARs) are 






 indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. St. Dev., Q1 and Q3 refer to standard deviation, first quartile and 
second quartile, respectively. N is the sample size. 
 
Day Mean St. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Full sample (N = 210) 
-5 -0.0038 0.0555 -0.0212 -0.0021 0.0180 
-4 0.0037 0.0545 -0.0156 -0.0012 0.0173 
-3 0.0047 0.0743 -0.0193 0.0005 0.0159 
-2 0.0009 0.0509 -0.0146 -0.0003 0.0167 















 0.0509 -0.0305 -0.0036
*** 
0.0122 
3 -0.0054 0.0559 -0.0238 -0.0014 0.0142 
4 -0.0041 0.0592 -0.0252 -0.0033 0.0149 
5 -0.0011 0.0525 -0.0177 -0.0029 0.0142 
(-1,1) -0.0470
***
 0.1516 -0.0749 -0.0166
*** 
0.0163 
(-5,-1) 0.0019 0.0997 -0.0448 -0.0054 0.0446 
(0,2) -0.0524
***




Panel B: Subsample by trade venue 
Listed only on the TSX (N = 138 ) 
(0,2) -0.0449
***
 0.1606 -0.0805 -0.0142
*** 
0.0204 
Cross-listed (including NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX, OTC, and other) (N = 72) 
(0,2) -0.0667
***




Panel C: Subsample by earnings releases 
Restatement announcements without earnings releases (N = 113) 
(0,2) -0.0402
***
 0.1437 -0.0668 -0.0168
*** 
0.0122 
Restatement announcements with earnings releases (N = 97 ) 
(0,2) -0.0666
***








Table 2. 9. Continued 
Panel D: Subsample by reasons for restatement 
Cost or expense (N = 59 ) 
(0,2) -0.0424
***
 0.1204 -0.0683 -0.0144
*** 
0.0137 
Revenue recognition (N = 38 ) 
(0,2) -0.1423
***
 0.2459 -0.2504 -0.0635
*** 
-0.0110 












Restructuring, assets or inventory (N = 20) 
(0,2) -0.0308 0.1078 -0.0810 -0.0245 -0.0050 
Acquisition or merger (N = 11 ) 
(0,2) -0.0119
 
0.1949 -0.0224 -0.0051 0.0690 
Other (N= 49)  
(0,2) -0.0381
**




Table 2. 10. Cross-sectional regression results for abnormal returns 
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results for the determinants of abnormal returns. 
The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return from announcement date to 
two days after the restatement announcements. REVENUE is equal to one if the restatement is 
related to revenue recognition, and zero otherwise. COMP, AUDITOR and REGULATOR are 
equal to one if the restatement is initiated by the company, auditor and regulator, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. SIZE is the natural log of market capitalization which is equal to the total 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price 10 days before the restatement 
announcements.  EFFSPRDIFF is the difference in effective spreads measured by the Madhavan, 
Richardson and Roomans or MRR model following restatements. FR is the median revision in the 






 indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.  
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 









AUDITOR 0.0125 0.27 0.0369 0.55 
REGULATOR 0.0148 0.16 0.0167 0.16 
SIZE 0.0037 0.60 0.0094 1.02 
EFFSPRDIFF -0.0064 -1.02 -0.0023 -0.34 
FR   0.2898 3.04
***
 
     
Number of 
observations 
168  88  
Adjusted R2 0.1125  0.2394  
F-statistic 4.53***  4.69***  
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Table 2. 11. Component GARCH results around financial restatement announcements  
This table reports the results for the component GARCH or CGARCH without and with 
asymmetry for 205 and 210 financial restatement announcements (events), respectively. 
Convergence was not achieved for five announcements using CGARCH without asymmetry.  For 
each event, the mean equation is given by: 
 it
j





                                                                          
(1) 









11 )()( Dhqq iititiitiiit                                                                         
(3) 
The second-term on the right-hand-side of equation (2) is absent in the CGARCH without 
asymmetry. Cross-sectional average parameter estimates (Coef.) are reported along with their 




CGARCH without asymmetry CGARCH with asymmetry 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 






β2 0.0637 0.86 0.1328 1.31 
γ-5  (Day= -5) -0.0027 -0.71 0.0044 0.62 
γ-4  (Day= -4) 0.0032 0.93 0.0157 2.55
***
 
γ-3 (Day= -3) 0.0056 1.10 -0.0004 -0.07 
γ-2 (Day= -2) 0.0015 0.40 0.0062 0.98 
γ-1 (Day= -1) -0.0018 -0.49 -0.0018 -0.39 





γ1 (Day= 1) -0.0172 -2.57
***
 -0.0122 -1.06 




γ3 (Day= 3) -0.0047 -1.21 0.0049 0.73 
γ4 (Day= 4) -0.0040 -0.96 -0.0101 -1.24 
γ5 (Day= 5) 0.0008 0.20 0.0009 0.16 
δ 0.0634 10.84*** 0.0038 0.27 
μ 0.0550 4.04*** 0.0743 2.57*** 
τ1 -0.0022 -1.10 0.0027 1.16 
ω 0.0069 1.49 0.0072 1.58 
ρ 0.6485 61.67*** 0.6254 47.63*** 
φ 0.0765 17.76*** 0.0503 3.72*** 
τ2 -0.0010 -0.92 0.0185 12.12
***
 
θ   0.0789 11.55*** 




Table 2. 12. Stock return synchronicity around restatement announcements 
This table reports the changes in the stock price synchronicity measured by R2 from the following 
regression around the restatement announcements (RAs): 
   ittUSitmiiti EXRRR   ][ ,2,1,        
where the variables are defined in the body of the paper. The pre- and post-restatement regression 
is run over a 12 month period ending one month before restatement and starting one month after 
restatement announcements for daily and weekly returns, respectively. Zero-return metric is 
measured as the number of zero-return days over 12 month periods ending one month before the 
restatement and starting one month after restatement announcements. Difference is calculated as 
the Post-RA value minus the Pre-RA value. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Pre-RA  Post-RA  Difference 
Panel A: R
2
 using daily returns (Full sample) 
Mean 0.0503 0.0600 0.0097 
Median 0.0196 0.0228 0.0016 
t-stat   2.14** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.12 
Panel B: R2  using weekly returns (Full sample) 
Mean 0.0983 0.1229 0.0245 
Median 0.0687 0.0734 0.0069 
t-stat   2.53
*** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.07* 
Panel C: R2 using daily returns (Securities related subsample) 
Mean 0.0527 0.0792 0.0265 
Median 0.0263 0.0349 0.0090 
t-stat   2.08** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.08* 
Panel D: R2  using weekly returns (Securities related subsample) 
Mean 0.1054 0.1695 0.0641 
Median 0.0760 0.1180 0.0399 
t-stat   2.11** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.04** 
Panel E: Zero return metric (Full sample) 
Mean 0.1363 0.1409 0.0047 
Median 0.1222 0.1116 -0.0031 
t-stat   0.88 
Wilcoxon p value   0.76 
Panel F: Zero return metric (Revenue recognition subsample) 
Mean 0.1328 0.1657 0.0329 
Median 0.1225 0.1494 0.0226 
t-stat   2.03** 
Wilcoxon p value   0.06* 
  
 112 
Table 3. 1. Descriptive statistics for restating firms 
This table reports the characteristics of 177 Canadian financial restatements during the period 
1997-2006. The total number of reasons exceeds the total number of restatements because some 
restatements involve more than one reason. 
 
Panel A: Reason for restatement 
Reason for Restatement Number Frequency (%) 
Cost or expense 48 25.53 
Other 44 23.40 
Revenue recognition 34 18.09 
Securities related 28 14.89 
Reclassification 12 6.38 
Restructuring, assets or inventory 12 6.38 
Acquisition or merger 6 3.19 
Related-party transaction 2 1.06 
In-process research and development  2 1.06 
Total 188 100.0 
 
Panel B: Initiating parties of the restatements 
Initiators Number Frequency (%) 
Company 59 33.33 
Auditor 15 8.47 
Company and Auditor 17 9.60 
Regulator 4 2.26 
Other 6 3.39 
Unknown 76 42.94 
Total 177 100.0 
   
Panel C: Industry distribution   
Industry and 2 digit SIC code  Number Frequency (%) 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (01-09) 0 0.00 
Mining (10-14) 45 25.42 
Construction (15-17) 2 1.13 
Manufacturing (20-39) 54 30.51 
Transportation, Communications, & Utility Services 
(40-49) 
14 7.91 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 4 2.26 
Retail Trade (52-59) 10 5.65 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (60-67) 15 8.47 
Services (70-89) 33 18.64 
Total  177 100.0 
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Table 3. 2. Summary statistics for sample and control firms 
This table reports summary statistics for both financial and governance variables for restating and 
control firms. The variables are defined in the body of the paper. Sales and total assets are in 
millions of dollars. Sales growth and Return on Assets (ROA) is in percent. p-value is for a two-
tailed t-test for the difference in means and Wilcoxon signed rank test for differences in medians, 
respectively. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median Sample 
Size Variable Sample  Control p-value Sample Control p-value 
Sales 1253.81 1494.90 0.56 73.47 59.88 0.02
** 
177 










Sales growth 41.569 20.355 0.16 14.403 10.043 0.51 110 
ROA -9.555 -5.100 0.05
** 
-1.533 0.972 0.12 177 
Board size 7.785 7.808 0.93 7.00 7.00 0.84 177 
Proportion of 
unrelated directors 
0.658 0.677 0.28 0.667 0.667 0.39 177 
Number of board 
meeting 
8.536 8.478 0.95 8.00 7.00 0.97 69 




0.898 0.922 0.22 1.00 1.00 0.04
** 
177 




4.00 4.00 0.05* 93 
At least one of audit 
committee is financial 







CEO is the chair of 
the board 
0.339 0.395 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.29 177 
CEO tenure on board 8.472 9.453 0.30 6 7 0.19 161 
CEO belongs to the 
founding family=1 if 
yes, and 0 otherwise 
0.373 0.333 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.40 177 







0.112 0.142 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.14 177 





0.093 0.110 0.45 0.014 0.018 0.26 113 
Related directors 
ownership 
0.129 0.135 0.83 0.027 0.022 0.70 92 
Unrelated directors 
ownership 
0.036 0.059 0.22 0.003 0.006 0.23 140 
Top3 ownership 0.096 0.139 0.11 0.025 0.033 0.14 92 
Big 5 firm=1 if 
auditor is big 5 firm, 








0.295 0.337 0.13 0.282 0.331 0.13 96 
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Table 3. 3. Correlation matrix 



























































































PUNRELDIR -0.06          
PUNRELAUD -0.06 0.54
** 





       
CEOCHAIR -0.06 -0.14
** 














    
CEOOWN -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.11
** 
0.00 -0.05    
LEVERAGE 0.12
** 
















0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 
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Table 3. 4. Logistic regression of the likelihood of restatement  
This table reports the results of the following logistic regression: 
 RESTATE=f (PUNRELDIR or PUNRELAUD, EXPERT, CEOCHAIR, CEOFOUND,     
                              BLOCKHLD, MGMTOWN, BIG5, LEVERAGE, GROWTH) 
where RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm and zero 
if the firm is a control firm. PUNRELDIR is the proportion of directors who are unrelated. 
PUNRELAUD is the proportion of directors in the audit committee who are unrelated. EXPERT 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the audit committee includes at least one director who 
is a CPA, CFA, CA, investment banker or venture capitalist, or has served as chief financial 
officer, vice president of finance, controller or treasurer. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the CEO is also the board chair and zero otherwise. CEOFOUND is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the CEO belongs to the founding family of the firm and zero 
otherwise. BLOCKHLD is defined as the percentage of voting rights held by outside 
blockholders with at least ten percent of the voting rights attached to any class of voting securities 
who are unaffiliated with management. MGMTOWN is the percentage of voting rights held by 
management who serves on the board. BIG5 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s 
external auditor is a Big 5 auditing firm and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is calculated as the 
ratio of total liabilities divided by total assets. Growth is calculated as the compound growth rate 
of sales in the three years preceding the year of restatement announcement. 
***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Independent variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept 2.280
** 
0.03 1.250 0.23 
PUNRELDIR -0.719 0.52   






CEOCHAIR 0.058 0.87 0.092 0.79 


























Pseudo R2 0.10 0.10 
Observations 215 215 
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Table 3. 5. Turnover for sample and control firms  
This table reports the mean turnover rates of the CEO, President, Board Chair, top three 
executives, CFO, unrelated directors, audit committee members and external auditor for sample 
and control firms during years +1, +2 and (1, 2) following the restatement announcements. t-test 
and Wilcoxon test p-values are for differences in means and medians, respectively. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 






Panel A: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover 





+2 0.128 0.099 0.43 0.44 141 





      
Panel B: President turnover 





+2 0.150 0.173 0.61 0.62 127 





      
Panel C: Board Chair turnover 
+1 0.131 0.069 0.07 0.07 145 
+2 0.115 0.077 0.30 0.31 130 





      
Panel D: Top three executives (CEO, President, Board Chair) turnover 





+2 0.214 0.214 1.00 1.00 145 





      
Panel D:  Chief Financial Officer (CFO) turnover 





+2 0.212 0.159 0.28 0.28 132 





      
Panel E: Unrelated directors turnover 
+1 0.494 0.482 0.84 0.84 168 
+2 0.421 0.386 0.54 0.54 145 
(1,2) 0.649 0.613 0.47 0.47 168 
      
Panel E: Audit committee turnover 
+1 0.476 0.476 1.00 1.00 168 
+2 0.400 0.331 0.24 0.24 145 
(1,2) 0.637 0.643 0.91 0.91 168 
      
Panel F: External Auditor turnover 





+2 0.097 0.048 0.00*** 0.00*** 145 






Table 3. 6. Logistic regression for management and auditor turnover 
This table reports the results for the following logistic regression: 
TURNOVER=f (RESTATE, PUNRELDIR, BODSIZE, CEOCHAIR, ROA, CAR) 
where RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm and zero 
if the firm is a control firm. PUNRELDIR is the proportion of directors who are unrelated.  
BODSIZE is the number of directors on the board. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if CEO is also the board chair and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets in the year prior 
to restatement announcements. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-5, 5) around 
restatement announcements. 












































































































Pseudo R2 0.121 0.118 0.070 0.076 0.110 
Observations 331 314 336 320 336 
      






























































































0.104 0.073 0.043 0.047 0.123 
Observations 331 316 336 321 336 
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Table 3. 7. Descriptive statistics for restating firms and control firms by SOX period  
This table reports descriptive statistics for restating firms in the period before and after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The Pre-Sox period is 1997 to July 30, 2002 and the post-SOX 
period is July 30, 2002 to 2006. Size of the restatement is the cumulative impact of the 
restatement on net income scaled by total assets in the year prior to the restatement announcement. 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal return over days [-5, 5] around restatement announcements. The 
p-value for difference-in-means t-stats in Panel A is calculated assuming unequal variances ***, ** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: descriptive statistics for restating firms by SOX period 





Size of Restatement -0.066 -0.013 -0.048 0.14 
CAR -0.120 -0.052 -0.069
* 
0.10 
     



















      
President turnover 










      
Board Chair turnover 





Post-SOX 0.194 0.176 0.73 0.74 108 
      
Top three executives (CEO, President, Board Chair) turnover 





Post-SOX 0.376 0.344 0.58 0.59 125 
      
CFO turnover 










      
Unrelated directors turnover 





Post-SOX 0.584 0.616 0.57 0.57 125 
      
External Auditor turnover 










      
Audit Committee turnover 
Pre-SOX 0.651 0.674 0.82 1.00 43 
Post-SOX 0.632 0.624 0.89 0.89 125 
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Table 3. 8. Logistic regressions for management turnover considering the effects of SOX 










where TURNOVER is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the person who holds the position 
(CEO, President, CFO) leaves the firm within twenty-four months following the restatement 
announcements. RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm 
and zero otherwise. POSTSOX is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the restatement is 
announced in the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. PUNRELDIR is the proportion of 
directors who are unrelated.  BODSIZE is the number of directors on the board. CEOCHAIR is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is also the board chair and zero otherwise. ROA is 
return on assets in the year prior to restatement announcements.
 ***, ** and * indicate significance 






































































































Pseudo R2 0.085 0.076 0.047 0.048 





Table 3. 9. Logistic regression for management turnover considering the effects of SOX and 
severity of restatements 












Where RESTATESIZE is the cumulative impact of the restatement on net income scaled by total 
assets in the year prior to the restatement announcement. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return 
over days [-5, 5] around restatement announcements. POSTSOX is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the restatement is announced in the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. 
PUNRELDIR is the proportion of directors who are unrelated.  BODSIZE is the number of 
directors on the board. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is also 
the board chair and zero otherwise. ROA is return on assets in the year prior to restatement 
announcements.















































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.064 0.085 0.069 0.080 0.038 0.042 0.031 0.026 
Observations 331 331 316 316 336 336 321 321 
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Table 3. 10. Governance variables for sample and control firms before and after the 
restatements  
This table reports different governance variables before and two years after the restatement 
announcements. The sample size is 145 pairs of restating and control firms. The variables before  
and after the restatement are taken from proxy statements dated before the announcements and 
second proxy statement issued after the announcements, respectively. The variables are defined in 
the body of the paper. Within sample p-values test for the differences in sample (control) firms 
before and after the announcements. Sample vs. control difference p-values test for the difference 
between sample and control firms after the restatement announcements.  
 













Board size 7.97 8.13 0.17 7.97 7.84 0.30 0.17 
Unrelated 
directors 




0.67 0.70 0.01 0.67 0.70 0.01 0.91 
Audit committee 
size 
3.28 3.36 0.17 3.32 3.28 0.30 0.28 
Unrelated audit 
committee 




0.91 0.96 0.02 0.91 0.95 0.00 0.87 
Blockholder 
ownership 
0.11 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.47 0.19 




Table 4. 1. Descriptive statistics for restating firms 
This table reports the characteristics of 146 Canadian financial restatements during the period 
1997-2006. The total number of reasons exceeds the total number of restatements because some 
restatements involve more than one reason. Size of restatement is the cumulative impact of 
restatements on net income in millions of dollars. It is scaled by the total assets in the year prior 
to the restatement announcement. Financial constraint status is classified as five mutually 
exclusive groups: not financially constrained (NFC), likely not financially constrained (LNFC), 
potentially financially constrained (PFC), likely financially constrained (LFC), and financially 
constrained (FC). 
 
Panel A: Reason for restatement 
Reason for Restatement Number Frequency (%) 
Cost or expense 43 26.06 
Other 35 21.21 
Revenue recognition 31 18.79 
Securities related 23 13.94 
Reclassification 9 5.45 
Restructuring, assets or inventory 15 9.09 
Acquisition or merger 6 3.64 
Related-party transaction 2 1.21 
In-process research and development  1 0.61 
Total 165 100.0 
 
Panel B: Initiating parties of the restatements 
Initiators Number Frequency (%) 
Company 51 34.93 
Auditor 13 8.90 
Company and Auditor 14 9.59 
Regulator 1 0.68 
Other 4 2.74 
Unknown 63 43.15 
Total 146 100.0 
   
Panel C: Industry distribution   
Industry and 2 digit SIC code  Number Frequency (%) 
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (01-09) 0 0.00 
Mining (10-14) 37 25.34 
Construction (15-17) 0 0.00 
Manufacturing (20-39) 55 37.67 
Transportation, Communications, & Utility Services 
(40-49) 
12 8.22 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 3 2.05 
Retail Trade (52-59) 8 5.48 
Services (70-89) 31 21.23 




Table 4. 1. Continued 
Panel D: Other characteristics of restatements 
 Mean Median 
Number of years restated 1.479 1 
Size of restatement -438.523 -0.405 
Size of restatement/total assets -0.031 -0.005 
   
Panel E: Financial constraint categories   
 Number Frequency (%) 
Not financially constrained (NFC) 9 6.29 
Likely not financially constrained (LNFC) 34 23.78 
Potentially financially constrained (PFC) 83 58.04 
Likely financially constrained  (LFC) 9 6.29 
Financially constrained (FC) 8 5.59 
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Table 4. 2. Summary statistics for sample and control firms 
This table reports summary statistics of financial variables for restating and control firms. The 
variables are defined in the body of the paper. Sales, total assets, long-term debt raised and equity 
raised are in millions of dollars. Sales growth and Return on Assets (ROA) is in percent. Debt and 
equity funds raised is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the long-term debt and new equity 
raised during the first year restated exceeds 20% of total assets, and zero otherwise. CEOCHAIR 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is also the Board Chair and zero otherwise. 
CEOFOUND is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO belongs to the founding family 
of the firm and zero otherwise. We assume that the number of analyst following is zero if the firm 
is not in the IBES database. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of stock returns over 
the 60 months prior to the first year restated. The reported p-value is for two-tailed t-test for the 





 indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Mean Median Sample 
Size Variable Sample  Control p-value Sample Control p-value 
Sales 1250.69 1199.76 0.88 48.52 43.92 0.09
* 
145 















ROA -9.937 -8.152 0.61
 
-1.089 0.361 0.29 145 
Long-term debt 
raised 
74.37 66.17 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.80 146 
Equity raised  27.73 35.14 0.61 3.58 0.45 0.06
* 
146 




 0.00 0.00 0.03
**
 146 
CEOCHAIR 0.384 0.377 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.91 146 
CEOFOUND 0.349 0.349 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 146 














Table 4. 3. Summary compensation statistics for sample and control firms 
This table reports summary statistics of compensation and incentive variables for restating and 
control firms. The variables are defined in the body of the paper and reported in thousands of 
dollars except for in-the-money options to salary. The variables are measured at the fiscal year-
end before the first year restated. The sample size for CEO only and CFO only is less than the full 
sample size because CEO or CFO compensations are not disclosed in a firm’s proxy statements. 
The reported p-value is for a two-tailed t-test for a difference in means and Wilcoxon signed rank 
test for the difference in medians, respectively. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median Sample 
Size Variable Sample Control p-value Sample Control p-value 
Panel A: Top executives 
Salary 241.807 214.684 0.07
* 
188.001 185.673 0.23 146 
Bonus  123.277 115.976 0.80 34.097 17.500 0.14
 
146 








In-the-money option 8234.193 1093.270 0.26 96.418 51.086 0.69 146 
In-the-money option 
to salary 
18.66 2.80 0.28 0.46 0.27 0.32 137 





35.428 11.325 0.20 1.531 1.738 0.75 146 
Unvested option 
sensitivity 
24.932 8.458 0.21 0.008 0.100 0.62 146 
Total option 
sensitivity  








Equity sensitivity 66.450 279.152 0.23 4.267 5.817 0.46 146 
Total  sensitivity 174.934 303.508 0.50 13.178 17.830 0.40 146 
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Table 4. 3. Continued 
Panel B: Chief Executive Officer (CEO)  only 
Salary 364.153 314.664 0.10
* 
251.945 252.269 0.27 140 
Bonus  259.946 286.494 0.76 49.000 4.144 0.53 140 
Option grant 15114.35
3 










2733.824 0.28 76.500 15.050 0.48 140 
In-the-money option 
to salary 
64.41 5.8 0.30 0.35 0.08 0.52 126 
Total compensation 15914.39
7 
1174.075 0.30 423.650 357.375 0.39 140 
Vested option 
sensitivity 
136.939 27.358 0.23 1.960 2.243 0.82 140 
Unvested option 
sensitivity 
64.199 21.570 0.24 0.000 0.000 0.47 140 
Total option 
sensitivity  








Equity sensitivity 216.051 135.829 0.58 9.866 13.210 0.17 140 
Total  sensitivity 594.366 195.305 0.24 28.292 35.926 0.13 140 
        
Panel C: Chief Financial Officer (CFO) only 
Salary 207.429 187.066 0.16 176.125 162.135 0.13 74 
Bonus  99.057 94.255 0.89 41.600 14.564 0.11 74 
Option grant 2755.523 128.245 0.30 0.000 0.001 0.78 74 
Restricted stock 
grant 
11.469 8.194 0.73 0.000 0.000 0.84 74 
In-the-money option 6435.232 554.541 0.29 43.230 24.500 0.67 74 
In-the-money option 
to salary 
18.99 2.07 0.29 0.18 0.18 0.64 70 
Total compensation 3106.243 483.381 0.30 255.894 217.706 0.24 74 
Vested option 
sensitivity 
18.578 5.537 0.23 0.665 0.731 0.90 74 
Unvested option 
sensitivity 
30.243 5.897 0.28 0.163 0.123 0.72 74 
Total option 
sensitivity  
81.504 14.481 0.28 1.933 2.610 0.66 74 
Restricted stock 
sensitivity 
0.192 0.041 0.22 0.000 0.000 0.38 74 
Equity sensitivity 18.203 2.380 0.36 0.000 0.000 0.21 74 




Table 4. 4. Logistic regression of the likelihood of restatement 
This table reports the results of the following logistic regression:  
RESTATE=f (Total option sensitivity or Vested option sensitivity and unvested option  
                sensitivity, Restricted stock sensitivity, Equity sensitivity, Long-term     
         incentive plans (LTIP) payouts, Capitalraise, Volatility, CEOCHAIR,    
                       CEOFOUND, Leverage, Sales growth), 
where RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is a restating firm and zero 
if the firm is a control firm. Total option sensitivity is the dollar change in the value of total stock 
options holdings (including newly granted options, vested options and unvested options) for a 1% 
change in stock price. Vested and unvested option sensitivity is dollar change in the value of 
vested and unvested options holdings for a 1% change in stock price. Equity and restricted stock 
sensitivity is dollar change in the value of equity and restricted stock holdings for a 1% change in 
stock price. Long-term incentive payout incentive is calculated as long-term incentive payout 
divided by total compensation. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total Long-term debt divided 
by total assets at the year-end before the first year restated. Volatility is calculated as standard 
deviation of stock returns over 60 months prior to the first year restated. Sales growth is 
calculated as the compound growth rate of sales in the three years preceeding the first year 
restated. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO is also the Board Chair 
and zero otherwise. Capitalraise is a dummy variable that equals one if the long-term debt and 
new equity raised during the first year restated exceeds 20% of total assets, and zero otherwise. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Top Executives CEO CFO 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Panel A: Model 1 
Intercept 0.0498 0.49
 
















 0.0000 0.58 0.0000 0.26 
LTIP incentive 0.6345 0.81 0.6707 0.80 2.3040 0.47 
Pseudo R
2 
0.015 0.010 0.014 
       
Panel B: Model 2 
Intercept 0.1846 0.39 0.0770 0.69 -0.248 0.91 
Vested option 
sensitivity 
-0.0445 0.20 -0.0221 0.45 -0.0246 0.56 
Unvested option 
sensitivity 





0.0002 0.18 0.0004 0.21 
Equity 
sensitivity 
-0.0000 0.35 0.0000 0.53 0.0000 0.50 
LTIP incentive 0.2524 0.92 0.5690 0.83 2.0567 0.59 
Pseudo R
2
 0.021 0.014 0.020 
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Table 4. 4. Continued 
Panel C: Model 3 
Intercept -0.9981 0.06
*





0.0122 0.59 0.0139 0.52 0.0049 0.77 
Restricted stock 
sensitivity 0.0005 0.18 0.0001 0.19 0.0004 0.23 
Equity sensitivity -0.0000 0.44 0.0000 0.60 0.0000 0.69 
LTIP incentive 6.3637 0.20 0.3173 0.91 0.8825 0.87 
Capitalraise 0.4640 0.26 0.4942 0.23 0.4263 0.37 
Leverage -0.3491 0.72 -0.3564 0.72 0.4165 0.72 
Volatility 9.1066 0.08
*
 7.3972 0.14 9.8840 0.10
*
 






CEOCHAIR -0.2604 0.49 -0.4059 0.29 -0.1451 0.75 
CEOFOUND -0.0498 0.89 -0.0806 0.83 0.2285 0.62 
Pseudo R
2
 0.078 0.071 0.067 
       
Panel D: Model 4 





0.0091 0.88 0.0164 0.71 -0.0357 0.56 
Unvested option 
sensitivity 
0.0031 0.87 0.0007 0.96 0.0176 0.52 
Restricted stock 
sensitivity 
0.0005 0.18 0.0001 0.19 0.0004 0.22 
Equity sensitivity -0.0000 0.43 0.0000 0.61 0.0000 0.22 
LTIP incentive 6.2976 0.20 0.2915 0.92 0.2625 0.96 
Capitalraise 0.4655 0.26 0.4968 0.23 0.4090 0.39 
Leverage -0.3451 0.72 -0.3514 0.72 0.4535 0.70 
Volatility 9.0704 0.08
*
 7.4309 0.11 9.5669 0.11 






CEOCHAIR -0.2614 0.50 -0.4216 0.28 -0.1624 0.72 
CEOFOUND -0.0555 0.88 -0.0857 0.82 0.2429 0.59 
Pseudo R
2
 0.079 0.072 0.073 
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Table 4. 5. Ordinal logistic regression models 
This table reports the results of ordinal logistic regressions. The ordinal dependent variable is 
coded as two if the restatements are prompted by a regulator or auditor, one for all the other 
restatements, and zero for control firms. All the explanatory variables are the same as those 
defined in Table 4.4. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Top Executives CEO CFO 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Panel A: Model 1 
Intercept 1 -4.3837 0.00*** -4.3138 0.00*** -4.4943 0.00*** 
Intercept 2 -0.9440 0.07* -0.7283 0.15 -1.3278 0.02** 
Total option 
sensitivity 
0.0162 0.55 0.0161 0.50 0.0054 0.76 
Restricted stock 
sensitivity 
0.0003 0.20 0.0001 0.25 0.0003 0.29 
Equity sensitivity -0.0000 0.47 0.0000 0.04** 0.0000 0.70 
LTIP incentive 5.5077 0.24 0.3270 0.90 0.8527 0.87 
Capitalraise 0.4328 0.27 0.4323 0.28 0.4744 0.30 
Leverage -0.3164 0.74 -0.3211 0.74 0.4514 0.69 
Volatility 8.1378 0.09
*
 6.7453 0.15 10.1971 0.08
*
 




 0.0047 0.12 
CEOCHAIR -0.1255 0.73 -0.2924 0.43 -0.0079 0.99 
CEOFOUND -0.0327 0.93 -0.1106 0.76 0.2047 0.64 
Pseudo R
2
 0.052 0.062 0.047 
       
Panel B: Model 2 
Intercept 1 -4.3722 0.00*** -4.2737 0.00*** -4.3118 0.00*** 
Intercept 2 -0.9314 0.11 -0.6880 0.21 -1.1353 0.08* 
Vested option 
sensitivity 
0.0163 0.77 0.0138 0.75 -0.0360 0.54 
Unvested option 
sensitivity 
0.0013 0.95 0.0013 0.93 0.0208 0.62 
Restricted stock 
sensitivity 
0.0003 0.20 0.0001 0.25 0.0003 0.28 
Equity sensitivity 0.0000 0.46 0.0000 0.04
**
 0.0000 0.67 
LTIP incentive 5.4508 0.24 0.2826 0.92 0.2211 0.97 
Capitalraise 0.4335 0.28 0.4341 0.27 0.4693 0.31 
Leverage -0.3160 0.74 -0.3390 0.72 0.4639 0.68 
Volatility 8.1421 0.09
*
 6.7097 0.15 9.8899 0.09
*
 




 0.0049 0.11 
CEOCHAIR -0.1320 0.72 -0.2993 0.42 -0.0134 0.98 
CEOFOUND -0.0347 0.92 -0.1207 0.74 0.2117 0.63 
Pseudo R
2
 0.052 0.062 0.053 
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Table 4. 6. The impact of option sensitivity on size of restatements 
This table reports the regression results. The dependent variable is the absolute value of the 
cumulative effect of restatements on net income scaled by total assets in the year prior to the year 
of restatement announcements. Total option sensitivity is the dollar change in the value of total 
stock options holdings for a 1% change in stock price. Vested and unvested option sensitivity is 
dollar change in the value of vested and unvested options holdings for a 1% change in stock price. 
Equity and restricted stock sensitivity is dollar change in the value of equity and restricted stock 
holdings for a 1% change in stock price. Long-term incentive payout incentive is calculated as 
long-term incentive payout divided by total compensation. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of 
total Long-term debt divided by total assets at the year-end before the first year restated. 
Volatility is calculated as standard deviation of stock returns over 60 months prior to the first year 
restated. Sales growth is calculated as the compound growth rate of sales in the three years 
preceeding the first year restated. 




 Top Executives CEO CFO 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept  0.0102 0.73
 
0.0105 0.72 -0.0009 0.91 
Total option 
sensitivity 
0.0005 0.55 0.0006 0.51 0.0000 0.85 
Restricted stock 
sensitivity 
0.0000 0.92 0.0000 0.87 0.0000 0.85 
Equity sensitivity 0.0000 0.94 0.0000 0.75 0.0000 0.00
*** 
LTIP incentive -0.0284 0.92 -0.0247 0.88 -0.0110 0.88 













 0.03 0.04 0.04 
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Table 4. 7. Option exercises by executives 
This table reports summary statistics of executive option exercises during the first year restated 
and regression results for restating and control firms.
 
In-the-money options is the sum of the value 
of exercisable options and unexercisable options. RESTATE is a dummy variable that is equal to 
one if the firm is a restating firm and zero if the firm is a control firm. 
***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median 
Variable Sample  Control p-value Sample Control p-value 
Panel A: Top executives 
Value of Options 
exercises 
1054092.4 227568.8 0.13 0 0 0.17 
No of exercised 
options/vested 
options 
0.91 0.09 0.24 0 0 0.08
*
 
       
Panel B: Chief Executive Officer (CEO)  only 




 0 0 0.49 





 0 0 0.22 
       
Panel C: Chief Financial Officer (CFO) only 
Value of Options 
exercises 
972550.5 132394.9 0.27 0 0 0.32
 
No of exercised 
options/vested 
options 
1.61 0.11 0.27 0 0 0.10
* 
       
Panel D: regression with options exercises 
 Top executives CEO CFO 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -369116 0.74
 
-2261702 0.15 368603 0.29 
Ln(Asset) 16912 0.82 113903 0.17
 
-25542 0.23 
Salary 0.468 0.77 0.649 0.72 0.741 0.02
** 










RESTATE 116562 0.41 505830 0.06
*










0.94 0.95 0.99 






Appendix 2.1   Categories for the reasons given for the financial restatements 
 




Cost or expense 
Restatements due to improper accounting for costs or expenses. This 
category generally includes a company understating or overstating costs or 
expenses, improperly classifying expenses, or any other number of mistakes 
or improprieties that led to misreported costs. It also includes improper 
treatment of expenses related to tax liabilities and tax reserves; improper 
treatment of financing arrangements, such as leases, when a related asset was 
improperly capitalized or expensed as part of the financing arrangement; and 
improperly reserved litigation restatements. 
Revenue 
recognition 
Restatements due to improper revenue accounting. This category includes 
instances in which: revenue was improperly recognized, questionable 
revenues were recognized, or any number of other mistakes or improprieties 
that led to misreported revenue. Also included are transactions with non-
related parties that artificially inflate volume and revenues, through the 
simultaneous purchase and sale of products between colluding companies 
that are known as round-trip transactions. 
Securities related  
Restatements due to improper accounting for derivatives, warrants, stock 




Restatements due to asset impairment, errors relating to accounting treatment 
of investments, timing and amount of asset write-downs, goodwill and other 




Restatements due to improper accounting for or a complete lack of 
accounting for acquisitions or mergers. These include instances in which the 
wrong accounting method was used, or losses or gains related to the 
acquisition were understated or overstated. 
Reclassification 
Restatements due to improperly classified financial statement items, i.e., 
current liabilities classified as long-term debt on the balance sheet, or cash 
flows from operating activities classified as cash flows from financing 
activities on the statement of cash flows. 
Related-party 
transaction 
Restatements due to inadequate disclosure or improper accounting of 
revenues, expenses, debts or assets involving transactions or relationships 




Restatements resulting from instances in which improper accounting 
methodologies were used to value in-process research and development at the 
time of an acquisition. 
Other 
Any restatement not covered by the listed categories, such as: restatements 
due to inadequate loan-loss reserves, delinquent loans, loan write-offs, or 
other allowances for doubtful accounts or accounting estimates; and 




Appendix 2.2   Spread decomposition and probability of informed  
 
A2.2.1   Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) or MRR Model  
The MRR model uses an approach to decompose the spread that assumes a constant order 
size. The transaction price changes, pt,, are given by 
tttt IIp   1)()(                                                                          
(A2.1) 
where α is the constant drift,  represents the transitory effect of order flow on prices, and  
represents the degree of information asymmetry or the permanent effect of order flow on prices.   
is the first-order autocorrelation of the trade indicator variable It. t is a composite error term 
including both the innovations in beliefs due to new public information and the effect of price-
rounding errors.  
 Trade direction is inferred using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm with a five second lag. 
Specifically, the algorithm classifies a trade as buyer (seller) initiated if the trade price is above 
(below) the prevailing mid-quote. If the trade occurs exactly at the midpoint of the quote, a “tick 
test” classifies the trade as buyer (seller) initiated if the trade price is above (below) the previous 
price. If the trade takes place at an unchanged price corresponding to the current spread midpoint, 
then its price is compared successively to the next most recent trade until the trade is classified. 
The generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure is used to estimate the model 
parameters (A2.1). The following moment conditions implied by the model exactly identify the 



















































The first moment condition defines the autocorrelation in order flow, the second condition 
defines the probability of a transaction executed within the quoted bid-ask spread, the third 
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condition defines the expectation of a zero residual mean, and the last two conditions are the OLS 
normal equations. In GMM estimation, the parameter vector is chosen such that the sample 
moments most closely approximate the population moments. Hansen (1982) demonstrates that the 
GMM estimates of the parameters are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. The 
Newey-West procedure is used to obtain the heteroskedastic consistent covariance matrix.  
The order processing component  and adverse selection component   are estimated in dollar 
terms for each restatement announcement. The implied spread is 2( + ), and the proportional 
averse selection and order processing components are given by  /( + ) and  /( + ), 
respectively. 
A2.2.2   Glosten and Harris (1988) or GH Model  
In contrast to the MRR model, the Glosten and Harris (1988) or GH model accounts for 
order size when decomposing spreads into a permanent (or adverse selection) component C0 and 
a transitory (or order processing) component Z0. Both components are positive functions of the 
number of shares traded in transaction t or Vt. Price changes, tp , are denoted as  
tttttttttt IVzIzIIVcIIcp   101110 )()(                                                (A2.3) 
where It and It-1 are the trade indicator variables (+1 for a buyer-initiated trade and -1 for a seller-
initiated trade). The order processing component is C0 = 2(c0 +c1Vt) and the adverse selection 
component is Z0 = 2(z0 +z1Vt).  
The parameters c0, c1, z0 and z1 are estimated using ordinary least squares for each restatement 
in the sample. The implied spread is 1 0 12( ) 2( )i o iS c c V z z V     , where iV  is the average 
trade size per restatement announcement. The ratios of the adverse selection and order processing 
components over the total spread as percentages are given by Zi/Si, and Ci/Si, respectively. 
A2.2.3   Probability of Informed Trade (PIN) 
 
The Easley et al. (1996) or EKOP model assumes the existence of three types of players: 
informed traders, uninformed traders, and competitive market makers. At the beginning of the 
 135 
trading day, an information event may occur with probability α. If an information event occurs, 
the probability of bad news is  and the probability of good news is 1-. Informed traders only 
trade when an information event occurs (i.e., buying on good news and selling on bad news). Buy 
and sell orders from informed traders follow the same Poisson process with arrival rate . Buy 
and sell orders from uninformed traders also follow a Poisson process with the same arrival rate  
and are independent of the information event. Thus, arrival rates for buy and sell orders are +, 
and , respectively, for good-news days; are , and +, respectively, for bad-news days, and  for 
no-news days. 
The Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is used to determine the number of buys and sells on 
each day for each restatement. The probabilities of no-event, bad-news, and good-news days are 






































                               (A2.4) 
where B and S are the total number of buys and sells for the day, respectively, and the parameter 
vector is  = (α, , , ). The days are assumed to be independent, so that the likelihood function 








),(()(                                                                                               (A2.5) 
The parameter vector   given the data set M = [(B1, S1),….(BI, SI)] is estimated by 
maximizing the likelihood function (A2.5).  
The probability of informed trade (PIN) is given by: 
 2PIN                                                                                                            (A2.6) 
The probability parameters α and  are constrained to (0,1) by a logit transformation, and  and  
are restricted to (0, ) by a logarithmic transformation. To ensure a global maximum, different 
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starting points are used. Standard errors of the parameter estimates are calculated using the delta 
method.  
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Appendix 4.1   Categorization of Financial constraints by Hadlock and Piere (2010) 
Following Hadlock and Piere (2010) and Kaplan and Zingles (1997), we collect information 
on financial constraints by reading annual reports and financial statements filed with SEDAR. In 
particular, we read annual letters to shareholders and the management discussion and analysis 
section for both restating firms and control firms in the fiscal year before the first year restated. 
We also perform keyword searches of the annual reports and/or financial statements by using 
“financing”, “finance”, “investing”, “invest”, “capital”, “liquid”, “liquidity”, “covenant”, 
“amend”, “waive”, “violate”, and “credit”. We extract every statement that is related to the firm’s 
ability to raise funds or finance its current or future operations. For many firms, we have multiple 
statements. Similar to Hadlock and Piere (2010), we assign each statement to one of the five 
categories from 1 to 5, where lower (higher) numbers indicates a lack of (presence) of financial 
constraints. 
The statements that indicate that a firm has excess or more than sufficient liquidity to fund its 
capital needs are assigned to category 1. Statements using the word “strong” or a similar adjective 
when describing a firm’s financial position are also assigned to this category. Examples of 
statements that are assigned to category 1 include: “The company is well positioned to continue 
its growth, with a strong balance sheet and significant unused debt capacity and credit facilities,” 
and “management believes that the Company’s liquid assets are more than sufficient to fund 
planned operating and project development and sustaining capital expenditures and discharge 
liabilities as they come due”. We assign the statements to category 2 which indicate a firm has 
adequate or sufficient liquidity to fund its needs. The main difference between category 1 and 
category 2 is the strength of the language. Examples of statements that are assigned to category 2 
include: “The Company believes that it will be able to generate sufficient cash flow to meet its 
current and future working capital, capital expenditure and debt obligation requirements,” and 
“The Company has adequate resources to finance operating needs over the business cycle as well 
as its growth and strategic objectives.” 
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The statements that are opaque and therefore difficult to classify into other categories are 
assigned to category 3. Category 3 also includes statements that are soft warnings regarding a 
firm’s future liquid position if certain scenarios were to happen. The feature of category 3 is that 
the statements not only do not indicate any financial strength but also do not indicate any current 
liquidity problems. Examples of statements that are assigned to category 3 include: “Although the 
Company has been successful in obtaining financing to date, there can be no assurance that the 
Company will be able to obtain adequate financing in the future or that the terms of financing will 
be favorable,” and “In order to achieve its long term development and commercialization strategy, 
the Corporation will need to raise additional capital through the issuance of shares or 
collaboration agreements or partnerships that would allow the Corporation to finance its activities. 
Nothing guarantees that additional funds will be available or that they may be acquired according 
to acceptable terms and conditions, allowing the Corporation to successfully market its products.” 
The statements that indicate current some liquidity problem such as having difficulty in 
obtaining finance, but with no direct direction that these problems have affected the investment 
decisions are assigned to category 4. Examples of statements coded as category 4 include: “We 
may incur substantial losses in the future that could make financing our operations and business 
strategy more difficult,” and “During the year, however, as prospects for economic growth in a 
number of the major global economies declined, metal inventories rose, mines began to close and 
capital available for lending for the development of new mine projects tightened. Consequently 
the Company decided to defer financing the development of the Magellan Project until these 
factors improved.” 
The statements that are assigned to category 5 indicate clear financial problems or constraints 
such as in violation of debt covenants, has been cut out of usual source of capital, is renegotiating 
debt payments, is forced to reduce investment because of liquidity problems. Example of 
statements coded as 5 include: “Under the terms of the company’s banking agreement, the 
company must meet certain stated financial covenants. As at January 31, 2002, the company was 
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not in compliance with the cash coverage covenant. The company is currently re-negotiating its 
credit facilities with the bank as well as looking at alternative sources of financing.” 
Now we aggregate these five categories to a single overall financial constraint group. The 
five mutually exclusive groups are: not financially constrained (NFC), likely not financially 
constrained (LNFC), potentially financially constrained (PFC), likely financially constrained 
(LFC), and financially constrained (FC). A firm belongs to NFC group if it has at least one 
statement coded as a 1 and no statement coded below a 2. These are firms that indicate more than 
sufficient liquidity and no evidence to the contrary. A firm belongs to LNFC group if its 
statements are only coded as 2s. These are firms that indicate sufficient liquidity with no 
statements of excessive liquidity and no statements indicating any weakness. A firm with mixed 
information about their constraint status belongs to the PFC group. An example is a firm that has 
a statement coded as 2 or better (indicating financial strength), but also has a statement coded as 3 
or worse (indicating possible financial weakness). The firm also belongs to the PFC group if all 
of its statements are coded as 3. A firm belongs to the LFC group if at least one statement is 
coded as 4, no statement is coded as 5, and no statement is coded better than 3. These are firms 
that indicate some current liquidity problems, with no offsetting positive statement and no 
statement that is so severe that they are placed into the lowest (FC) category. Finally, a firm 
belongs to the FC group if at least one statement is coded as 5 and no other statement is coded 
better than 3. These are firms that clearly indicate the presence of constraints with no strong 
offsetting positive disclosures. 
 
 
